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Abstract
In this thesis I have a threefold purpose. Firstly, I will attempt to argue that the 
individual utterances agents make in natural language dialogue stem from specific 
beliefs, goals, and plans and that these interlock with those of other agents in the 
production of dialogue. I suggest that agents utilise syntactic, semantic, pragmatic and 
contextual knowledge in this process. Furthermore, that these elements contribute to 
the utterances speakers make and hearers interpret in the pursuit of their individual 
goals, and cannot be treated separately. I will suggest that utterances, being intentional 
behaviour, are sub-components of plans to achieve specific communicative purposes. 
Following from this, I will present a descriptive model showing how the beliefs and 
goals of agents contribute to the composing of a logical form for an utterance prior to 
its syntactic representation. It is suggested that the logical form of an utterance, is 
composed of elements relating to the agent's beliefs and goals, and includes pragmatic 
and contextual elements and that these are present prior to the utterance being made and 
predispose the choice of eventual syntactic components. I do not attempt to model the 
syntactic form of the utterances but limit the model of the agents to a display to each 
other of their logical forms and show how these might be interpreted and elicit 
responses from the hearer in furtherance of their goals. My third purpose is to present 
a hand-simulated process of this model, to demonstrate how a particular dialogue 
might be constructed by two agents. This is attempted by ascribing a set of beliefs to 
them and providing them with specific goals. In the final chapter, the achievements 
and inadequacies of this research are summarised, and possible improvements and 
developments suggested in the context of current and future directions.
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Chapter 1 - Setting parameters
1.1 Research Aims
This thesis describes research aimed at a theoretical framework for a computer 
model of natural language dialogue. It has been designed as a theoretical preliminary 
to future implementations of dialogue systems.
The aim of this study is to make some attempt at understanding how conversation 
might work and to delineate some of the elements required by a model of conversation 
between two or more people. Following from this it might be possible to discover 
characteristics as to how some aspects of conversation might be organised and 
structured.
The motivation for this research stems from the necessity to discover the 
psychological processes operating in the behaviour of dialogue and to facilitate greater 
ease in man-machine interaction.
1.2 Introduction
Conversation involves an interchange between two or more people in which each 
participant may produce more than one utterance. Each of these contributions build 
upon previous contributions either directly or indirectly (Hoey 1983: 1) and this 
characteristic implies that talk between people is organized. However, when one 
comes to analyse a piece of dialogue it becomes apparent that we take a great deal for 
granted without thinking very deeply about what is happening. Some idea of the 
problems encountered can be obtained when listening to a conversation in an unknown 
language. A steady stream of verbal sounds are emitted by the speakers which are 
unintelligible and are perceived to be unsegmented. For example, the last phrase, if 
heard by someone who didn't understand English might hear it as a continuous stream 
such as, 'andareperceivedtobeunsegmented'. We realize that our own stream of 
conversation is perceived in this manner by persons who do not understand our 
language.
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Language is never truly continuous, for to convey discrete meanings there has to 
be discrete units. One of the primary obstacles in learning a new language is 
deciphering the code which involves finding out what the units are. At the lowest level 
there are distinctive but meaningless sounds which combine into what we call 
syllables. Above this level are words and parts of words such as prefixes and suffixes 
and above this level is the level of syntax which again is a complex of levels in itself.
Language therefore is hierarchic and as each level is examined it gets larger and 
somewhat more difficult to decide what the structure is supposed to be. Alongside 
these structural aspects of language are those characteristics relating to meaning - its 
semantic content. Also, those aspects dealing with language in use - pragmatics and 
aspects of context that contribute to interpretation and understanding.
This stratification of language provides humans with an unlimited means of 
resource-fulness for communicating ideas, actions, hopes, feelings, desires, emotions 
and so on.
Conversation can be markedly different from written text It can be characterized 
by false starts, hesitations and repairs. Conversation can contain verbal gestures which 
convey meaning and are purposive and which do not appear in written texts. Some of 
the audible gestures can be called lexical and closely resemble words, so much so, that 
some people regard the audible gestures as ’real words’. For example, some have 
standard spellings such as ’uh-huh’ which can stand for ’yes’; huh? for ’what?’; and 
’hmn’ for ’I’m unsure’. It is possible to hear a conversation between two people 
which is coherent and understandable but which when recorded and transcribed into a 
written form can appear to be disjointed, full of interruptions and hesitations, 
seemingly, disorganized and without structure.
Conversation is an activity that all of us participate in, probably every day of our 
lives. We do it with ease and for the most part we do not give much thought to it, 
language being such a normal and taken-for-granted characteristic of human existence. 
On reflection then, it is all the more staggering that this most common and seemingly 
mundane activity has no good theory to explain and demonstrate how it actually
works. This is all the more disconcerting when it is considered how much effort, 
research, thinking, writing and experimentation has been devoted to attempts to 
understand language and to construct a plausible theory. It is a problem to which the 
minds of some of the most eminent scholars have been applied, not only in the fields 
of linguistics and grammar but also from the domains of philosophy, psychology, and 
sociology. So wide and so exhaustive has been the investigation into language that it 
has given rise to several new areas of language research - psycholinguistics, 
sociolinguistics, neurolinguistics and linguistic aphasiology.
An initial reaction to the vast body of research relating to the study of language 
might be to think that Uttle further original contributions could be made to the subject 
and that most of the knotty problems had already been debated and solved. Unless the 
would-be-researcher has more than a cursory interest in the subject she might be 
tempted to choose a more limited domain for research and study. Initial reactions 
though, can be misleading. Any serious student of language comes to realize fairly 
quickly that although much research into the subject has been done, it has not given 
rise to any comprehensive or coherent theory that can be used to explain and 
demonstrate how language works.
It is true that there are many theories about specific aspects of language, some of 
which help us to understand better what a complete theory of language would need to 
include and explain. But no theory exists which incorporates the essential 
characteristics of language into a coherent and consistent theory that could be exposed 
to empirical testing and validation.
The study of language then constitutes a vast field. Although much is known, 
much more seems to be hidden and the ’tip-of-the-iceberg" metaphor seems apt in 
describing what has been achieved and what still needs to be discovered. It is not the 
aim of this work to provide a comprehensive, coherent explanatory theory. That would 
simply be pretentious in the present state of knowledge. The domain is large and if 
advances in understanding are to be made, they are likely to be best achieved by 
tackling specific and limited areas of the subject for some time to come.
Conversation is only one particular facet of language. As already noted, it is a 
major characteristic that all of us are very familiar with and more or less take for 
granted. Unless asked to explain it, we are likely to think that we know how it works 
and that there is little that needs to be explained. It is only when we start to ask 
questions about what is actually happening in a conversation or in a dialogue and how 
the participants manage to make sense of each other, that we begin to understand the 
complexity of the phenomenon.
1.3 The problem
Some of the following questions serve to identify the difficulties confronting the 
researcher within the domain of conversation.
When a person directs a question or a comment at another person how does the 
other person know what is expected of them? How does the hearer know whether the 
speaker wants some information or simply to say something? How do they know what 
to reply and what to include in their reply, even whether the utterance needs a reply? 
Moreover, how does the speaker know that by asking a question she might further her 
goals and obtain the information or services required?
How does the speaker know how to formulate her utterance so that the hearer can 
understand and how does the hearer understand anyway? Indeed, how does the 
speaker know that the hearer has understood her utterance? How does the hearer know 
what reply to make out of all the possible replies that might be relevant or appropriate? 
How do words convey meaning in the manner in which they appear to? How does a 
biological organism such as the brain manipulate ideas, concepts, information and how 
does it store this knowledge without which, language wouldn't work?
This list of questions and problems is cursory and incomplete but does provide a 
flavour to the kinds of problems the researcher into conversation needs to address and 
for which a theory of language would have to account for.
My aim in this thesis is not to resolve or provide solutions to all the foregoing 
questions, each of which could possibly be the subject of a thesis in its own right, but
to focus on what might be some of the chief characteristics of the dialogue process. In 
doing so, some hints and insights as to tentative solutions to some of the problems 
might be discovered.
1.4 Motivations
The theoretical premise underlying this work is that utterances are generated and 
interpreted as a consequence of participants pursuing their individual goals and 
purposes. These goals are the result of participants holding certain beliefs which are 
pursued by the carrying out of plans. Communication is interaction between one or 
more participants and the process of dialogue is the manner in which each participant 
achieves their individual goals.
A major limitation of many previous models is that they often model only one 
participant of the interaction or that the interaction takes place between a computer 
program and a human operator. Power’s (1974) model appears to be one of the few 
exceptions to this and one in which two robots are modelled within a communicative 
task (2.2.2).
What seems to be assumed in many models is that if one participant is modelled, 
usually the speaker, then the other participant is assumed to operate in the same 
manner and is generally referred to as a passive listener, seemingly without 
communicative goals of their own. Explanations in such models give account of how 
the speaker’s utterances are interpreted by the hearer.
This is a useful approach and one which has produced valuable insights. It is 
possibly the approach that is usually adopted because it helps to simplify the processes 
involved and makes the explanations less cumbersome. It is an approach most 
characteristic of language understanding systems. Nevertheless, it does have its 
limitations as it is a perspective that vests the speaker with the motivation, 
communicative goals and plans and generally attributes the hearer with a passive 
recipient role.
A model of dialogue needs to account for the roles of both participants and be able 
to specify the interaction between the participants and how each achieves their goals 
(or otherwise) simultaneously in the communicative encounter.
The view taken here is that it is essential to consider the intentions, goals, plans 
and communicative acts of both participants and how they interact together. Each 
participant is viewed as achieving goals within the interaction but in a process of 
dialogue. Only by explaining this process more specifically wiU it be possible to 
delineate a more realistic model of dialogue. This view accords with much recent work 
on discourse and discourse structure relating to intent recognition.
Cohen (1984: 97) has concluded that intent recognition wiU need to be a central 
focus for pragmatics and discourse components of future speech understanding 
systems and argues that computational linguistics wiU need to develop formalisms for 
reasoning about speakers' use of descriptions. Grosz & Sidner (1986: 175) propose a 
theory of discourse that stresses the role of purpose and processing in discourse and 
suggest that the structure of discourse is composed of three separate but interrelated 
components; linguistic structure - intentional structure - and - attentional structure.
This work is best described as falling within a 'performance' model of language. 
Chomsky made a distinction between 'competence' - a person's tacit knowledge and 
understanding of grammatical rules, and 'performance' - how a person uses language 
in practice (Chomsky, 1965: 10). Increasingly, as a result of generative grammar 
being unable to provide further understanding into language, the usefulness of this 
distinction has been called into question. Many researchers have recognised that a 
solely syntactical approach to language understanding is impossible and that pragmatic 
information which is not itself essentially linguistic, is necessary for language 
understanding (Robinson & Moulton, 1985: 2).
The approach adopted here is that use of language is so closely entwined with 
knowledge of language that any coherent theory needs to explain how knowledge 
gives rise to practice and that the competence/performance distinction no longer serves 
a useful purpose (cf Bara & Guida, 1984: 3; Kintsch, 1974: 3).
1.5 Original contribution
The model of dialogue presented here is of two or more participants who interact 
together in dialogue to achieve their individual goals and purposes. Each participant 
has a set of goals and a plan by which to achieve these goals and also a set of beliefs 
which provide the motivation for their plan and goals. The idea behind this model is 
that as participants pursue their individual plans and goals in a communicative 
encounter and as an outcome of their beliefs then dialogue ensues.
What is original about this idea is that both participants to the dialogue are pursuing 
different objectives and goals. They do not adopt the goal of the other participant 
which is a characteristic of many other models which incorporate planning and goal 
elements, but pursue their own plan and objective but within a cooperative framework 
and in so doing, produce dialogue. The resulting structure and organisation of this 
dialogue reflects the original goals and plans of the participants.
The emphasis then is not on individual utterances taken in isolation, neither is it on 
a conversation that has taken place and presented for analysis. The focus attempted 
here seeks to present some aspects that might contribute to a plausible model of some 
of the processes that might be involved when two or more people participate in 
dialogue.
The way in which this is achieved is that the participants within the model are 
viewed as being equal parties to the communicative encounter. They alternate as 
speakers and hearers depending on whether they are pursuing a goal or waiting for one 
to be to be satisfied. Each of them have a limited set of beliefs, a goal to achieve and a 
plan by which to achieve the goal. Both participants possess similar knowledge 
structures and routines which enable them to realise their communicative goals.
This research can be viewed as complementing Power's (1974) work. His work 
was unique in that it was one of the first to attempt a model of conversation employing 
the concepts of plans and goals for its two participants, characterised as robots. 
Regrettably, his work and focus does not appear to have been popular or to have been 
extended but nevertheless, remains a pertinent focus for research. A modest claim of
this work is that it places a similar and equal focus on both roles within a dialogue thus 
permitting important insights to be made about the nature of conversation and the 
dialogue process.
While Power's model was limited to two robots cooperating together on a very 
simple task within a limited domain (sliding a bolt and opening a door), the model 
exemplified here is applied to more natural and less structured domains. These are a 
sales scenario between a bookseller and a customer, a negotiation between union and 
management representatives; and a classroom encounter between a student and teacher.
It is not my intention to present a model which can explain all aspects of 
conversation and dialogue. Conversation can range from the highly structured and 
controlled such as that which characterises a court room scene to that which appears to 
have little or no structure such as the 'chit-chat' experienced at parties or over the 
garden fence. My intention is to model some of the characteristics involved in task 
oriented dialogues where the domains might be natural but are highly constrained by 
the task focus. The emphasis of this work is on the entities and processes involved 
such as beliefs, plans and goals. Given a different set of beliefs, plans and goals for 
each participant, the model should be extendable to other domains and might lend itself 
to less structured and more fluid conversational encounters.
The model itself uses 'frame-like structures' to contain the belief and knowledge 
entities of the participants and some of the processes within the model such as plan- 
methods. A trace through the model describes the dialogue process from the formation 
of a 'plan' for each of the participant's 'goals' through to the display of each utterance 
until each participant's goal is acliieved or aborted and die dialogue completed.
Having identified the research task, and before going further it is necessary to 
review briefly the varying fields of study relating to the study of conversation and its 
analysis. By doing so, the present work will be placed within the general field of study 
and a context identified.
1.6 A brief overview of tbe field of study
Within the study of natural language, conversation analysis is one of the fastest 
growing and developing fields. In the last fifteen years numerous papers and books 
have been written describing various models and their particular virtues.
There are several differing approaches to the study of conversation analysis and its 
organization and while a superficial comparison of these approaches would suggest 
that they are quite distinct, the different approaches have some common characteristics 
which suggest, that on a deeper level of study they resemble each other in their overall 
conception.
Taylor & Cameron (1987) have made a critical survey of the field and deal with a 
small selection of the models currently popular. The differing approaches appear to fall 
into one of five categories or is a variation on one of those categories. The five main 
approaches to conversation analysis are: the models of the social psychologists; those 
emanating from the 'Birmingham school' and described as 'exchange structure' 
models (Coulthard, 1984; Coulthard & Montgomery, 1981); the approach derived 
from H. Paul Grice and the pragmatists and based on principles and maxims (Grice,. 
1957,1968,1975; Leech, 1983; Levinson, 1983); the ethnomethodological models of 
conversation analysis (Douglas, 1973; Garfinkel, 1967, 1974; Sacks, Schegloff and 
Jefferson, 1973) and those of the 'speech act' theorists (Austin, 1962: Searle, 1969).
Other significant approaches to the study of language have come from cognitive 
psychology, cognitive science and computational linguistics.
From the '40's there had been a developing interest in information technology and 
considerable theorizing on how information could be processed by machinery 
(Shannon, 1948). This interest in information processing developed along with the 
theory of computers and their invention. The theories in these fields had their impact 
on psychology and led psychologists to focus much more attention on the processes of 
the mind. The theory and development of computers provided the discipline with a 
powerful metaphor by which the processes of the mind could be described and 
possibly explained. The psychological processes which enabled people to cope and
deal with incoming stimuli from the world around them were to be envisaged in terms 
of computational calculations and information processing.
1.7 The theoretical underpinnings for this research
The model of dialogue presented here falls within the approaches of cognitive 
psychology and information processing theories of mind. It is therefore influenced by 
the insights and understanding derived from the disciplines of cognitive science and 
computational linguistics and of the computer metaphor in general. Cognitive science 
and the computational model of mind are not without their critics and therefore it is 
necessary to discuss some of these criticisms in greater detail and to show more 
explicitly the theoretical under-pinning and impetus for this research and its place 
generally within the field.
1.7.1 Information processing models
The focus of the information processing approach is that human beings are 
processors of information and that their subsequent actions and decisions result from 
this mental activity (Howell, 1982: 3; Lindsay & Norman, 1972; Pylyshyn, 1980: 
111; Reason, 1988: 36). An important aspect of this type of theorizing and modelling 
is to assemble what is known or suspected, into a general model of human 
performance. A typical model is described by Howell (1982: 4) and which is briefly 
described here.
Information is received from the environment and processed by the sense systems. 
It is interpreted by perceptual mechanisms the operations of which are dependent on 
previously stored information. Following perception, information is translated by 
other mechanisms into a plan of action that is then implemented through the effectors 
or motor control mechanisms. Information from the subsequent response is fed back 
to the system for purposes of adjustment, revision and learning. The component 
processes of such a system are those of sensing, perceiving, attending, remembering
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and translating and response selection. A diagram of Howell's block model is shown 
in Figure 1.1.
Some of the earlier models portrayed information as passing through a series of 
structures and buffers, in which processes dealt with the information as it were 
passing through a pipeline. One of the problems with this type of model was that the 
processes that went on in the buffers or 'black boxes' were ill-defined or not explained 
at all. Reason (1988: 38) cites Neisser's caricature of such one-way sequence models 
labelling them as, 'processing', 'more processing' and 'still more processing'. 
Nevertheless, these models helped to identify the basic issues facing cognitive theory 
and to identify the components that any comprehensive model would have to account 
for. Some of the later models, as discussed by Reason (ibid.) seek to overcome the 
unexplained 'black box' structures of the earlier pipeline models.
The basic issues confronting cognitive theory concern the type of memory system 
and whether it is a unitary or modularized structure. Whether tiie processing is 
localized to a central area or whether it is distributed more widely throughout the 
system. Also, the manner in which the permanent knowledge structures are 
represented and organized. Tliere are also issues about control processes. Most models 
distinguish implicitly or explicitly between controlled and conscious processing or 
automatic and unconscious processing. Or control is described as being a complex 
interplay between the two modes. Reason points out that some theorists locate 
attentional or controlled processing within a restricted 'work-space' of the cognitive 
system, and that a bulk of cognitive processing is done automatically by numerous 
specialized processors that are not 'switched' off but remain in varying states of 
activation in order that activation can be received from other sources other than the 
limited work-space (Reason, 1988: 43-47).
Tills discussion of information processing models is brief but serves to provide a 
context for this research and to identify some of the issues which this work is 
concerned with.
1 1
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1.7.2 The computational view of mind
The computational view of mind rests on a number of intuitions relating to 
fundamental similarities between computation and cognition (Pylyshyn, 1980: 111). 
These intuitions are derived from the fact that both human organisms and computers 
are physical systems whose behaviour can be described as being governed by rules 
acting on symbolic representations. One of the basic assumptions behind this approach 
is that cognitive processes can be understood in terms of formal operations carried out 
on symbol structures. Pylyshyn argues that certain types of behaviour such as beliefs, 
tacit knowledge, goals etc., are determined by symbolic representations and that it is 
this characteristic that suggests that mental activity is computational. He argues that if 
computation can be viewed as an abstract symbolic process that transforms formal 
expressions that are in turn interpreted in some other domain of representation such as 
numbers, then -
"...the view that mental processes are computational can be just as 
literal as the view that what IBM computers do is properly viewed as 
computation". (Pylyshyn, 1980; 115)
Pylyshyn argues that this view entails that mental activity can be viewed literally as 
the execution of algorithms. He sees the modelling of cognitive processes as 
proceeding in two phases. The first is to emulate the functional architecture of the mind 
and the second is to execute the hypothetical cognitive algorithm on i t  The algorithm is 
viewed as representing a literal proposal for the structure of tiie mental process (ibid.).
The computational view of mind has generated considerable controversy 
(Aanstoos, 1987; Dreyfus, 1972; Searle, 1980,1984). Both Searle and Dreyfus reject 
the computational view of mind and strongly criticise Artificial Intelligence (AI), its 
goals and program, which they view as being the vanguard of the theory.
Searle makes a distinction in his criticisms between strong AI and weak AI. He 
equates the strong AI view with the brain being likened to a digital computer and the
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mind being likened to a computer program and described in a terminology of literally 
having thoughts and feelings (Searle, 1984: 43). He argues that 'cognitivism' or 
cognitive science has arisen to fill a gap between the brain and the mind which he calls 
the mind-body problem or how the mind relates to the brain. His thesis is that in reality 
there is no gap and that the mind and the body interact and are not two different things. 
Mental phenomena are simply features of the brain. (Searle, 1984: 26). He goes on to 
pose the question as to whether computers can think and concludes his discussion 
firmly in the negative. The reasons being that only brains can cause minds and that 
computer programs work on the basis of syntax and procedural rules whereas the 
mind has more than a syntax; it is also characterised by having a semantic content as 
well.
Furthermore, Searle sees the mind as being characterised by certain intractable 
aspects, such as 'intentionality' and 'consciousness' both of which are not possessed 
by computers. He accepts that cognitive science also sees the computer as the right 
picture of the mind and not simply as a metaphor but which is different to strong AI as 
it doesn't, or doesn't have to claim that computers literally have thoughts and feelings 
(Searle, 1984: 43). His interpretation of the cognitive science research program is that 
thinking is viewed as the processing of information and that information processing is 
simply symbol manipulation. By this approach, the best way to study thinking is to 
study computational symbol-manipulating programs, whether they are in computers or 
in the brain.
The task of cognitive science from this view is to characterize the brain at the level 
of its functioning as an information processing unit rather than at the level of nerve 
cells and axons or of conscious mental states. Computer programs are useful 
therefore, for modelling ideas about mental processes. Model programs can be 
constructed and tested and if they work certain assumptions can be made that mental 
processes might work like the programs that have been formed as simulations of their 
functions. This, according to Searle, is the cognitive simulation view but Dreyfus
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appears to question even whether this type of research program can have any value in 
it (Dreyfus, 1972: xxxv).
Christopher Aanstoos presents a critique of the computational model of thought 
from the thinking and writings of Merleau-Ponty (Aanstoos, 1987) The main thrust of 
his contribution is that aU thinking is like all consciousness, that is, that it is 
fundamentally situated in a context or is 'worlded*. According to Merleau-Ponty, to be 
worlded is to be engaged or involved in situations:
"thereby grasping them from within this involvement with them." 
(Aanstoos, 1987: 190).
In this view, human rationality is rooted in human presence father than being 
absolute or detached and because thinking is always situated in the human context it is 
thus 'perspectival'. Aanstoos defines this aspect of Merleau-Ponty's thought as 
follows:
"...thinking is perspectival, yet its very perspectivity provides thinking 
its launching, its movement beyond the givens to the latent horizons of 
possibility and, through them, to further possibles which they imply" 
(Aanstoos, 1987:192)
One of the difficulties of much psychological theorizing in the past was that it 
either had to be accepted or rejected on the basis of its subjective plausibility and this 
judgement had to be made by the reader or audience. There were either none or very 
few ways of rigourously testing some of these ideas. The ideas of Merleau-Ponty on 
'perspectival thinking' indicated above helps to illustrate the point that is being made. 
The ideas sound very fine and plausible but can such ideas ever be tested? Why 
should we accept Merleau-Ponty's ideas rather than any others? Can these form the
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basis of hypotheses that might contribute to a comprehensive and coherent theory of 
mind? Maybe, but hardly in their present nebulous and subjective form.
Whilst being aware of the deficiencies of the information processing approach the 
question is begged whether a more worthwhile direction could be pursued. 
Regrettably, there doesn't appear to be one that either promises to be so rewarding or 
to provide the necessary insights. The question has been asked as to where 
psychologists are to turn for a more complex theory? (Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976: 
118). Miller & Johnson-Laird answer their own question and their sentiments with 
respect to this debate form part of the motivation and justification for this work:
"If one hopes to characterize the psychological processes themselves, 
the most promising source of ideas rich enough to capture the 
architecture of this system is the modem theory of information 
processing. Hypotheses formulated in terms of information processing 
may also prove inadequate or inappropriate to the task, but they are the 
best available in our present state of knowledge. We see no feasible 
alternative for psycholinguistic theory but to pursue these ideas as far 
as possible" (Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976: 118)
I do not intend to prolong the discussion further and have raised these issues here 
to indicate that the information processing approach as it is influenced and dominated 
by the computational model of thought is not without criticism. Some of the criticisms 
arc a serious challenge both to some of the premises of artificial intelligence and 
cognitive science and may turn out to be correct Nevertheless, a premise on which 
this work is conducted is that the view that human beings can be considered as 
information processing systems provides a fertile domain for questioning, examining 
and testing the ideas put forward about mental processes.
The model presented here comes within the framework of cognitive psychology. 
However, both the information processing and artificial intelligence approaches have
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more than a bearing on this work and provide an orientation for thinking about and 
testing these ideas more explicitly. Whilst a working computer program producing a 
sequence of dialogue could be a useful objective, the theory underlying such a 
program is likely to be more important and this work attempts to provide some 
aspects of such a theory. The emphasis of this research is therefore on the 
development of theory and the specification of the problem rather than details relating 
to implementation.
Constmcting a model of dialogue is a mammoth project involving most aspects of 
language, both understanding and processing. Initial plans and ideas in a research 
project undergo continual revision and given the constraints of time and resources, 
research programs have to be modified. The model presented here is not a working 
program as its processes are hand simulated. Nevertheless, the discipline of 
specifying dialogue as a process has been applied to aspects of the model and have 
served to identify problems, improve theory and clarify thinking. This work 
therefore, can be seen as a preliminary exploration of a theory of dialogue to be 
implemented as a possible program in a future research task.
1.8 The use of models in scientific research
Reference has been made on several occasions in this introductory chapter to the 
term 'model'. It is necessary to define explicitly what is meant by the term and 
particularly, how it relates to this work.
The building and constructing of models in order to understand something or to 
see how something might work is not a new phenomenon and has been an activity 
that has been resorted to down through the ages. The research literature reveals a 
plentiful source of metaphors and models that help to illuminate and provide 
understanding of otherwise complex theories. For example, Robinson & Moulton 
(1985: 8) borrow an old model to describe their modem 'scope and dependency' 
theory of language cognition. This is described in terms of an orrery, a clockwork 
mechanism devised to represent the motions of the planets about the sun and named
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after Charles Boyd, Earl of Orrery for whom it was made in 1713.^ In their theory, 
the orrery is used to describe the essential features of concepts in an idea which is a 
prelinguistic structure and how they relate to each other. Though the model is simple 
the force of it is quite powerful.
In the previous discussion, reference has been made to information processing 
models and computer models of thought. In fact, the computer metaphor has become 
one of the richest metaphors for constructing models in the area of cognitive 
psychology and so used are we to this kind of terminology, it is very easy to take the 
practice much for granted without explaining what sort of model it is we are using and 
what can be expected of it. Some researchers do discuss the use and value of models 
within scientific research and engineering (Black, 1962; Hollnagel, 1988; Wahlstrom, 
1988) and it is necessary, to consider some of the presuppositions and implications of 
this practice in relation to this work.
Max Black in his essay. Models and Archetypes (1962) identifies four types of 
model all of which have problems relating to their use and value: scale models, 
analogue models, mathematical models and theoretical models.
The purpose behind scale models is to reproduce selected details and features of 
the original to make it more accessible and to bring the original down to a more 
workable level. We might want to know how a new airport is going to fit into the 
environment or what impact a new office block might have on the landscape of a town 
and so a scale model is reproduced to mirror the essential features of the envisaged 
original. A major difficulty with this type of model is that any inferences that are 
drawn from model to original are "intrinsically pi^carious" and it is normally necessary 
to require validation and correction from other sources (Black, 1962: 221).
Analogue models involve a change of medium and can be defined as some material 
object, system or process which is designed faithfully to reproduce the structure of 
relationships in the original. Once again. Black argues that this too is a model that
1 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987 edition.
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requires independent validation for the following reason. Inferences made from the 
point-by-point correspondence of relationships of original to model can give rise to all 
sorts of irrelevancies and distortions which are presented in an aggravated measure in 
the model (ibid: 223).
He treats the question of mathematical models at some length and examines their 
use among social scientists who speak about ’mapping' an 'object system' upon a 
'mathematical system or model'. In this context the original field of thought is 
projected upon the abstract domain of the mathematical theory and the resulting 
'model' is viewed as being more simpler and abstract from which to extrapolate 
inferences. Black points out that it is important to remember that this sort of 
mathematical treatment does not furnish explanations and can be expected to do no 
more than draw consequences from the original assumptions. The danger of making 
simplifications for the needs of success in the mathematical analysis can entail:
"a serious risk of confusing accuracy of the mathematics with strength 
of empirical verification of the original field" (ibid: 225).
Mathematical models, scale models and analogue models differ substantially from 
theoretical models. Black argues that both scale and analogue models have to be put 
together but that the architect's 'hypothetical' model is nothing at aU and the imaginary 
analogue models will not show us how things are likely to work in the real world.
The difference between these models and a theoretical model is that the theoretical 
model is not literally constructed but its value and strength consists in a certain "way 
of talking" (ibid: 229). This type of model does not have to be constructed and needs 
only to be described. This brings with it certain advantages as well as limitations for 
the model builder. Whilst she may not be distracted by irrelevant rclationships and 
properties of the model, it does deprive the model builder of the discipline of actually 
constructing a model and of the inherent controls in this process. One of the difficulties 
of working with a theoretical model is that without independent tests or means of
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verification, inconsistencies can develop between elements of the model. There is then 
a danger of making inappropriate assumptions.
Black suggests that there are formidable risks to be taken in using theoretical 
models and that any particular model may amount to nothing more than:
"a strained and artificial description of a domain sufficiently known 
otherwise" (ibid: 237).
However, he argues that the use of metaphor can often be valuable in achieving 
insight and that the role of models in scientific research have a similar value to the use 
of metaphor and the role of imagination in‘literary endeavour. In fact, he views 
imagination as being one of the most powerful factors in aU research:
"For science, like the humanities, like literature, is an affair of the 
imagination" (ibid: 242-243).
The "way of talking" associated with the theoretical model involves the 
imagination. Though there are risks in this type of theorizing such models can often 
help us to see and make new connections.
This cursory review of Black's stimulating essay does not do justice to his ideas 
and arguments but some of the most salient points are used here to illustrate the nature 
and use of models in scientific research and some of the problems associated with this 
method. The purpose of tliis discussion fur the present work is to identify the sort of 
model which is being constructed here.
My work can be categorized as a theoretical model and is motivated by the 
principles, as identified by Black, on which this type of model is put forward. 
However, imagination has not been allowed unlimited freedom as some attempt has 
been made to test and validate elements and relationships within the model for the 
purpose of self-consistency. This has been achieved in some measure by imposing
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certain constraints on the model. That is, the model must be viewed as a process that is 
computable and lends itself to explanation in computable terms or is able to be 
implemented as a computer program. This has not always resulted in success but the 
problems encountered are identified and discussed as well as the insights and 
connections that can be made from it
1.9 Preliminary definitions
Up until now I have used a number of terms such as conversation and dialogue 
without defining them and it is necessary to define how terms are to be used in this 
thesis. The term dialogue is not frequently used within the literature and not generally 
defined when it is, nevertheless, it is used as a descriptor for some models and also as 
a term for describing conversation. The terms most generally used are 'conversation', 
'discourse', 'text', 'speech' and 'talk'. In much of the research which relates to the 
study of spoken interaction, most studies assume the reader to have a knowledge of 
what conversation is. Being the primary basis between persons for direct social 
interaction, conversation is assumed to be self explanatory and not usually requiring 
more specific definition. For example, Allen & Guy intioducing tire subject of 
Conversational Analysis describe it in the following terms:
"Conversation is the primary basis of direct social relations between 
persons. As a process occurring in relative time, conversation 
constitutes a reciprocal and rhythmic interchange of verbal emissions. It 
is a sharing process which develops a common bond" (Allen & Guy,
1974: 11).
The study of conversation and dialogue comes within the boundaries of 'discourse 
analysis', a term initially coined by Harris (1952: 355) for the study of text and which 
continues to be used through to the present day (Hoey, 1983: 34; Stubbs, 1983: 1). 
However, Harris, Hoey, Stubbs and others use the term fairly broadly to label modes
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of study that often are at variance with one another. Stubbs (1983: 1) makes the point 
that the term 'discourse analysis' is somewhat ambiguous and suggests that generally, 
it refers to attempts to study the organization of language above the sentence or the 
clause and therefore its focus is on larger linguistic units such as conversational 
exchanges and written text.
Stubbs uses the term 'discourse analysis' in the sense of referring to the linguistic 
analysis of "naturally occurring connected spoken or written discourse" (Stubbs, 
1983: 1). Though he admits that the use of the terms 'text' and 'discourse' which are 
used within the wider term of 'discourse analysis' are both ambiguous and confusing, 
he does not draw any firm distinction between the two.
Van Dijk (1977: 3) draws a very clear distinction between 'text' and 'discourse', 
regarding 'text' as an abstract and theoretical unit underlying what is usually termed a 
'discourse'. In this usage 'discourse' is viewed as a 'text' that has been externalized 
by an author, in the sense of it being in a spoken or written form.
None of these distinctions are very useful for present purposes and as I am not 
concerned with 'text linguistics' per se I do not propose to use any of these definitions 
and will not discuss this further. I will use the term 'utterance' to refer to a 
contribution made by a participant and the sequence of utterances between two 
participants as a 'dialogue', the latter term which is clarified below. A dialogue in its 
written form is called a dialogue-text
Crystal (1985: 96), in his Dictionary of Linguistics describes 'discourse' as a term 
used in linguistics to refer to a continuous stretch of language larger than a sentence, 
especially spoken language. Surprisingly, he has no entry for the term 'dialogue' and I 
can only assume from this omission that it is used less frequently both in general 
parlance and also in the literature, rather than any particular arguments against its use.
The Shorter Oxford Dictionarv (1987) has two meanings for the substantive use of 
the word 'dialogue' whereas for 'conversation' it has ten. The range of meanings for 
the latter include; - 'the action of living or having one's being in or among'; 'sexual 
intimacy'; 'behaviour or manner of life'; 'interchange of thought and words';
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'familiar discourse or talk', and so on. With such a range of different meanings it 
would seem that it was a term best avoided. Nevertheless, it is a term which has a very 
common usage and therefore is easily understood. To avoid its usage in this study 
would pose some major difficulties as its use throughout the literature is extensive. I 
therefore, use the term 'conversation' when discussing the subject in general and in 
examining studies of other writers and researchers. Following from this, I use the term 
'interaction' to refer to the conversational exchanges which take place between 
particular participants.
My objective in this study is to model the spoken interaction between two or more 
people and attempt to specify how this might be achieved. Within the constraints of the 
model I do not wish to use the term 'discourse' as again, this has several technical and 
everyday meanings which include such senses as that of, 'speech', 'talk', 'narration', 
'a spoken or written treatment of a subject at length' and so on, which make it 
insufficiently tight as a concept for this study. For the specific purposes of both 
describing the model and discussing its objectives I use the more parsimonious 
meaning encapsulated in the term 'dialogue'. From its origin in Latin and Greek this 
word has gone through minor change, if any, and its primary meaning is appropriate 
for use when discussing the model at a later stage. It is simply, 'a conversation 
between two or more persons'.
The use of this term does not limit the model to describing the interaction of two 
people only as it is possible for the model to be extended to include other participants. 
What it does delineate is the boundaries within the interaction represented by this 
particular model. That is, 'dialogue' refers to only two speakers at a time whether it is 
speaker A with speaker B, or between speaker A and speaker C. Whilst to all intents 
and purposes such a scenario could be described as a general conversation, the focus 
of this study is on the links that are made between one speaker and one other at any 
one time. The contention of the model is that if these links can be demonstrated to be 
appropriate, cohesive and understandable then the total dialogue produced will 
demonstrate structure and be understandable in terms of beliefs, plans and goals. How
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many persons can be party to a conversation before coherence and cohesion begin to 
be strained depends on the participants, their goals and the material being discussed 
but which is not a matter that I need to address at this stage.
I am concerned with a model of natural language dialogue, so it is reasonable that I 
will have cause to refer to 'speakers', 'hearers', 'authors', and 'audiences'. I use the 
term 'speaker' to refer to the person who produces the utterance. The term 'hearer' 
refers to the one who is listening and seeking to understand the speaker. The roles of 
course are interchangeable within the flow of dialogue. To refer to a specific section of 
dialogue the term 'dialogue-text' wiU be used as previously noted. The term 'author' is 
used to refer to any specific utterance of the dialogue-text produced by that speaker. 
The term 'audience' is used to refer to one or more persons that are designated by the 
speaker to receive an utterance and who attempt to understand it
1.10 Why a model of dialogue?
The view of this study is that dialogue takes primacy over monologue whether 
written or spoken (Hoey, 1983: 27). I do not wish to denigrate in any manner the 
volume of important work that has been done in the area of monologue as many 
insights and much valuable knowledge has been gained from this field of study. But 
neglecting the study of dialogue is likely to limit advances to a more complete 
understanding of such an integral and common aspect of human interaction.
Rosenberg (1980: 11), has argued that natural language understanding with 
computers will require a greater understanding of the nature of human dialogue and 
makes the obseivation tliat tliere are no working systems that incorporate the spectrum 
of ideas relating to 'discourse analysis'. Regrettably, thirteen years on, this stUl seems 
to be the case and the necessity is more pressing than ever. Winograd (1980: 229), 
indicated that his work then, was moving towards the domain of human action and 
interaction and saw the utterance as being a linguistic act that has consequences for the 
participants, not only for their immediate actions but also to commitments for future 
action.
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This work is situated within a similar context of thinking about human action. 
Human dialogue is viewed as being a purposive, goal oriented activity which results 
from the beliefs and planning activity of its users.
An oft used metaphor is that it takes 'two to tango' and this applies to dialogue. An 
analysis of each partner's steps and arm movements in the 'tango* might provide a 
plausible and correct description of what was happening in this activity. It might be 
possible to construct individual models of both partners to see how both of them 
danced. This might be an appropriate way to start analyzing their actions but 
somewhere along the line the two models would have to be brought together to see 
whether their individual actions married together and became a true reflection of the 
'tango'. If they didn't, the interaction could be disastrous.
In language understanding we know much about the abilities of individual 
speakers and hearers but a model of them interacting together is a pressing 
requirement. The focus of this work is on that 'dance' which takes place between 
participants in a dialogue; how they each derive their goals and purposes from the 
interaction and the ways in which these are achieved. A comprehensive, coherent 
theory and model of dialogue is an imperative requirement and long overdue. Tliis: 
work does not claim to be that theory or model but a contribution to some of the 
elements and components that will be required by such a model. In that sense it is an 
exploratory foray into the issues at large.
1.11 A brief reader's guide
In the following chapters the elements required by such a model are identified.
• Chapter two explores the basic assumptions on which the theory and model is 
based and provides a review of the relevant literature and some previous 
research.
• Chapter three discusses the theory of rational interaction under-pinning the 
model and the theoretical elements required in such a theory.
2 5
• Chapter four forms the basis for the animated description of the model and 
identifies its components.
• Chapter five is a hand simulated trace of the model in action and traces the 
participant's goals through to their outcome in utterance form.
• In the last chapter the model is evaluated and its conclusions discussed. Also, 
relevant applications stemming from the research are noted and future research 
directions are identified.
-oOo-
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Chapter 2 - Minimal assumptions for the development of a model of
dialogue
A difficulty that a researcher is presented with in the domain of language is not 
only the extent of the source material she needs to be acquainted with but also the 
plethora of theories and ideas about language that have a bearing on the research topic. 
Existing theories and conclusions influence and guide the choice and design of any 
research that follows. Some basic assumptions underlie most, if not all research, 
having been derived from prior observations and findings and as a consequence 
influence both content and outcome of any project
Assumptions are not always clearly stated but it is an essential task of this project 
to identify the major themes and theories relevant to the area of study. What I wish to 
do in this chapter is first to set out the arguments for the minimal assumptions that
underlie the theory and model of dialogue presented in this thesis. Then to identify and
« . .
discuss related research and models of dialogue. Because the extent of the research 
and literature is so large the review presented here is limited to the purpose of setting 
the present research in context. The reader is referred to the report by George Kiss 
(1986) for a comprehensive and extensive review of work relating to high-level 
dialogue in man-machine interaction.
2.1 The six major assumptions underlying this work are:
1. The primary role of natural language is communicative.
2. Following from 1 conversation is purposive and rational 
behaviour.
3. Following from 1 and 2 conversation takes place within a 
social context and can be viewed as a cooperative activity.
4. Following from 2 and 3 conversation is characterised by 
regularities rather than rules or principles.
5. Following from 2, 3 and 4 conversation is intentional and
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plan-based behaviour.
6. Following from 4 and 5 conversation is inherently organized 
and structured.
2.1.1 Assumption 1 - The primary role of natural language is 
communicative
I am assuming that my reader will accept the assumption, that the primary role of 
natural language is communicative and without further justification or claims on my 
part other than an appeal to common understanding. In the present state of knowledge 
natural language is viewed as being a uniquely human activity which allows humans 
the capacity to communicate in a unique manner. As has already been noted (1: 9), 
conversation can be described as being "the primary basis of direct social relations 
between persons" (Allen & Guy, 1974: 11).
The primary role of natural language is to enable humans to communicate 
something about themselves and their experience to others. It is likely to have other 
functions but which I do not propose to address here.
2.1.2 Assumption 2 - Conversation is purposive and rational behaviour
One of the most human activities is that of talking to each other. Whatever term we 
use for this activity it relates to the everyday situations in which two or more people 
address each other for a period of time and communicate something of themselves to 
the other. People can use conversation to express their feelings and mood; to state their 
beliefs or doubts; to obtain information and knowledge and to convey feelings and 
attitudes. Conversation can be an instrument to obtain what is wanted and to express 
many dimensions of human experience. It appears to be a behaviour that is rational and 
purposive and which implies that participants use conversation in an organized and 
orderly manner to obtain and achieve goals.
The use of the word 'purposive' to describe conversation requires further 
explanation. Humans are aware of the characteristic of purposiveness and so are able
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to appreciate and alter their environment in an explicitly purposive manner. This they 
do by studying the environment and then imposing new forms upon i t  It is in this 
sense that I use the word 'purposiveness' in relation to conver^tional behaviour. The 
point of the argument is that when a human uses natural language in the 
communicative act she must be aware of two things. Firstly, the purposive nature of 
the instrument she is using and secondly, the objective or change in a particular 
environment which she seeks to achieve by using the instrument
2.1.3 Assumption 3 - Conversation takes place within a social context
Much research into language, including the study of conversation, often focuses 
only on the structural, grammatical and semantic characteristics. Within such a focus 
an assumption is often made that conversation consists of units, the sequencing of 
which are governed by some kind of rules. From this view, the major problem for the 
analyst or researcher, is to isolate and identify the units and rules which comprise 
conversation. Once this difficulty is resolved the process of conversation will then be 
open to explanation.
What is largely ignored in such a program, is tlie social context in which 
conversation takes place. A consequence of which is that we are often left with loose 
ends and some imponderables in our theories that simply do not fit together or match 
the empirical evidence. It needs to be emphasised that conversation is inextricably 
linked to a social context and any conversation or dialogue can only be properly 
understood in relation to the context in which it has taken place.
Every conversational contact is oriented toward some communicative goal which 
contributes to its continuity and which goals may be influenced or motivated by 
feelings and emotions or stem from obligations. While it is not my purpose to attempt 
to model these latter characteristics, it is accepted that they can have a motivating role 
within communicative interaction and that these factors help to influence and 
characterize the beliefs that lie behind a person's purposes and goals. It is the beliefs of
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the participants that form an integral part of the model presented here and it is 
acknowledged that beliefs are affected by these other more intangible characteristics.
Sociological perspectives of conversation and social interaction which focus on 
the wider context in which interaction takes place have contributed many important 
insights to our knowledge of language and its use. Among some of the studies referred 
to in the literature a particularly significant contribution is the work of Erving 
Goffman. He has made an analysis of the ritual elements that appear to be a part of 
social interaction, particularly face to face communication (Goffman, 1955: 213-231; 
and 1969).
His analysis of these ritual elements suggest that people have an attachment to a 
particular ’face’, face being an image a person has of themselves in terms of approved 
positive social attributes. A particular 'face' in interaction can be easily disconfirmed or 
confirmed and which is a reason that each participation in a contact is a commitment A 
person is assumed to have feelings for the face of others as well as one's self and the 
amount of feeling that one has for any face in particular is proscribed by the rules of 
the particular group and defined by the situation. When a person presents an image of 
themselves that is consistent and supported by the judgement of other participants she 
is said to be in face, to have or to maintain face. The line a person is maintaining 
within a contact is viewed as being of a legitimate institutionalized kind and the face 
presented is seen as being located in the flow of events rather than in, or on, the body 
of the person.
Some other researchers, including linguists and anthropologists have developed 
lines of enquiry from the ideas of Goffman and some of these argue that there are 
universals in language use that govern politeness phenomena and face threatening 
behaviour across cultures. Brown and Levinson have developed a more formal model 
of how this works in practice and use cross cultural examples to demonstrate their 
theory (Brown & Levinson, 1978; 1987). Labov & Fanshel (1977: 26), are 
researchers who confront the problem of emotions and obligations and adopt a view of 
conversation as a type of interaction which takes place within a social framework.
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They argue that the rights, duties and obligations of each partner within a conversation 
must be understood if we are to understand any specific discourse rules that might 
underlie conversation.
Furthermore, Halliday (1973, 1978) has drawn attention to the fact that speaking 
and understanding language always takes place in a context We do not "know' our 
language simply as an abstract system of vocal signals but in the sense of knowing 
how to use i t  The form of knowledge we have about language is knowing how to 
behave linguistically and knowing how to speak to other people. Embedded within this 
knowledge of how to use language is how to choose the forms of language that best 
serve our purposes in particular situations. We do not use language in isolation and 
Halliday has suggested that language comes to life only when functioning in an 
environment. It is used in scenarios that have a context, of persons, relationships, 
actions and events, those things from which meaning is said to derive. From this 
perspective language always has a 'context of situation' (ibid., 1973: 49). This basic 
concept was one originally suggested by Malinowski (1923) and subsequently 
elaborated by Firth (1957), both of whom appear to have had considerable influence 
on HaUiday's ideas.
Conversation then, takes place within a social context. The foregoing would 
indicate that participants to a conversation share in this social context to varying 
extents. That is, each of the participants hold beliefs about the context that forms a 
background or motivates their conversation. The extent to which participants share 
information about the context suggest that they have 'mutual knowledge'. 
Furthermore, the constraints that stem from the social context suggest that 
conversational activity has another dimension, which is that it can be viewed as a 
cooperative activity. Both ideas are important and discussed at length in the literature. 
It is necessary to discuss both concepts and how they will be used in this work.
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2.1.3.1 The problem of mutual knowledge
Communication requires a high degree of coordination between speaker and 
hearer both to the choice of language and context. An explanation of how this 
coordination is achieved is to use some notion which views the participants as 
'sharing' worlds together. For example, Cohen & Levesque (1980: 263) argue that in 
order to communicate, speakers must make their plans shared or public knowledge, 
following Schiffer's (1972: 144-148) argument that the recognition of intention must 
be mutually believed thereby avoiding an infinite regress of intending that one 
recognize an intention.
Hobbs & Robinson (1979: 316) make the point that normally, a speaker will 
choose the descriptions of entities involved in an utterance in such a way that the 
listener will easily be able to identify the entity referred to. That is, properties the 
listener knows about and words that are familiar to the listener are generally and ideally 
used by the speaker. In relation to this, Clark & Marshall (1981: 32) in their 
discussion of definite reference point out that to be "felicitous", a definite reference 
must use only properties in the speaker's and hearer's domain of mutual knowledge. 
However, Hobbs & Robinson (1979: 317) make the point that in actual performance 
speakers can be quite casual in choosing their descriptions because there is always an 
opportunity for repair.
The notions of 'mutual belief spaces' or 'mutual knowledge' are significant in 
this context and seem to be widely accepted without much criticism. However, 
Sperber & Wilson, (1986: 21), reject the construct of 'mutual knowledge' believing 
that it is untenable and has no counterpart in reality for the reason that the term itself is 
a misnomer. That is, that the knowledge that different agents have is peculiar to 
themselves and cannot be considered as being 'mutual' in the true sense of the word. 
Instead, they opt for a notion of 'mutual manifesmess'. They argue that an individual's 
total cognitive environment is the set of all the facts that she can perceive or infer - that 
is, all the facts that are manifest to her or are capable of being manifest to her.
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I do not intend to debate the issue as to whether the notion of 'mutual knowledge 
is an "empirically inadequate notion" (Sperber & Wilson, 1986: 38) but what I do 
wish to note is a characteristic that Sperber & Wilson acknowledge and that is, that the 
communication process itself gives rise to shared information. I do not intend to 
discuss the sense in which humans share information or the extent to which they share 
information about the information they share. What is important about this argument is 
that participants who share the same language and linguistic community, share a pool 
of knowledge in common with each other. Whilst they wiU have their own individual 
perceptions of this knowledge these perceptions will overlap sufficiently with those of 
others, to provide a common domain by which to make sense of each other’s 
utterances. It is in this sense that this work will use the term mutual knowledge' 
although the term 'shared information' will be preferred.
The interested reader is directed to the texts and related debate concerning 
Sperber & Wilson's ideas on this subject and to compare these with the views of 
Taylor and Cameron who argue that the similar principle of "intersubjectivity" should 
be abandoned (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, 1987; cf Levinson, 1989; and Taylor & 
Cameron, 1987:162). My purpose for introducing the subject of 'shared information' 
is that it is tied intimately to the model a person has of the other person's plans, 
intentions, beliefs and utterances and is therefore relevant to this work.
The other important concept arising from the social context of conversation and 
the allied idea of agents sharing knowledge and information together is that of 
'cooperation'.
2.1.3.2 The context of cooperation
Communication is a process that takes place between agents within a social 
context. Grice (1975) has suggested that the process of communication can generally 
be viewed as being a cooperative venture. It is necessary to explain what is meant by 
'cooperation' in this instance.
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Galliers (1989: 61) is particularly concerned with the concept and postulates a 
cooperative model of dialogue which acknowledges multi agent conflict Her views 
about the place of cooperation and conflict within dialogue differ from the present 
work and will provide a background for discussion as well as for defining the concept 
for use in this model.
Areas of artificial intelligence research which are concerned with multi-agent 
planning or joint problem-solving are faced with the issue of cooperation. Galliers 
(ibid: 61) argues that the principles of cooperation have not been rigidly worked out, 
neither are they explicitly expressed in these systems, whether they be human- 
computer interaction (HCI), or machines networked together as in distributed artificial 
intelligence (DAI). The thrust of Galliers' argument is that the concept of cooperation 
is generally assumed and is implicit in these systems and theories but whose emphasis 
is elsewhere. Her major contention is that there is a lack of recognition in existing 
work of the nature of conflict and that conflict is an important component of 
cooperation. Because of this deficiency, she argues that:
"...the existing notions of cooperation implicitly or explicitly 
incorporated in current artificial intelligence research on cooperative 
multi-agent systems, are simply inadequate to real-life application" 
(Galliers, 1989: 61).
As the model presented here is concerned with a real-life application of dialogue 
and ic extendable to multi-agent interaction this suggested deficiency in the research 
has a bearing on the present work.
The major criticism of Galliers to the accepted notion of cooperation which is 
implicitly encoded in much of the existing work, is that agents have a common goal 
and that assumptions of benevolence and helpfulness on the part of agents are made 
without any recognition of the place of conflict. This may in some cases involve each
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agent in a multi-agent system having a goal to achieve the same end result, but in other 
cases, an agent might take over the goal of another agent and pursue it as their own.
One view of cooperation that is sometimes adopted is that of sharing, where the 
agents who are in complete agreement to their goal, share the tasks necessary to 
achieve it (Galliers, ibid: 124). This view of cooperation incorporates the concepts of 
'helpfulness' and 'mutual consideration'. Allwood (1976) postulates a definition of 
ideal cooperation as:
"A number of interacting normal rational agents are said to be engaged 
in ideal cooperation to the extent that
1. they are voluntary striving to achieve the same 
purposes,
2. they are ethically and cognitively considering each 
other in trying to achieve these purposes,
3. they trust each other to act according to 1 and 2 unless 
they give each other explicit notice that they are not
(Allwood, 1976: 56 57).
According to Allwood the characteristics of cooperation include mutual 
consideration as well as having a common purpose. Galliers (ibid: 124) suggests that 
previous computational research in cooperative interactions has embodied these 
notions of helpfulness and mutual consideration as the recognition of another's goal. 
Agents, accordingly, are designed to always be cooperative - that is, helpful and ready 
to take on the other agent's goals as their own. It will be seen later that this is a 
characteristic assumed by Power in his model (2.2.2) where either Mary or John 
communicate their goals to the other in order to obtain cooperation for the joint 
planning exercise of opening a door (Power, 1974). Appelt in his KAMP system also 
assuiues tliat:
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" if one agent is helpfully disposed towards another and knows that
the other agent intends to bring something about, he then adopts that 
goal as his own" (Appelt, 1985: 49).
Galliers challenges these assumptions by asking the question as to whether any 
condition or ciroumstanoo exists in existing research where helpful agents do not 
necessarily adopt other agents' goals merely by virtue of recognizing their existence. 
She cites Cohen & Levesque's (1987) work which stipulate that agents are defined as 
helpful in adopting other's goals, but only as long as they do not have any existing 
contradictory goals of their ovvn. She acknowledges that this stipulation is likely to be 
true of the other work mentioned, but that it is not explicitly stated and that the implicit 
assumption generally seems to be, that agents simply do not have conflicting goals of 
their own. She rejects what she describes as the existing notions of cooperativity used 
in recent AI research and incorporates into her theory the premise that:
"one important component of cooperative interaction is the joint 
resolution of conflicts" (Galliers, 1989:65).
The definition of cooperation she gives is:
"... cooperation includes a common goal which may be
generated as a result of recognizing it as another's goal, but this is 
conditional upon the agent's own preferenees. Helpfulness is retained 
as an important element of cooperation by commitment to the common 
goal being relative to the other agent having it as a goal. It is the 
inclusion of preference which so importantly removes benevolence 
from the definition, and replaces it with agent autonomy" (Galliers,
1989: 67-68).
3 6
A claim of this present work is that the nature of cooperation as it concerns 
communication is being misconceived when it is argued that one of its major objectives 
is that of a common goal or purpose. In this respect Galliers' definition offers little 
more, over and above existing definitions, apart from acknowledging the component 
of conflict. Communication takes place on occasions, to numerous to categorize, 
where there is no common goal or purpose to achieve, nevertheless, the actual process 
of communication is deemed as being a cooperative venture and to have a purpose to 
some end (cf Grice, 1975). Even where states of severe conflict exist between agents 
and goals are very different, communication can still take place and the act of 
communicating, even to discuss differences of position, indicates cooperation.
What is taking place in these situations is an act of cooperation in communication - 
that is, maintenance of the communicative stance or state is a goal per se, in order to 
achieve more distant goals and objectives. Cooperation is a state that can operate on 
varying levels and ignoring this distinction causes confusion. I believe that Galliers 
has not made this distinction and confuses the nature of cooperation underlying the 
communicative process with the nature of cooperation required by agents either to 
aclûêve a common task or goal or to negotiate the resolution of conflicL Most of the 
definitions of cooperation include this concept of a 'common goal' without 
acknowledging that some activities are cooperative in essence.
The nature of cooperation involved in communication can be likened to the activity 
of a competitive game such as football or chess or a sport such as boxing. The 
participants need to have a level of cooperation to participate in the game regardless of 
their objectives for the outcome of the game, which individually are likely to be very 
different. A team of footballers have the objective of their side winning and the other 
side losing; likewise with a competitor in a game of chess or in a boxing match. One 
agent wants to win with the consequent loss to the opponent. Competitors in such 
activities are not working together to achieve a common purpose and if a draw results, 
both sides generally view such an outcome as disappointing and not in concordance 
with their original goals. Nevertheless, participants are cooperating to 'play the game'.
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They abide by its rules and maxims otherwise it could be argued they are not playing 
the game in question.
I would argue that Galliers confuses the concept of cooperation with that of 
compliance and that tills partly stems from her views of conflict and the roles that 
agents are given, of being able to 'manipulate' each other's knowledge configurations 
(ibid: 68; the term she uses is 'mental states'). As far as Galliers is concerned conflict 
has an important role in the maintenance and stability of cooperative multi-agent 
systems (Galliers, 1989: 67).
The view adopted in this thesis is different. What is being argued here is that the 
very nature of the human condition can be viewed in terms of conflict and that 
cooperation has evolved to deal with the conflict that is inherent in the interaction 
between human agents. Moreover, it is also argued that cooperation derives from self- 
interest (Axelrod, 1984: 6-7 & 2.1.3).
This is a very different emphasis than that of Galliers who proposes that conflict 
has a positive role in maintaining cooperation. Rather than viewing it from this angle, 
cooperation should be viewed as a means of diminishing conflict. It is by the 
establishment of cooperative processes that order is brought out of chaos and 
organization is achieved from agents pursuing disparate goals. Conflict is a 
charactoristic of human affairs and it is either eliminated or diminished by negotiation* 
and to the extent that agents can mutually achieve their goals and aspirations.
Without processes of cooperation, interaction and communication can quickly slide 
towards a state of conflict This does not mean to say agents will always achieve their 
goals. Some goals of other agents are accepted in preference to one's own goals 
because they are seen to be advantageous in some way or other. It is also inevitable 
that some goals might have to be dropped and the goals of other agents accepted, either 
voluntary or by imposition, because of the power relationships existing between 
agents and groups of agents within society.
The place of conflict in human interaction adopted in this work as opposed to that 
of Galliers', might be considered as a difference in emphasis but it is not only this.
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Cooperation is a relationship between agents which is viewed as evolving out of 
conflictual relationships, that exist inherently between human agents. The 
communicative process above all must be viewed as a cooperative process by which 
agents can interact with one another and have a basis from which to negotiate other 
conflicts.
It is an assumption of this work that language and its major components - syntax, 
phonology and semantics, have evolved as a function of language and that a major 
characteristic of this functional use of language is to provide agents with the skills of a 
cooperative nature. A person has far more to gain from mutual cooperation in language 
than mutual defection, for if an agent cannot make herself understood her chances of 
achieving her goals is decreased, which has implications for survival
Therefore, a definition of cooperation for this work is as follows. Participants 
involved in communicative interaction are engaged in a shared process. They work 
together and act in conjunction to the same end which is to maintain the communicative 
process until one or both of their purposes for doing so are considered achieved or to 
have failed. The practice of communication is viewed as being the most economic and 
advantageous way in which purposes and goals are achieved and existing conflict 
either avoided or diminished or even increased, if that is the agent's purpose.
2.1.4 Assumption 4 - Conversation is characterised by regularities 
rather than rules or principles
Many researchers describe conversation as being a highly organized level of 
language and emphasize the characteristics of structure (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984; 
Coulthard, 1977; Hinds, 1979; Hoey, 1983; Reichman, 1985). This structure and the 
way in which regularities occur in an orderly manner suggests to many researchers that 
conversational interaction must be governed by rules and tliat tliese rules must be 
tacitly known to all interlocutors (Chomsky, 1976; Labov & Fanshel, 1977; Schank, 
1977).
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The task to be confronted by the analyst is two-fold. Initially, the forms of the 
units from which conversation is constructed need to be identified and described and 
then the sequencing of these units and their occurrence need to be demonstrated. 
Furthermore, the analyst needs to know what underlying principles are shared by 
interactants for communication to result in a successful joint production. Different 
analysts have focussed upon varying characteristics and identified in these the units of 
language: e.g. the utterance, the sentence, the adjacency pair, the move or the speech 
act, along with theories as to how they might be sequentially connected. Each have 
their protagonists as being the structural units of conversation.
So widely assumed is the 'rules and units' approach, the assumption often remains 
unchallenged and the only questions that are asked are about the nature and type of rule 
believed to be governing the units of conversation.
Taylor & Cameron (1987: 8) are researchers who have raised some very pertinent 
objections to this approach. They argue that many researchers never question why 
particular rules are there in the first place or how the rules that are assumed to govern 
conversation come into being.
They draw a distinction between a 'rule' and a 'regularity' and ask whether it is the 
case that any discerned regularity in conversational interaction should be taken as 
evidence for the existence of a rule (ibid: 11). Within the social sciences it is 
acknowledged that more than just regularities are needed to justify the existence of a 
rule and that there needs to be some evidence that a prescription is being followed 
(Harre, 1974:143). In the view of Taylor & Cameron:
"...mere regular behaviour in situations is insufficient to confirm the 
existence of a specific rule. It is always possible to formulate a number 
of rules according to which one's data make perfect sense; but it is very 
difficult to evaluate the alternatives in any sensible, let alone conclusive 
way" (ibid: 51).
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They argue that many analysts who use the rules and units framework are unable 
to produce good evidence that a remark has in fact been heard as any particular 
category of act and that without this sort of evidence it is impossible to see whether 
one set of rules is any superior to another set These criticisms complement the view 
presented in this work that certain regularities can be discerned as underlying 
conversation but that these are not necessarily rules or principles that have any apriori 
justification.
2.1.5 Assumption 5 - conversation is intentional and plan-based 
behaviour.
A premise of this thesis is that conversation is an instance of purposive, rational 
and intentional behaviour. People use language primarily to communicate with other 
people, in pursuit of their own goals. In this respect, a speaker's motivation plays an 
important role in structuring what she says. An assumption of this study is that 
language is action (Austin, 1962; Brown, 1980; Goldman, 1970; Searle, 1969). Also, 
that people think about what they say and in doing so formulate goals and plans by 
which these goals can be pursued and achieved.
Alvin Goldman in his book 'A Theory of Human Action' argues that purposive 
behaviour is closely connected with the concepts of 'reasons' and that 'reason type 
explanations' are a species of causal explanations for human behaviour (Goldman, 
1970: 76). Anscombe defines an intentional act as one which the agent does 'for a 
reason' (Anscombe, 1957: 9). I do not intend to discuss the philosophical implication 
of what it means 'to do something for a reason' but to note that the notions of reasons 
and reasoning is intimately tied to that of intentionalistic states.
My aim in raising the matter here is to refer to Goldman's argument that acts are 
caused by 'wants' and 'beliefs' and that these concepts play a central role in the 
analysis of intentional action and in any explanation of action. Language can be viewed 
as an instance of goal-oriented behaviour motivated or 'caused' by the factors of
41
'wants' in the form of 'beliefs' and 'intentions'. ^  Utterances are produced in the form 
of speech actions and are executed in order to have some effect on the hearer. Action 
representations are not only or merely programs for doing something, they are also 
knowledge structures that may be used by other processes. The effect that a speaker 
intends to have on her hearer is that of modifying the hearer's beliefs or goals.
A central assumption of this study is that people are rational agents who are 
capable of forming and executing plans to achieve goals. This is in line with numerous 
recent studies (Allen, 1983, 1984; Allen & Koomen, 1983; Allen & Perrault, 1978, 
1979, 1980; Brown, 1980; Galliers, 1989; Levin & Moore, 1977; Pollack, 1986). 
These studies, viewing language as intentional behaviour, provide tentative solutions 
to a wide range of linguistic problems at the sentence level and exploit the fact that 
language is primarily designed for the transmission of goals. Some of these studies 
have indicated, that identifying the goals of the speaker provides a natural way of 
dealing with sentence fragments such as noun phrase utterances, sentences that should 
not be interpreted literally but as indirect speech acts, and utterances whose purpose is 
to clarify, acknowledge or correct a previous utterance (Allen & Perrault, 1978,1980).
Relevant to the intentional and plan-based characteristic of conversation is the 
research relating to speech act theory (Austin. 1962; Searle, 1969,1979); pragmatics 
(Grice 1975; Leech, 1983; Levinson, 1983); and planning (Bratman, 1983, 1987; 
Bruce, 1980; Bruce & Newman, 1978; Miller, Galanter & Pribram, 1960; Schank & 
Abelson, 1977; Wilensky, 1979, 1983). The subject of planning is discussed further 
in chapter three as this activity is considered to be a strategic element in the 
conversational process.
1 Further clarification of these ideas are made in chapter 3 in the discussion of Bratman's 
views concerning intention which are adopted for this work.
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2.1.6 Assumption 6 • Conversation is inherently organized and 
structured
An obvious but an initial point to be made is that conversation is a joint production. 
This implies that speakers constantly take account of their audience by designing their 
talk for their hearers. Not only might a speaker shift their style of language to suit the 
context but will have some idea of what their audience already knows and what they 
want to know. Therefore, they will have some idea how to select and present the 
information.
The structure of conversation relates to such questions as: How do conversations 
commence and how are they maintained or terminated? How are the conventions of 
turn-taking organized and distributed? How are topics chosen and introduced and how 
does focus and attention change? What place do repairs and false starts have in 
conversational organization and how are interruptions made, questions asked, and 
answers given or evaded? These are a few of the characteristics that affect the 
conversational flow and whether it is maintained or disrupted.
Schegloff & Sacks (1973) noticed that some tum-allocational techniques do set 
themselves more clearly apart such as an addressed question selecting its addressee to 
speak next, or that in starting to speak when not selected, a party selects herself to 
speak.
The former technique relates to one case of a class of utterance types, or 'types of 
sequences' parts, which share the property of possibly selecting next speaker. These 
class of sequences are characterized by the following features; (a) two-utterance 
length, (b) the component utterances appear in adjacent position, and (c) different 
speakers are responsible for producing each utterance (Tsui, 1989: 545). These 
sequential units are termed 'adjacency pairs' (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973: 295). The 
adjacency pair class of units also includes such sequences as greeting/greeting; 
invitation/acceptance or decline; complaint/denial; compliment/accepts or rejects; 
challenge/rejection; offer/accept or reject; instruct/receive; summons/answer
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(Schegloff, 1968); openings (Schiffrin, 1977) closing sequences (Schegloff and 
Sacks, 1973).
The components and rules of Sack's turn-taking model for conversation define 
'legal' points of transfer from one speaker to the next and conversation is said to 
develop in the manner of adjacency pairing. However, it is evident that the 
organization of conversation is not always made up of 'adjacency pairs' and this aspect 
of the ethnomethodological approach to conversational analysis has come in for some 
severe criticism (Brown & Yule, 1983; Ellis & Beattie, 1986; Reichman,1985; Taylor 
& Cameron,1987).
Whilst there are some sequences that have preferred or dispreferred second parts 
such as those identified above, not all conversation is of this type and there are 
stretches of conversation that cannot be characterized in this manner. As has been 
suggested, there are other options, such as the potential for a three-part exchange with 
an optional fourth or fifth part (Tsui, 1989: 562) and possibly others.
Reichman (1985: 174) argues that the adjacency pair approach to the structure of 
conversation is an insufficient model and does not explain or describe adequately the 
structure of conversation. This she sees as being because of its emphasis on paired 
forms and concludes that this emphasis makes it an analysis which restricts itself to a 
linear development of conversation only. Furthermore, she argues that it has no way 
of explaining that aspect of conversation that is nonlinear and non-sequential. She 
proposes an alternative model based on 'context spaces' and which attempts to model 
an episode of conversation in its entirety.
Her model seeks to explain the frequent shiftings, suspensions, and resumptions 
of topics that are characteristic of most conversations. She envisages conversation as a 
series of moves - e.g. 'support' and 'challenge' and her principle goal appears to be to 
make Grice's conversational maxims more amenable to computation. Her approach is 
more concerned with conversational moves as they relate to an argument or discussion 
and may be better viewed as conversational strategies (cf Stutt, 1989).
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Reichman's ideas are not of great relevance to this work and I do not intend to 
discuss the structure of conversation in any depth. The reason why I have introduced 
the subject briefly here, is that an assumption underlying this work is that it is not 
possible to attribute structure to a conversation unless the beliefs, communicative 
goals, intentions and plans of the participants are known. Attempts have been made to 
categorise conversational structure, such as Reichman has done, but the difficulty with 
this approach is that different researchers categorise conversations differently and their 
is l i^ e  agreement between them as to what the 'moves' or 'units' of conversational 
structure are.
The approach of this work is different. Conversation and dialogue are structured 
but this structure can only be ascertained as far as the beliefs, intentions, 
communicative goals and plans of the participants can be discovered or are revealed. It 
is acknowledged that there are even greater difficulties with this approach as 
participants to a dialogue or conversation rarely reveal their beliefs explicitly or their 
goals motivating their utterances and assessments by analysts can only be subjective at 
best. However, in the work presented here an attempt is made to model the beliefs, 
goals and plans of a number of agents in order to show how these result in certain 
utterances being made and goals achieved. The resulting conversation or dialogue h ^  
a structure but this structure is related to and reflects the communicative goals and 
beliefs of the participants.
What I now wish to discuss is some of the earlier computer implementations 
attempting to model dialogue which have been based on ideas relating to these 
assumptions and also to discuss and note some more recent research on the subject
2.2 Models of dialogue and related research
Efforts to program computers in an attempt to elucidate speaker's and hearer's, 
problems have led to some understanding of how the speaker decides what to say 
next, of how hearer's understand what is said, and of how conversations might be 
structured.
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My purpose here is to review some of the work and programs that have been 
written and to offer some kind of critical review of systems that are models of 
dialogue. Immediately below I have briefly surveyed some of the language production 
models that have been reported in the literature. In this brief review I do not intend to 
discuss programs or models which focus on the organization or structure of dialogue 
above the single utterance; those approaches that rely on the notion of focus; or those 
that concern a particular aspect of dialogue, e.g., argument, conflict, narrative, etc., as 
these are not of immediate concern to this work (Carbonell, 1981; Galliers, 1989; 
Grosz, 1977,1978, 1981; Hovy, 1988; Reichman, 1985; Stutt, 1989).
2.2.1 Early models
Two dimensions appear to have characterised earlier attempts to model dialogue. 
Question-answering systems and programs which sought to emulate human 
conversation and language complexity.
Question-answering is a characteristic of language which presents as being a 
straight-forward context in which to experiment with the understanding and 
communicative ability of the computer. These consisted in experimenting with a store 
of information, or the mechanism for developing such a store and a procedure for 
extracting Expropriate information from the store when presented with a question.
Some of these were BASEBALL (Green, Wolf, Chomsky & Laughery, 1963; 
STUDENT (Bobrow,1968); SIR (Semantic Information Retrieval) system (Raphael, 
1968). Whilst these programs are possibly the most commonly referred to in the 
literature (Boden, 1977: 96 and other places) the work in question-answering systems 
has been considerable and continues at the present time. Space does not permit each 
system to be noted and discussions of this early work can be found in Barr & 
Feigenbaum, (1981,1982); Feigenbaum & Feldman (1963); McTear, (1987); Minsky, 
(1968).
The other major dimension of earlier research; programs that emulate human 
conversation have also been widely referred to and discussed within the literature.
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These include ELIZA (Weizenbaum,1966); PARRY (Colby, 1973); SHRDLU 
(Winograd, 1972); GUS (Genial Understander System) (Bobrow, Kaplan, Kay, 
Norman, Thompson and Winograd, 1977) and the Dialogue Games Model of Levin & 
Moore (1977) and Moore, Levin & Mann (1977). There are many other less popular 
models.
These early programs are of a special format type. The systems generally used two 
special formats designed for the particular subject matter they were dealing with. One 
of the formats was for representing the stored knowledge of the system while the other 
represented the meaning of the language input Such an approach has its limitations 
and other researchers sought to design systems which were not limited by their 
construction to a specialized and particular context and used English text as a basis for 
storing information. I do not intend to discuss these models of text production here as 
the focus of this research is not on text production per se, but on the phenomenon of 
natural language dialogue. Some of these programs are: PROTEUS (Davey, 1978); 
ERMA (Clippinger, 1977); DEBBIE (Sedwell, 1985).
There are other systems which I do not intend to discuss as they are of limited 
interest relative to the considerations required for a model of natural language dialogue. 
Among which are Carbonell & Collins' (1973) SCHOLAR which produces an 
arbitrarily ordered list of sentences relating to geographical facts about a given country; 
Schank's (1975) SAM and Meehan's (1977) TALESPIN both of which are story 
generators based on Schank's (1972, and elsewhere) theory of conceptual 
dependency.2 Related to these programs are PAM and QUALM. PAM (Wilensky, 
1983) concerns the notions of plans, goals and themes in story comprehension and 
QUALM is a question-answering system which was used in conjunction with SAM 
and PAM (Lehnert, 1981: 149). None of these systems produce natural dialogue and 
therefore are not included in this brief survey.
^These are discussed in, Inside Computer Understanding: Five Programs Plus Minatures by 
Roger 0  Schank & Christopher Riesbeck. Also included are discussions of Robert 
Wilensky's PAM and Jaime Carbonell's POLITICS programs
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There is one program which requires to be examined in some detail and that is 
Power's (1974, 1979) model, the purpose of which was to model conversation 
directly. Although it is not a program that is discussed widely in the literature, it is one 
that comes closest in an attempt to model the relationship between the goals and beliefs 
of the participants and their utterances. Power's model and research is very pertinent to 
the present work and requires to be examined at some length.
2.2.2 Power's computer model of conversation
The major objective of Power was not the structuring of individual utterances but 
the higher-level organization of dialogue. In this sense it is a 'performance' model of 
language rather than a 'competence' model in Chomskyan terms. If we are to 
understand a conversation. Power argues that at least three fundamental factors have to 
be accounted for. These are the goals of both speakers and the conversational 
conventions that both the participants to the conversation share (Power, 1974: 3). 
Without an acknowledgement of the place of these elements we are unlikely to 
discover how it is possible to conduct coherent, purposeful conversations.
Behind this thinking is the idea that a speaker, not only conveys meaning by the 
utterances she makes but is also trying to do something or to achieve some purpose. 
Also, the hearer has not fully understood an utterance in its entirety unless she has 
perceived its purpose as well as its literal meaning. What is being considered is that 
language is not only a medium for communicating information but used rather as a 
purposive instrument in achieving plans and goals. Power's program appears to come 
closer than any other, to having communicative purposes that change in the course of a 
conversation. Steedman & Johnson-Laird have drawn attention to the fact that it seems 
to be the only study in which two copies of a program have been used to model both 
participants in a dialogue and which is conducted entirely by themselves. (Steedman & 
Johnson-Laird, 1979:125)
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2.2.2.1 A brief description of the program
The program is somewhat unique in that it seeks to model a conversation between 
two robots rather than a conversation that might take place between a program and its 
human operator. In constructing his model in this manner Power was influenced by 
previous language-producing programs in which the human operator interacted with 
the system. He makes the point that in these systems, it is the human operator who 
almost always takes the initiative and determines the overall structure of the dialogue. 
The problem about this is that the processes by which the operator takes the initiative 
and maintains the overall control over the conversation remain hidden in her mind and 
are not made explicit (ibid: i). The aim of Power's program is to make these processes 
totally explicit and therefore, human participation is avoided.
The two robots are each represented by a section of the program and the 
conversation between them is conducted in a small subset of English. It is a mixed- 
initiative dialogue which can involve interruptions and the nesting of one segment oL 
dialogue within another. The robots are placed within a simple world of a few objects 
in which they co-operate to achieve a simple practical goal in this world. Their 
conversation is meant to arise naturally out of this common aim and each remark 
relates to the goal they are trying to achieve. The robots have to agree on a plan, 
exchange information, discuss the consequences of their actions and carry them out.
The program has two kinds of procedures called ROUTINES and GAMES. The 
GAMES are used to conduct sections of conversation while the ROUTINES mirror the 
underlying thoughts of the robots. There are several GAMES each of which 
correspond to a common conversational pattern such as a question and its answer, or a 
plan suggestion and its response to i t  GAMES are joint procedures in which 
instructions are divided between the robots and determine what can be said, which 
robot will say what and how each utterance will be analysed and responded to. When 
a section of dialogue occurs the relevant GAME is loaded in the minds of both robots 
but each adopt different roles and consequently, perform different instructions and 
produce different utterances.
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The two sections of the program are controlled by a 'chairman' function which 
runs the conversation and which is initiated by the operator. The chairman first calls 
the section of the program representing John. John then thinks for a while and 
eventually returns control to the chairman. This usually occurs because he has just 
made an utterance and needs to give Mary a chance to reply. The chairman then calls 
Mary who in turn decides whether she wants to say something. Control alternates in 
this way between the two robots until the run is completed and neither robot has 
anything more to say. Before calling the chairman the operator needs to define the 
starting position by initialising key variables as to the state of the world, the names of 
the robots, what actions they can perform, what their beliefs are and what their goals 
are. An example of the dialogue that the program produces can be found in Appendix 
8 .
The way in which language is dealt with within the model is by way of an internal 
language. Expressions in this internal language are translated by specific functions into 
English and vise a versa. Power admits that no attempt is made to do a proper parsing 
of the language used, or even to bother with grammar at all (ibid: 198, 202). The 
reason for this is that his purpose was not to model language per se but the structure of 
dialogue and therefore, to focus on parsing or grammar he saw as being non-essential 
to his main purpose.
Although routines and games are major control structures, they are not the highest 
level of control. These structures have to be interpreted and sometimes a decision has 
to be made to discontinue them in order to make an utterance or swap control to the 
other robot. The various parts of the program responsible for this come under the 
broad title of the 'Executive" (ibid: 187-197). There is a master function for each 
section of the program which represents the mental processes of each of the robots. 
The algorithm representing the mental processes forms part of the 'Chairman" 
program and when it arouses one of the robots it runs until it makes an utterance or 
swaps. Power admits that this is something of a problem but sees it as being a 
limitation characteristic of setting up a conversational system inside a computer which
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is a serial system. It is impossible to have each of the robots thinking at the same time 
as would occur naturally with speaker and hearer.
The way in which Power has dealt with this problem is to use a time-sharing 
system so that the minds of the robots work in psuedo-paraUel. In his program he has 
a short 'Chairman' procedure which calls the robots alternately (ibid: 188-189).
2.2.2.2 Evaluation of Power's program
Power has captured some important features that characterize natural language 
dialogue. The robots in Power's program can 'learn' within certain limitations. By 
perceiving certain changes in their world the robots have their memories updated. This 
is not done automatically as changes in the environment have to be noticed by the 
robots by an examination of the objects they can see. This is an important feature in 
natural language dialogue as participants need to remember at what stage they are in a 
conversation and be able to update their knowledge of what information has been 
supplied, what goal or subgoals have been achieved and what still needs to be said. 
Without such updating a person would not be able to carry on even the simplest of 
conversations and might ask the same question repeatedly although havhig already 
received the answer. This aspect is linked with another vital characteristic which is that 
each robot has a model of the world and also a model of its partner.
Power makes a distinction in the types of knowledge that the robots possess. 
Much of the knowledge that they have never changes during a run of the program. For 
example, knowledge about how to make plans, how to use language, what can be seen 
or done, how many objects there are in the world. This type of knowledge remains 
constant once it has been set by the operator whereas the knowledge of object 
positions can vary. Theories concerning the consequences of actions can change as can 
one robot's model of the other robot's mind. Plans, goals and utterances can also 
change.
Generally, the knowledge that the robots have can be divided into two main kinds: 
their model of the world and the model they have of the mind of their partner. Each of
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the robot's model of the world holds their beliefs about the positions of objects, that 
is, the current state of the world, and their theories of how the world works, their 
beliefs about the consequences of actions. Their models of their partner’s minds 
consist of what the other can or cannot see, what the other can do and what the other's 
beliefs are about how the world works. The robots use their models of the world and 
of each other's mind to construct and carry out their plans in achieving goals. In this 
respect Power attempts to deal with vital aspects of natural language dialogue.
Even so, the program cannot be said to include a model of the other participant 
beyond a few facts concerning their goals and basic abilities. It is the lack of an 
appropriate model which leads to the pointless exchange of utterances 8 to 13 (see 
Appendix 8). Steedman & Johnson-Laird (1979: 128) make the point that this 
exchange could have been avoided if Mary had known that people do not seek to 
achieve goals that are already attained, and had updated her model of John's mind 
accordingly.
2.2.2.3 Problems and limitations of Power's program
Power himself anticipates a number of criticisms of the model and identifies some 
of the defects of the program (ibid: 207). The conversational pattern is too rigid and 
John and Mary are too much alike. All sections of conversation have to be announced 
and there are no proper facilities for putting right misunderstandings. The robots are 
unable to detect violations of illocutionary rules, cannot refer to previous sections of 
the dialogue or tell whether or not a game is appropriate.
Power draws attention to a characteristic of the program which he describes as 
being its most important feature. This is that the conversation is divided into short 
sections, each of which is generated by a joint procedure. He draws attention to the 
fact that these sections contain two or more utterances but generally only two (ibid: 
203). In a later article (1979: 111), he indicates that the program is based on a view of 
conversational structure which resembles that of Schegloff & Sacks (1973) which 
consists largely of the 'adjacency pair' (2.1.6). Though no mention of the adjacency
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pair is included in the original discussion. Power suggests in this later paper that there 
are strong grounds for considering the adjacency pair to be a more important unit of 
conversation than the utterance. Furthermore, he states that the program implements 
these ideas in that the robots have a list of instructions which lays down how each 
utterance in the pair should be produced and interpreted.
It has been previously noted that there are doubts as to whether it is possible to . 
give the 'adjacency pair' the sort of pre-eminence that some researchers do, as a great
deal of conversation does not follow the structure of the adjacency pair. As a unit of
;
conversational structure it is only able to explain some of the phenomena that occurs in 
dialogue (2.1.6).
What is significant about Power's later work is that while he notes the 
ethnomethodologists work in relation to the adjacency pair, he makes no mention of 
Sack's model of the turn-taking mechanism (2.1.6 & Appendix 7). It is this aspect of 
turn-taking between the robots in his program which constitutes one of its major 
weaknesses. It has been previously noted that the robots alternate under the control of 
a "Chairman" function which initially calls the robots by name. The calling of the 
robots by name each time is both unnatural and contributes to the dialogue becoming 
long-winded and repetitive. As a consequence, Mary and John are not communicating 
directly but through a third 'party'. Rigid alternating between the robots is unnatural 
and somewhat artificial.
At no point in Power's model can the current speaker decide to continue the 
conversation as she could in a natural dialogue and which is allowed for in Sack's 
turn-taking model. The speaker is regulated strictly by a device somewhat removed 
from both robots. The robots do not respond to the second part of an adjacency pair 
because of any inference that can be made about the first part which requires such a 
response (Power seems to imply this in relating his model to the adjacency pair), but 
because the 'Chairman' calls them to do so. An appropriate model of dialogue will 
have to address this problem and find a way so that what is said by one speaker elicits 
a response without the aid of some external device. Such a response needs to arise
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from the models each speaker has of the other and from the model of the conversation 
so far developed.
Another weakness of the model is that the robots are not able to recognise the plans 
or the goals of the other without them being explicitly announced (ibid: 209). It has 
been noted that speakers and hearers make sense of much language phenomena by 
being able to infer the goals and to recognise the plans of the other participant (2.1.5). 
Power admits that his robots cannot infer the other's intentions and that this was done 
for ease of design and clarity. Nevertheless, it is a feature which appears to be integral 
to understanding in dialogue and any model which ignores this characteristic is likely 
to be deficient.
For each type of conversation in the program there is only one game definition 
(ibid: 207). This means that the dialogue takes the same pattern each time. Apart from 
the call of the other's name, every other utterance is expected, in the sense that the 
hearer knows in advance which move it is in the game. Power suggests that the kind 
of rigidity exhibited by the program is an inevitable result of using games, since the 
whole idea of a game is that the robots are following a procedure with a fixed 
definition which they both know in advance. The method depends on both robots 
having exactly equivalent game definitions and being able to agree about the position 
reached at any point in the game. Consequently, the robots never have 
misunderstandings with each other whilst in the process of a game, which is not a 
characteristic of natural conversations. If the robot is linked to a human operator 
(which it is possible to do) there are continual misunderstandings if the operator is 
unable to follow the game définirions implicitly (ibid: 208).
The fact that all sections of conversation have to be announced is a further 
objection that is linked with the first two (ibid: 209). Every time an ordinary game is 
played, it first has to be announced by a special function. It is designed in this manner 
so as to bring the control structures of the robots into line with each other to make sure 
they have the same game loaded. Power admits that this is one of the most unnatural 
features of the conversation and that the program could be adapted so that extensive
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use of this was unnecessary. Though some adaptation might be possible, the problem 
remains in essence because of the method employed and therefore is a major defect.
The robots have no proper facilities for putting right misunderstandings (ibid: 
210). If a remark by a partner cannot be interpreted there is only one possible 
response. The robot has to call her partner to get GAME loaded, declare that a muddle 
has arisen which cancels all routines except BASIC and start afresh. Consequently, the 
robots start again at an earlier point in the computation whereas the misunderstanding 
could have been a minor one which did not warrant going so far back.
Human language-users are extremely competent at conducting meta-conversations 
to retrieve previous conversations. The robots cannot do this because they lack an 
understanding of what each of the games are meant to achieve nor do they know why 
the instructions making up each game are suitable for achieving the game's purpose. 
Furthermore, the robots lack an understanding of what the language they are using is 
meant to achieve. In a natural conversation, if something is not understood it can either 
be by-passed, in the expectation that something later will clarify what has been said, or 
a hearer can inform the speaker that they do not understand or ask for clarification. In 
this respect language is used to put right the misunderstanding that has occurred. If the 
robots were given more effective models of their partners and were able to recognise 
the plans and goals of the other as well as their own, in the actual language being used, 
they would have a better facility for putting right misunderstandings.
Finally, the robots are unable to refer to previous sections of the dialogue (ibid: 
203). This is because the utterances are the entries in the games and which are local 
variables of joint procedures. As soon as the game exits these variables are lost. The 
robots do not have a model of the conversation as it develops so are unable to answer 
any questions relating to previous sections of the dialogue nor can they make 
comments about it. In the part of the dialogue given as an example in Appendix 8, 
John announces to Mary at 7 "Shall we make a plan", Mary, unable to detect violations 
of illocutionary rules ( John's request to get in, 5) interrupts John by asking him 
whether he is already in [12]. After receiving his reply in the negative she announces at
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14, "Shall we make a plan" a suggestion made by John only six short utterances back. 
Power admits that this part of the system is impossible to adapt in order that reference 
be made to previous sections of the dialogue. This is a major weakness and one that 
any model of dialogue needs to overcome.
Power's work is valuable in relation to this research and serves as something of a 
landmark in attempting to model conversation. This present work complements some 
of his ideas which are considered important such as the motivating factors of beliefs, 
goals and plans in conversation. He explores the nature of conversation in relation to 
its organisation and structure which can be viewed as being a most useful direction to 
pursue and is another aspect related to this woik as far as structure and organisation 
relates to the original beliefs and goals of the participants.
His is a model that builds on speech act theory and emphasises pragmatic aspects 
of dialogue such as performance and context. His model also attempts to tackle 
conversation from the perspective of some of the major assumptions which have been 
identified in the first part of this chapter such as purposive and cooperative behaviour 
as well as planning to achieve goals. Also, to model these from the viewpoint of both 
participants simultaneously.
The model is not without defects as have been identified but his work has had a 
major influence on the ideas presented in this thesis.
■oOo-
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Chapter 3 - A theory of rational action and interaction as a basis for 
a theory of purposive dialogue
The main idea motivating this work considers dialogue to arise from the interaction 
of the participants' beliefs, knowledge and intentions, in the pursuit of plans and 
goals. These give rise to commurticative goals which are realized by the participants 
making choices from specific semantic options relating to the social context of the 
speech situation which in turn, are realized in speech actions that utilize specific 
grammatical/vocabulary options (Halliday, 1973,1978).
The foregoing might be seen as a statement of the obvious but while we might 
believe dialogue is produced in this matmer it is a different matter to make these 
processes explicit. It might be the case that we understand the utterances speakers 
make by making all sorts of inferences about the speaker's intentions, knowledge and 
beliefs but it is not possible to examine the specific beliefs, knowledge structures and 
intentions of an agent that motivated a particular utterance. This is for the simple and 
self evident reason that we do not have access to another person's mind.
Consequently, much of the research into conversation, analyses dialogues or 
dialogue-texts after the event. The purpose of this being to ascertain the structure of the 
dialogue in an attempt to define or describe the motivations, strategies and intentions of 
the speaker and by this method to arrive at an understanding of what is going on 
between a particular speaker and hearer. The difficulty with this method of analysis is 
that it remains a subjective assessment of what is actually happening and different 
analysts might come up with differing conclusions about a particular piece of dialogue.
This work approaches the problem from an altogether different direction and by 
constructing a model of two or more imaginary agents each with a set of 
communicative goals. These agents are provided with a set of beliefs some of which 
are individual beliefs, while some others are held in common. Each agent is also given 
a particular goal they need to achieve. Goals are achieved by the agents pursuing 
individual plans which involve them displaying utterances to the other agent Each
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agent is provided with knowledge structures as to the type of utterance to be displayed. 
The purpose behind this enterprise is to make the processes of dialogue explicit
Underlying such a model is a theory of interaction which is rational and which is a 
basis adopted by many researchers and theorists (Cohen, 1984; Cohen & Levesque, 
1987; Galliers, 1989). It appears to be the view predominating within the literature and 
the purpose of this chapter is to describe the characteristics of rational agents and 
rational action that form a basis for this model of dialogue.
What I propose to do in this chapter is not only to describe the characteristics of 
rational agents but to explain how these characteristics fit into the model of dialogue as 
presented in this work.
3.1 Characteristics of rational agents
3.1.1 Rationality
An assumption of this research is that dialogue is a cooperative enterprise 
(following Grice, 1975) and that this characteristic of cooperation derives from the 
underlying rationality of the participants. Another assumption is that human beings are 
planning agents and that the plans they create are used to achieve purposes and obtain 
goals and objectives. Human beings are able to make and to be committed to plans 
because their actions derive from knowledge about themselves and of the world in 
which they are situated with other agents. This knowledge consists of beliefs and 
attitudes and the behaviour of human agents is motivated by these along with wants, 
desires and obligations.
A theory of rational action and interaction presupposes certain principles. These are 
that agents require a body of knowledge of how to perform their goals and that they do 
so with the knowledge that other agents operate in a similar manner. Agents have 
beliefs about other's intentions and goals and are able to reason about these in order to 
formulate their own goals and plans of how to influence the beliefs and goals of
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others. Also, having beliefs about the beliefs and goals of other agents can affect one's 
own beliefs and goals.
There are differing views as to the nature of rationality. Davidson (1963: 700) 
adopts a 'holistic' perspective in which he views complete sets of beliefs and desires 
as inevitably fitting together rationally and sees all behaviour as being rational. Galliers 
(1989: 50) notes this descriptive approach in her work but adopts an evaluative 
approach to rationality in which actions are selected as rational in contrast to others, 
being dependent on relationships of consistency with the individual's other existing 
knowledge configurations. Another perspective is that of Ellis (1979) who argues that:
"the laws governing the structure and dynamics of rational belief 
systems are the laws of logic" (Ellis, 1979: vii).
He proposes a physical ideal of a rational belief system which has as a central 
component, the ideal of rational equilibrium. The concept is likened to that of a 
perfectly balanced ecological system.
"An ideally rational belief system is one which is in equilibrium under 
the most acute pressures of internal 
criticism and discussion" (Ellis, 1979:4).
He acknowledges that such states may never be realized in actual systems but 
argues that the concepts used for an ideal system are useful for explaining the 
properties and structural features of ordinary human belief systems. Ellis makes the 
observation that ordinary human belief systems normally, and perhaps always, fail to 
be ideally rational for the reasons that they are being continually disturbed by new 
material (acquired beliefs) which are not or not always subjected to internal criticism 
and discussion. Even if acquired beliefs are subjected to this sort of examination the 
implications might not be always understood in order to be effective.
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The approach adopted here follows that of Galliers (1989) and the ideas of 
Allwood (1976) which Galliers discusses at some length. Allwood's approach is also 
evaluative, relating rational action to the idea of consistency with the agent's beliefs 
and goals but with reference to some kind of independent assessment of those beliefs 
or goals. Allwood makes a similar distinction to that of Ellis:
"We are not making the claim that agents act rationally, but only the 
weaker claim that agents act in a way that seems rational to themselves 
(Allwood, 1976: 23).
Dennett (1978:11) argues in a similar vein to EUis that if an intentional system was 
perfectly rational all logical truths would appear among its beliefs. He acknowledges 
though, that any intentional system will be imperfect and so it is not possible for all 
logical truths to be ascribed as beliefs to such a system. Human intentional systems are 
imperfect for the reasons given by Ellis and thus Allwood's claim that agents act in a 
way that seems rational to themselves seems the more accurate and realistic 
proposition.
The assumption adopted in this research is that human beings are 'intentional 
systems' which implies that such systems are 'rational'. What this means is that if a 
person has p, q, and r, beliefs, it is supposed that this person believes what follows 
from p, q, and r. Without such an assumption we cannot make predictions or rule out 
that the person in question will not do something utterly stupid despite their beliefs. 
Our common sense explanations and predictions of human behaviour is that it is 
intentional and rationality is assumed. If an acquaintance produces an irrational 
response to something we say or do, our immediate reaction is not normally to 
question their rationality but to look for some other explanation. Perhaps they didn't 
hear properly what was said or perhaps they didn't understand. So entrenched is the 
presumption of rationality that our predictions of what is happening infer other 
explanations for the problems in understanding or breakdown in communication.
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Because we view ourselves as acting rationally we assume that other agents act as we 
do. Dennett has suggested that:
" one cannot have a world view of any sort without having beliefs,
and one could not have beliefs without having intentions, and having 
intentions requires that one view oneself, at least, intentionally, as a 
rational agent" (Dennett, 1978:253).
The logic of Dennett's statement forms the basis of rationality assumed for this 
work. Human beings are viewed as rational agents, but as has been noted, human 
systems of rationality are imperfect Consequently, it is not possible for all logical 
truths to be ascribed as beliefs to such a system and therefore it seems unwise to 
attempt to construct such systems from which to extrapolate the psychological 
plausibility of particular processes.
It is not my intention to construct a model of rationality, perfect or imperfect, but to 
single out some aspects of a rational system that might contribute to the process of 
dialogue. The elements and processes singled out for emphasis in this model must be 
seen as belonging to a much larger rational system which is not modelled but assumed. 
These elements are goals, plans and sets of beliefs of two or more agents conversing 
together. It is assumed that these elements exist and function within a more complex 
rational system and it is against this background the model must be viewed.
What is now required is to identify the other components belonging to rational 
agents, those of intentions, plans and goals which stem from agents' belief systems 
and show how these particular elements relate to the model presented in this work.
3.1.2 Intentions and intentional!ty
Intentions and intentionality need to be examined in the context of a theory of 
action and of practical reasoning from which they are derived (Anscombe, 1963; 
Davidson, 1963; Davis, 1979; Searle, 1980).
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It has been previously noted (2.1.5) that a common approach to a theory of action 
is that actions are caused by beliefs, wants and desires but if this is the case we are left 
wondering as to what role intentions play. On the surface it would appear that actions 
are caused by intentions. Agents may adopt beliefs and goals to change others' 
knowledge configurations in order to effect changes in the world but in doing so they 
have intentions and these are intentions to act in specific ways.
Intentions appear to differ from beliefs in that the content of an intention is an 
action whereas the content of a belief may be a proposition or a psychological state 
(Engel, 1984: 51). Many studies of intention make attempts at reducing the concept to 
a combination of beliefs and desires but Bratman (1987: 14) argues that an intention 
must be considered a psychological entity in its own right
Cohen & Levesque (1987) also claim that rational behaviour cannot be analyzed in 
terms of beliefs and desires alone and that the intentional component, though intimately 
related to these entities is not reducible to them but must be viewed as being an 
important component in its own right This research adopts a similar view and more 
particularly the idea proposed by Bratman (1987: 28) that intentions are the sub­
components of plans. This wLQ be discussed further under the section on plans and 
planning.
The question arises as to what intentions actually are. They are most certainly 
'inner events' but this tells us very little and the more closely intentional action is 
examined it comes to appear that intentions are dispositions of some complexity. 
Bratman (1987: 8) suggests that intentions can be viewed as sub-components of plans 
and this is a view that is supported by other observations.
Intentions and intentional states have objects (Meiland, 1970: 16; Searle, 1980: 
48). Intentions are directed at or are about objects or states of affairs in the world. 
Meiland views the object of an intention as what is being intended or what the intention 
is about. If for example x has an intention to go to London and another intention to go 
to Milton Keynes, these intentions have different objects. One relates to the action of 
going to London and the other to Milton Keynes.
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Objects of intentions and intentional states can be beliefs, desires, other intentions 
etc. Meiland (ibid: 16) makes a useful distinction which is that intentions can be 
conditional or unconditional and that the two types of intentions take different types of 
objects. Unconditional intentions have actions as their object while conditional 
intentions have objects which are actions that are performed in certain circumstances or 
under certain conditions. Conditional intentions have the form 'X will do A if C 
obtains'. The object of the intention contains a condition which is part of what the 
intention is about. Unconditional intentions are directed at an action object which has 
the form 'X will do A'.
Some intentions are intentions to perform certain actions as a means to some end; a 
way by which a more major goal may be achieved. An agent can have a certain 
purpose in carrying out some action but this is different from her doing some action 
for a purpose. Some actions are done as a means to achieve other purposes. For 
example, if X has an intention to save £1(X) by Christmas X must have performed 
certain actions by means of which X was in possession of the £100 at Christmas.
I do not propose to deal with intention and intentionality in any more depth as the 
subject is quite vast and the enquiry properly belongs to philosophy (Davis, 1979; 
Dennett, 1978; Meiland, 1970; Searle, 1980). The purpose in dealing with it here, 
albeit briefly, is to acknowledge this component of rational agents and its relationship 
to the elements of beliefs, plans and goals which are the elements with which this 
research is most concerned with.
In this work intentions are characterised as sub-components of plans. Sub­
components of an agent's plan are realised in particular communicative goals which are 
related to specific utterances. Utterances between two agents form a dialogue, the 
structure of which reflects the wider and larger intention and plan of each agent which 
is composed of the smaller sub-components. By characterising intentions in this 
manner it is suggested that 'having a plan' and 'having a goal' are subjective states 
which when put into operation become intentional actions.
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In the model of dialogue presented here each utterance that is made is directed at 
achieving some communicative goal which contributes to an overall goal of the agent. 
Therefore each utterance is categorised as being an intentional action which is a sub­
component of a much larger intentional strategy and plan.
The concept of plan and planning now needs to be examined and an indication 
given of how the concept of planning is to be used in this work.
3.1.3 Planning - a framework for the organization of behaviour
One of the assumptions stated in chapter two was that the nature and function of 
natural language was plan-based (2.1.5). That is, that language is an instance of 
purposive behaviour which is used primarily to communicate with other people in 
pursuit of goals. This assumption is based on the belief that language is action 
following Austin (1962); Goldman (1970); Brown (1980); Searle (1969) and others. 
Fundamental to this belief is that people think about what they say and in doing so 
formulate plans by which their goals can be pursued and achieved.
A distinction often made in relation to knowledge is that of 'knowing about 
something' and 'knowing how to do something'. Planning comes within the domain 
of the latter, and therefore can be viewed as an ability rather than as a static knowledge 
structure. Even so, the demarcation is not as clear as this as it is likely that plans often 
become knowledge structures in themselves and are stored in memory as such.
Research into planning and problem-solving has been one of the most energetic 
areas in cognitive science and in the area of artificial intelligence in particular. Miller, 
Galanter & Pribram (1960) acknowledge much of their thinking on plans as stemming 
from Newell, Shaw & Simon (1958). Others who have done work in this area are 
Fikes & Nilsson, (1971); Newell & Simon, (1972); Sacerdoti, (1975, 1977); 
Sussman, (1975); Tate, (1975). Much of this work relates to single agents performing 
physical actions in simplified domains, such as the manipulation of blocks on a table. 
More recently, there have been efforts to apply planning models to problems of 
discourse (Appelt, 1985; Hovy, 1988).
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Generally, there has been three approaches in tackling this problem. Firstly, there 
are the approaches to dialogues concerning plan-based activities such as Grosz's 
(1977) work on dialogues between experts and apprentices involved in the task of 
repairing an appliance. A second approach is the use of planning models to determine 
the goals and plans of characters in a story. Among those who have worked on this 
approach are Bruce, (1980); Bruce & Newman (1978); de Beaugrande (1980); Schank 
& Abelson (1977); Wilensky (1979,1983). The third trend is that of planning in 
discourse and an examination of what is involved in the planning that must be carried 
out in the production of sentences and conversation (Appelt, 1985; Hovy, 1988).
3.1.3.1 Plans - what they are and why we bother with them
When Miller et al., refer to a plan they refer to a hierarchical process in the agent 
that can control the order in which a sequence of operations is to be performed 
(1960:16). Bratman (1983: 271) suggests that when we refer to plans we can mean 
either of two things, distinguished by Pollack (1986) as either data-structures or 
mental phenomena. He suggests that a more careful usage of the terminology would 
reserve the use of 'plan' for the former and 'having a plan' for the latter (ibid: 271). 
Pollack (1986: 207) suggests that 'having a plan' is analysed as having a particular 
configuration of beliefs and intentions. This is the use that Bratman adopts which 
views 'having a plan' as being a state of mind, a use which I adopt in this work.
Thus plans are in the same category as intentions and beliefs but which are 
different as wiU be discussed later. A synthesis of the views of Miller et al., and 
Bratman, suggests that 'having a plan' is the state of mind whereby a person controls 
the order in which a set of beliefs and intentions are executed to perform a sequence of 
operations to achieve a goal.
Bratman (1983, 1987, 1990) is a researcher, who more than most others, has 
worked out in greater detail what sort of things plans are. His ideas harmonize with the 
views presented in this work and therefore are discussed in some detail.
65
3.1.3.2 Bratman's view of plans
Starting from the point that 'having a plan' is a state of mind, a plan can be 
identified as a coherent collection of acts a person can accomplish to achieve some end 
state. It can consist of one or more immediately executable steps or any step can be a 
plan in itself. Each plan has possible pre- and post- conditions, and as each step can be 
a plan, each step has pre- and post- conclusions.
Bratman (1987: 5-7), links plans and intentions closely together which is useful 
for my purposes. He claims that the approach to intention from a traditional 
philosophy of mind can be cited in terms of four theses (Anscombe, 1963; Goldman, 
1970).
1. The methodological priority of intention in action.
2. The desire-belief theory of intention in action.
3. The strategy of extension.
4. A reduction of future-directed intention to appropriate 
desires and beliefs.
Briefly, what this strategy implies, is the idea that what makes it true for an action 
to be performed intentionally or with a certain intention, are those facts relating to the 
action as to what the agent desires and believes. 2 follows from 1 and the combination 
of 2 and 3 lead on to 4. Within this theory of intention, action is viewed as being a 
matter which is related to the agent's desires and beliefs, while intention to act is to be 
identified with some desire-belief complex. The rationality of intentional action in this 
view is primarily a function of the agent's desire-belief reasons for action. Other 
considerations bear on the rationality of conduct only indirectly and dependent on their 
relation to the agent's desires and beliefs. Bratman believes that all four theses should 
be rejected and thus also, the desire-belief model.
The problem he sees with these four theses is that they are more appropriate to an 
understanding of nonhuman animals but not to planning agents such as humans. Two
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dimensions to the commitment of future directed intention are volition and reasoning. 
A characteristic of plans is that they are formed, retained, combined and constrained by 
other plans. Often they are only partial and need to be filled in, reconsidered and 
modified and the strategies expressed by the theses 1 and 3 do not do justice to the 
argument that humans are rational planning agents who have resource limitations and 
need to coordinate their actions both on an intrapersonal level as weU as a social level.
Intentions can be viewed as the building blocks of plans and Bratman suggests 
that, "plans are intentions writ large" (ibid, 1987: 8; cf. Miller et al., 1960: 65). This is 
a useful way of viewing intentions and all things considered, it seems appropriate to 
reject the desire-belief model of intention in favour of a planning approach to intention. 
In this view intentions concerning future actions become elements in larger plans and 
so prior deliberation shapes later conduct Prior intentions and plans provide a practical 
reasoning framework by which the desire-belief reasons for various options can be 
weighed. Such a reasoning framework provides a filter on options that become a 
potential solution to problems.
The ideas of Bratman accord with the basis of this work that communication is a 
rational, purposive activity. Intentions are somewhat intangible concepts but to cast 
them as components of plans make them more manageable. Utterances in this model 
are viewed as intentional actions following Searle (1980: 52) and therefore are seen as 
sub-components of higher-order plans in the achievement of speaker's goals.
There are other characteristics of plans which I do not intend to discuss such as 
control, stability, means-end coherency, and the hierarchical as well as linear nature of 
plans. Though these aspects are important as well as being interesting they are not 
relevant to my main argument which is the plan-based nature of dialogue that 
characterises utterances as being the sub-components of higher-order communicative 
plans and goals. Whereas many other studies have applied planning approaches to the 
higher-order and over-arching planning behaviour of agents this work applies it to 
agents' communicative goals and seeks to show how these might be made explicit in 
individual utterances.
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3.1.4 Knowledge and belief
Our day to day interaction appears to require that we have an internal model of the 
world on which to base our actions. To enable us to cope with the demands of daily 
living it is necessary for us to carry around in our heads a vast array of knowledge and 
information. Each of our cognitive functions - perception, memory, problem-solving 
and the use and understanding of language relies on this store of knowledge. A central 
issue for psychologists is the structure and content of this internal model and the 
restrictions and processes which govern i t
Models of perception, memory, problem-solving, and language understanding or 
production are dependent, to varying degrees, on the type of information structures 
they employ. If we were able to determine the structure and content of a person's 
internal model then psychologists could use this knowledge to extrapolate to other 
models, aspects of human behaviour. The way in which these internal models may be 
structured and organized has implications for models of other types of behaviour 
which utilize stored information.
Cognitive models of the mind or information processing models of memory 
display three basic characteristics:
1. The first concerns and relates to the structure of knowledge and 
how this stored information is represented within the memory 
system.
2. The second aspect concerns the nature of the processes which 
operate on this stored information and,
3. thirdly, the overall system structure which is the permanent 
and neural physical processing feature of the system.
My immediate concern is how the characteristics implied in 1 and 2 relate to this 
work. That is, how the knowledge or the beliefs of the agents are to be made explicit
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and represented in this model and what might be the nature of some of the processes 
that operate on stored information in the process of dialogue.
Within the literature several different representational types can be identified and it 
becomes apparent that different types serve differing purposes and functions 
(Anderson, 1983: 76; Fodor, 1975: 194; Johnson-Laird, 1983: 157). It would seem 
that there exists a hierarchy of such types and even hierarchies within a type. It is the 
nature of this organization that contributes to the richness and flexibility of the system. 
Representations can be mixed and although at one level a psychological process may 
use a symbolic string of symbols, it may at a higher level use various sorts of 
representation such as images, mental models or propositions.
It is not my intention to deal with the subject of knowledge representation or the 
structure of knowledge at any length apart from how it relates to and affects this woik.
The beliefs of the agents in this model are represented in a prepositional form and 
it is this form of representation which is discussed in more detail. This does not imply 
that other representations such as spatial images (Anderson, 1983: 52), mental models 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983) and temporal strings (Anderson, 1983: 57; Pylyshyn, 1973: 2; 
Johnson-Laird, 1983: 146/148) are unimportant but rather that they are not viewed as 
being as amenable or as flexible as a prepositional representation for my purposes.
Neither am I dealing with the structure of beliefs and knowledge and therefore do 
not intend to discuss theories of knowledge structure such as semantic networks 
(Quillian, 1968) or semantic field theories (Findler, 1979: see also Brachman & 
Levesque, 1985; Schubert, 1976) or frames (Minsky, 1975). Scripts (Schank & 
Abelson, 1977) are another form of knowledge structure and have some similarities to 
plan-methods that are used by this model. The way in which this concept is used will 
be explained in the description of the components of the model while a much fuller 
description of Schank & Abelson's ideas can be found in Appendix 5.
I turn now to a discussion of propositional representations of beliefs and 
knowledge which is the representation chosen for this work.
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3.1.4.1 Abstract propositional representations
This approach to representation assumes that what a person knows can be 
represented by a finite list of propositions or axioms. Johnson-Laird (1983) uses the 
concept in its traditional philosophical terminology and states that a propositional 
roprosontation is a mental representation of a verbally expressible proposition (ibid: 
155). He reminds the reader that philosophers have generally taken propositions to be 
the conscious objects of thought - entities that we entertain, believe, think about and 
which are expressed in sentences and utterances.
These propositions are abstract constructs and not to be thought of as being tokens 
of actual sentences of some natural language that are being stored. Rules of deductive 
reasoning or some method of inferencing can then be applied to this list of 
propositions to generate all the logically valid propositions which follow from the 
initial premises. It is an approach which is generative in the sense that an unlimited 
number of beliefs' can be deduced from the initial representation.
This encoding process is more abstract in form than that of temporal strings or 
spatial images in that the code is independent of the order of information. For example, 
MARY SCOLDED JANE has the propositional representation of [scolded Mary Jane]. 
It encodes the fact that the two arguments, Mary and Jane, are in an abstract relation of 
scolding. The representation does not encode who is on the right or on the left of the 
example; that is, it doos not encode the difference between MARY SCOLDED JANE 
and JANE WAS SCOLDED BY MARY. The encoding of the scene may ignore all 
other details such as the clothing of the participants or their spatial configuration at the 
time. What propositional encodings do is to identify certain elements as being critical 
and ignore all others.
Another feature of propositions is that they represent relational categorisations of 
experience. In development, the mind has learned to see certain configurations only 
whioh implies that there are constraints among the elements of propositions. For 
example, 'scolded' takes two arguments while 'give' takes three and 'decide' requires 
as one of its arguments an embedded proposition, A pertinent property of propositions
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is their ability to detect elements that are connected before detecting how. The relational 
structure imposes conditions on propositional structure in that the relation only takes a 
fixed number of slots, no more and no less.
Sometimes, a relation is constructed in which not all the arguments are specified 
but even then we fill in the missing arguments by drawing inferences. For example, if 
we hear the statement JOHN WAS SHOT we cannot but help fill in the dummy agent; 
that is, the person doing the shooting. The notion of a missing slot is another feature in 
which propositions differ either from strings or images. It would be difficult to 
envisage strings or images having 'holes' in them. Strings and images appear to code 
stimuli directly and any combination is logically possible but individual elements of the 
string or image do not constrain what the other elements might be. Propositions do not 
reflect environmental structures directly but rather reflect an abstraction of the event 
The distinctive properties belonging to propositions derive from their abstract and 
set-like character (Anderson, 1983: 75/6). The encoding processes have to be learned. 
People learn from experience which aspects of an event are significant and accordingly 
develop a code to represent these higher-order properties. Such a process is a more 
direct and efficient way of storing information than the storage of raw stimuli data and 
is likely to yield an economy of storage in long-term memory.
Rather than storing sentences or the exact words of a sentence, the code represents 
the significant relationships between semantic components directly. Anderson (ibid.) 
points to other more significant advantages of such a representation. They will occupy 
less space in working memory and therefore, will not burden the pattern matching 
processes with unnecessary detail. Furthermore, the inferential rules or processes 
required to manipulate the structures, can be stored only for the abstract relations and 
need not be separately stored for all types of input that give rise to the relation (ibid.).
There is much empirical evidence to support this view of propositional 
representations and one of the principle lines of research comes from the various 
sentence memory studies (Kintseh, 1974: 150-151). These show that memory 
performance can be better predicted by semantic variables than by the word structure
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or grammatical syntax of the original sentences. This research shows that the gist of 
what is said is recorded better than the memory for the exact words spoken or read (cf 
Bransford, Barclay & Franks, 1972).
Pylyshyn (1973: 12) and Anderson & Bower (1973: 151-156) have argued that a 
propositional code is sufficient to encode all kinds of information. However, 
Anderson (1983: 45) in his ACT* system notes that for all the arguments for the 
sufficiency of propositions, they often prove quite cumbersome in implementation. He 
discovered that nonpropositional representations could work well in a production 
system framework. As a result, he argues that what is important is what can be done 
with a representation and not simply its form or notation.
Consequently, he argues for a tri-code theory of knowledge representation on the 
grounds that different representationfi are needed, not just for different applications but 
for different aspects of the same application. As an example he cites the generation of 
geometry proofs in which a linear structure is required to represent the order of 
statements in a proof; spatial structures to represent the diagram; and propositional 
structures to represent the logical interpretations of postulates (1983:45).
Another discovery of Anderson which militates against the arguments for a 
prepositional system over a multicode system is that the propositional representation of 
sentence word order can be complex relative to the simplicity of the string to be 
represented. This is because the conventions used in propositional representation are 
required for representing the complexities of other knowledge structures which means 
that characteristics pertinent to simple knowledge structures cannot always be 
capitalized on. Inefficiency results when processes have to operate on unnecessary 
detail.
From the foregoing it could be easily assumed that the concepts 'proposition' and 
'propositional attitudes' are clearly categorised within the literature and without 
controversy. Unhappily, this is not the case and the concepts prove to be more 
slippery than this discussion would indicate. Barwise & Perry (1983: 177) draw 
attention to the differences that exist in defining the terms and suggest that there is little
7 2
semblance of any consensus as to what a proposition actually is. They point out that it 
has been categorised variously as: a state-of-affairs, sentence, sentence-meaning, 
mental representation, or a set of possible worlds. Nevertheless, though the formal 
definition of these concepts is not without difficulty the various senses point in a 
certain direction and it is these senses that we have to work with.
3.1.4.2 The representation of knowledge in this work
Knowledge belonging to the agents in this model has been characterised as their 
beliefs. These are represented as propositions.
Belief appears to have several components to it. A cognitive or knowledge 
component as well as an affective and behavioural component It is not my intention to 
discuss the affective or behavioural components of belief in this work as the concepts 
associated with these components, though important, do not have any immediate 
bearing on my main objective. The cognitive component of belief is my immediate . 
concern and it is this element which is represented in this work in a propositional 
form.
A distinction is often made in the psychological literature between beliefs as 
propositional attitudes and beliefs as psychological states. For example, Engel 
suggests that we should not confuse having a belief with being conscious of the 
contents of the belief (Engel, 1984: 53; cf Jacob, 1984: 72). It is not easy to unravel 
the distinction between the possible causal role of beliefs and their content and what is 
accepted here is the 'common sense psychology' notion that there are elements of 
both.
Jacob (1984: 69) points out that in our explanations of behaviour we typically 
invoke two kinds of mental elements, those of beliefs and desires and by combining 
them, make sense of behaviour. We say that Bill did such and such because he 
believed that p and wanted q and in doing so indicate that Bill has a certain preference 
for a certain state of affairs to pertain and chooses an action to realize this state of 
affairs. People are viewed as performing actions on the basis of having certain beliefs
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which implies that psychological belief-states play a causal role in action (Galliers, 
1989: 29). Both Engel and Jacob suggest and discuss different theories to this problem 
but which need not concern us further here.
Not all beliefs are equally important to the individual but by what criteria can a 
person's beliefs be distinguished as being central and important from those which are 
less so? The centrality of beliefs and the role they serve for the person has implications 
for that person's behaviour but some beliefs will have a more prominent role than 
others. Rokeach (1968) proposes a defining attribute of importance for beliefs which 
is in terms of 'connectedness':
"....the more a given belief is functionally connected or in 
communication with other beliefs, the more implications and 
consequences it has for the other beliefs and, therefore, the more 
central the belief (Rokeach, 1968:5).
This attribute of connectedness is used by Rokeach to order beliefs along a central- 
peripheral dimension. What arises from this ordering is the suggestion that the more 
central a belief is, the more it will resist change and the more the central belief does 
change, the more widespread the repercussions will be on the rest of the system. The 
four defining assumptions of connectedness are: (1) existential versus nonexistential 
beliefs; (2) shared versus unshared beliefs about existence and self-identity; (3) 
derived versus underived beliefs; and (4), beliefs concerning matters of taste 
(Rokeach, 1968: 5-6).
From these criteria it can be argued that the most central beliefs are those that are 
learned by direct encounter with the object of the belief. Such beliefs can be viewed as 
being incontrovertible as they rarely pose as being subjects of controversy, e.g. 
humans need air to breathe, death is inevitable etc. Rokeach suggests that such beliefs 
can be considered as being axiomatic and have a "taken for granted character". These 
type of beliefs can be described as being primitive in as far as they represent the basic
7 4
truths a person has about their nature and of physical and social reality. Included in 
this system are beliefs about the constancy of physical objects and the constancy of 
others with respect to physical objects.
In the model being proposed in this work, the changes that are modelled as taking 
place between agents' knowledge configurations are in the area of the agents' derived 
beliefs and beliefs concerning matters of taste. Changes in these beliefs have fewer 
functional connections and consequences for other beliefs and it is argued that it is on 
this level that much of the normal day-to-day interaction and communication between 
agents is concerned. However, the more primitive beliefs have a bearing on what is 
mutually agreed between the agents and the way in which they cooperate in the 
communicative interaction. Much of what relates to this aspect has a taken for granted 
characteristic similar to that of primitive beliefs and only becomes an issue when an 
agent departs from what the other agent considers to be normal.
3.1.5 Wants and goals
Galliers (1989) in her model suggests that:
"Goals characterize what is implicit in the agent's desires. Having a 
goal that p, describes what the world would be like if p were true. This 
means that implicit in an agent's goals are all the logical consequences 
of those goals, just as having one belief means all the logical 
implications are also believed. A goal is a state of the world, and it is 
the state of the world the attainment of which, is desired by the agent. 
Attainment of the state thus satisfies the goal" (Galliers, 1989:44).
This definition used by Galliers in her theory, is determined by the particular 
formal approach which she has adopted in modelling beliefs derived from a 
representation using modal operators in a possible-world semantics (following 
Hintikka,1962). In a possible-world semantics agents know all the logical
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consequences of what they know and believe all the logical consequences of what they 
believe. The same characteristic, because of the formalism used, is also applied in her 
scheme to the formalization of goals. This characteristic is one that bedevils possible- 
world semantics but is too strong for models of human dialogue. This is a 
characteristic of ideal belief systems but it has been previously noted that human 
rationality and human belief systems are imperfect and a formalization for intentions, 
beliefs, and goals needs to be found to account for imperfect rational belief systems.
Agents have multiple goals some of which are long term, others of which are more 
short term and immediate. The immediate focus of this present work is on those goals 
that the agent is committed to in the process of dialogue. The view adopted here 
follows that of Galliers in accepting that the notion of commitment to a goal is 
important and that die existence of a goal presupposes some level of commitment. This 
is in line with Cohen and Levesque's work which defines a persistent goal as one 
which the agent will only give up, either when it is satisfied, or comes to believe that it 
is impossible to achieve or the reason for it no longer exists (Cohen & Levesque, 
1987; Galliers, 1989: 45).
The term 'communicative goal' has been used throughout this work and deserves 
clarification. Galliers (1989: 46-47) defines its use in her theory as being used only to 
refer to the desire to induce changes in the knowledge configurations of others. The 
use of the term here is wider. It not only refers to the purpose for which the agent 
initiated or participates in the dialogue, but also refers to the goal of each utterance and 
the necessary changes that need to be made in the knowledge configuration of others to 
ultimately achieve that goal. In this sense, each of the sub-goals are part of the main 
goal and could be described as 'communicative sub-goals'. A response from the hearer 
to a speaker's 'sub-goal utterance' may result in the speaker either changing the 
original goal or even dropping it and therefore is related to the original purpose for 
communication. The term communicative goal in this work covers both these uses.
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A major argument of this thesis is based on the premise that utterances bring about 
changes in the knowledge configurations of agents. It is necessary to look more 
closely at what is meant by this process.
3.1.6 Belief revision and changes in knowledge configurations
Changes in the knowledge configuration and beliefs of agents can be brought 
about in a number of ways as agents are exposed to new and fresh information. This 
might result in the formation of new beliefs, adaptations and modifications to existing 
beliefs and sometimes result in a challenge or prove to be contradictory to existing 
beliefs. It may only mean that another piece of knowledge is added to the system. 
What we are concerned with in this present work are the changes in knowledge 
configurations of agents as a result of utterances occurring in the process of dialogue.
Before proceeding further it is important that I clarify what is meant by the term 
knowledge configuration'.
This work is sympathetic to Galliers (1989: 29) view, that Cohen & Levesque's 
(1985) work and others (see Galliers, 1989: 29) is an advance from earlier work 
which is primarily a theoty of communication in terms of mental states and how these 
lead to action and the subsequent effects of those actions on mental states. However, I 
believe the use of the term 'mental states' can be misleading and needs some 
clarification.
Despite this being a term that is used extensively in the literature, writers and 
researchers generally do not clarify what they mean by it and Baker & Hacker in 
particular have challenged its use as being ludicrous. They say:
".... the belief that to know something is to be in a certain mental state.
This is a grave misunderstanding" (Baker & Hacker, 1984: 279).
and argue that moods such as cheerfulness, depression as well as excitement, terror 
and anger are mental states. Such states do not continue through loss of
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consciousness, that is, one may be excited when one goes to sleep before a significant 
event but is not excited while asleep. They maintain that knowing is not a mental state 
as one's knowledge cannot be interrupted, only forgotten and later recollected or 
relearnt (ibid: 279-80). Although what Baker & Hacker appear to be referring to may 
more appropriately be designated as emotional states and one may take exception to 
their view that knowing is not a mental state, I have chosen to avoid the term in an 
attempt to avoid any confusion. In this work a distinction is made between mental 
states which can be equated with emotional states and the changes in a person's 
knowledge configuration that are brought about by being exposed to the process of 
dialogue and any new information displayed in this process.
Therefore, instead of the term 'mental states' I will use the alternative term 
•knowledge configurations'. I believe that this term is more perspicuous for my 
purpose and relates more explicitly to the changes in elements of knowledge that come 
about in the process of dialogue. In this work Toiowledge configuration' will refer to a 
person's knowledge and belief set at a particular point in time. It relates specifically to 
the set of beliefs a person has which relate immediately to the dialogue in progress.
3.1.6.1 Manipulation versus display
Galliers (1989: 68) and Allwood (1976: 73) take the view that changes in agents' 
knowledge configurations (Galliers' mental states) are brought about by the 
'manipulation' of one agent by another. Both argue that it is plausible that agents are 
able to manipulate the knowledge configurations of other agents by what they say. 
Galliers uses the concept in her work without defining what she means by it and 
appears to leave the reader to understand the term in its normal and everyday sense. I 
fmd the use of the term in this context problematic, and believe that Galliers' use of it 
is somewhat inconsistent in relation to some of her other claims for agents, i.e. that 
agents have autonomy over their knowledge configurations and are viewed as being 
able to control what they boliovo and what thoy reveal:
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"Agents are considered autonomous. They have control over the flow 
of information in the multi-agent system, both in terms of what they 
acquire and what they reveal" (Galliers, 1989: 34).
To change someone's mind about some state of affairs according to Galliers, is to 
alter the context of a person's knowledge configuration thus changing conflict into 
cooperation. She adopts the view that the role of dialogue is the instrument by which 
agents can manipulate these knowledge configurations (Galliers, 1989: 8).
The problem with her use of the verb 'manipulate' is that it is a term which seems 
to imply that an agent can manipulate the knowledge configurations directly in the 
same way that an agent can manipulate the controls of a machine or use their hands in a 
manual task. The implication that agents can directly manipulate the knowledge 
configurations of others, conflicts with the claim that agents have autonomy over the 
knowledge configurations that they acquire or reveal.
Similarly, Allwood argues that:
"From the point of view of the sender, the communicative process 
begins when he consciously begins to manipulate the individuals 
around him" (Allwood, 1976:73).
He defines the term and its use in this manner:
"By manipulation will be meant any action intended to bring about a 
reaction in another individual. The intention accompanying a 
manipulatory action will be called an evocative intention. The 
manipulatory action need not be apprehended by the receiving 
individual" (Allwood, 1976:73).
7 9
I would argue that Allwood's use of the term is misleading and that it is an 
inappropriate term for its purpose. It is similar to a number of verbs that could be used 
in its place and which serve only to indicate what the intending agent is wanting to 
achieve. For example, to deceive, frustrate or lie. Each of these indicate activities by 
one agent to influence another but do not tell us whether the agent to whom the activity 
is done, undergoes any change in knowledge. What they do indicate is the intention of 
the intending agent and it is possible to conclude that the utterances made with such 
intentions carry illocutionary forces which could have an effect on the other agent's 
knowledge configurations.
What I believe to be a more useful term with respect to changing agents' 
knowledge configurations and which is another of Allwood's terms, is that of 
'display'. (Allwood, 1976:74). About such a term Allwood has the following to say:
"The first stage of evoking a conscious reaction is very often to get an 
individual to merely apprehend or attend to some specific object We 
will call a manipulatory action which is intended to make a receiver at 
least apprehend or attend to a certain object, through some manner of 
apprehension like direct observation or inference, an act of display" 
(Allwood, 1976: 74).
Furthermore, Allwood argues:
"An act of display is thus a rather complex intentional action involving 
at least the following intentions, with some degree of awareness:
1.the instrumental plan governing the manner of display, and
2.the purposive plan governing the information intended to be 
communicated, based on assumptions about shared cognitive 
presuppositions and normal rational agenthood...." (Allwood, 1976:
75).
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"...from the sender's point of view, manipulation can primarily aim at 
both unconscious influence and at conscious apprehension, but display 
always aims at apprehension first. Both activities can then aim at 
further reactions on the part of the receiver" (AUwood, 1976: 90).
Though Allwood's use of the term 'manipulatory action' has been rejected, what is 
being postulated here is that an agent has certain intentions in making certain 
utterances, the purpose of which is to change the hearers knowledge configuration to 
an orientation in which the hearer is able to apprehend information prior to the possible 
recognition of the speaker's intentions. In order for this to be possible the speaker 
displays the orientation of her knowledge configuration to the other participant by the 
utterances she makes. The receiving agent is confronted with the information and after 
apprehension has to make a choice or decision as to whether any change in her beliefs 
is in order. This sounds simpler than it is.
Knowledge configurations are fluid conditions and cannot but be affected by 
incoming information and therefore, are changing all the time, especially in the process 
of dialogue. Once an utterance is heard and understood by an agent, though the 
speaker could withdraw the comment, there is a sense in which it cannot be withdrawn 
and has an irrevocable characteristic about i t  However, whether any more permanent 
changes take place within the belief system of the receiving agent, relates to the agent's 
autonomy over their own knowledge configurations and the decisions they make 
regarding the nature of the incoming information. An agent in making an utterance 
displays her own knowledge configurations in a specific orientation. The receiving 
agent is exposed to this orientation of beliefs by the sending agent which cannot be 
otherwise.
What effect this has on the receiving agent relates to her own specific orientation of 
beliefs and may have little or much relevance. If the display is of significant relevance 
it may bring about a change in the knowledge configuration of the receiving agent 
Much depends on the content of the information displayed, the intention of the sending
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agent, the illocutionary force of the utterance received and the relevance of this to the 
receiving agent The use of the term ’display’ has advantages over the use of the term 
’manipulation’ and preserves the concept of the autonomy of agents over their 
knowledge configurations in what they acquire and reveal.
Some brief space now needs to be devoted to an examination of the mechanisms 
the receiving agent employs to make the necessary changes to their knowledge 
configurations on the receipt of now and relevant information,
3.1.6.2 Association
Incoming information associates or matches with the specific orientation of the 
hearer's knowledge configuration at that particular point in the process. Elements of 
the incoming information may already be present or activated in the receiving agent's 
knowledge configuration and therefore requires no further activation. They may be 
activated by the context in which the dialogue is taking place and in this respect salient 
to both participants. If not, additional incoming information will activate or elicit 
associations with previously stored information which then become part of the 
receiving agent's knowledge configuration. Associations are made when bits of 
incoming information are known and recognized and matched with previously stored 
pieces of information. In other words there is a matching or connecting of information 
that takes place and additional information can be said to fit with previously stored 
information.
It is likely that at some stage in the process new information wül be available to the 
receiving agent which either has to be noted, accepted or rejected. Whatever, it 
influences in some way the current orientation of the receiving agent's knowledge 
configuration and this fresh information may involve a considerable amount of mental 
processing. Furthermore, connections might have to be made by the receiving agent as 
to how the new information fits with existing information as the connections may not 
be obvious or evident immediately. This process is described as inferencing.
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3.1.6.3 Inference
Agents are able to draw conclusions or inferences from the information contained 
in another agent's knowledge configuration and to the extent that this knowledge 
configuration is displayed to them. A hearer has no direct access to the intended 
meaning of the speaker and often has to rely on making inferences to understand what 
is said. What enables them to do this is the enormous amount of existing background 
knowledge they have available to them. Gumperz (1982) puts it in the following 
manner.
"Conversationalists thus rely on indirect inferences which build on 
background assumptions about context, interactive goals and 
interpersonal relations to derive frames in terms of which they can 
interpret what is going on"
(Gumperz, 1982: 2).
Agents are actively constructing an interpretation of what they hear and exercising 
effort to understand and make sense of this. It is done by making connections between 
the social context and their existing background knowledge. Background knowledge 
underpins dialogue and the larger the pool of background information participants in a 
dialogue share together, the more likely their conversation will be condensed and 
abbreviated. This is for the reason that fewer connections have to be made, as agents 
who know each other intimately share a greater fund of background knowledge.
As a consequence, they are able to make more assumptions about each other and 
many of the connections they need to make are made automatically. The ability to draw 
conclusions about the behaviour, beliefs and intentions of other persons, relates to a 
person's consciousness and to the way a person perceives themselves being seen by 
others. Allwood (1976) suggests that the ability has to do with social competence. His 
conslrual of inference making is:
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"Drawing conclusions is here to be construed in a broad sense as 
inferential ability, ability to notice connections, similarities and 
analogies on the basis of earlier experience of particular individuals and 
the world in general" (Allwood, 1976:94).
He claims that this is not only a part of social consciousness and competence but is 
the kind of ability that makes it possible for an agent to interact with other individuals. 
Brown & Yule (1983) appeal to the rather general notion of inference and describe it 
as that process which:
"...the reader (hearer) must go through to get from the literal meaning 
of what is written (or said) to what the writer (speaker) intended to 
convey" (Brown & Yule, 1983: 256).
They suggest that information can be seen in formal terms as the missing link 
which is required for an explicit connection to be made between one item and another 
and therefore, it might be possible to envisage inferences, necessary to understand 
utterances, as the process of filling in the missing links (ibid: 257).
They discuss a distinction between two categories of missing link. A kind that is 
made automatically and those they describe as 'bridging assumptions'. The distinction 
is made on the basis that bridging assumptions take processing time and automatic 
inferences don't. As a consequence they suggest that the missing links that are made 
automatically should not be described as inferences (ibid: 259-262). It is helpful to 
look at their arguments a little more closely.
The conclusion that 'bridging assumptions' take more mental processing time 
derives from the work of Haviland & Clark (1974) who found that determining the 
referent for the beer in (3.2b) took readers significantly longer to process than in 
(3.1b):
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(3.1) a. Mary got some beer out of the trunk, 
b . The beer was warm
(3.2) a. We checked the picnic supplies, 
b. The beer was warm 
(Haviland & Clark, 1974: 514-515)
The understanding of (3.2) requires a particular inferential process which is 
described as being a ’bridging assumption’ between (3.2a) and (3.2b) which is:
(3.2) c. llie  picnic supplies mentioned include some beer
The argument being that this type of bridging assumption takes time and accounts for 
the difference in comprehension times noted between (3.1b) and (3.2b). Brown & 
Yule suggest that the implication from this type of research finding is that inferences 
take time (ibid: 257).
Automatic inferences are somewhat different and they cite the following examples:
(3.3) a. 1 bought a bicycle yesterday
b. The frame is extra large
c . The bicycle has a frame
(3.4) a. 1 looked into the room
b . The ceiling was very high
c. The room has a ceiling
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(3.5) a. This afternoon a strange man came into my office
b . His nose was purple
c. The man has a nose
(from Brown & Yule, 1983: 257)
They suggest that in each of these examples, the missing link expresses 
information which we might expect to be represented in one of the stereotypic 
knowledge formats (e.g. frames, scripts etc.,). Brown & Yule argue that if the 
distinction is to be made between inferences as bridging assumptions that involve 
processing time and automatic inferences as indicated in these examples, then it would 
follow that those missing links which are automatically made are not rightly described 
as inferences (ibid: 259). There are some difficulties that need to be identified with 
their argument and the examples they have used to support this.
Firstly, they argue that inferences such as bridging assumptions take time on the 
basis of the example in (3.2). On the surface this example is problematic in terms of 
processing time and being able to distinguish the difference in this between (3.1) and
(3.2) as Brown & Yule do not make clear whether this could be due to a repetition 
effect of the words used in the sentences. However, Haviland & Clark were aware that 
their results might have arisen because of the simple facilitating effect of repetition 
(ibid: 515) and carried out experiments to control for this. They found that the mere 
repetition of the critical noun was not enough to account for the length of time taken in 
the initial experiments and concluded that tlie fust sentence of tliesc couplets was new 
information that needed to be attached to previously processed information in memory 
(ibid: 512)
The argument that (3.3) - (3.5) should not be seen as inferences is correct because 
no missing links can be identified and no connections have to be made. This 
postulation is made on the basis of the following argument. How many bicycles don't 
have frames? How many rooms don't have ceilings and how many men don't have
8 6
noses? Whilst a room might still be a room without a ceiling and a man still a man 
without a nose, would a bicycle be a bicycle without a frame? Many objects are known 
for what they are because of the characteristic parts that constitute them as being that 
object. That men have noses is likely to be an existential type of belief (3.1.4.2 & 
Rokeach, 1968: 5) and only noted as being different when a person is seen as being 
deformed in some manner or has been injured.
I am suggesting that much of our knowledge is stored either in a 'frame' or 'mental 
model' type of organization which helps to explain this phenomenon. When a 
particular frame or mental model has been activated in memory the essential parts that 
constitute the basic model are necessarily activated along with that model otherwise it 
would not be a mental model of that item. For example, reference to a bicycle would 
activate a mental model of a bicycle in which a frame, two wheels, handle-bars, saddle 
and pedals are likely to be part of the model. One would have to know what a bicycle 
was to have such a model activated. The frame appears to be an item that is essential to 
the idea of a bicycle and without one, one is left with an assortment of bicycle parts.
The concept of frame or mental model can be used to explain representations either 
in terms of a 'whole' or if necessary, its individual parts can be used. Tire individual 
parts can be added to or deleted, depending on the task and the use of the model. 
Similarly, a person is likely to have mental models of rooms, the stereotype of which 
is Rkely to have a ceiling and also mental models of faces which are likely to require 
the presence of a nose. Many connections between one item and another can be made 
on this basis. Items can be retrieved from mental models with ease for they are present 
within the model and only focus, attention or reference is required to activate 
individual parts of the model.
The examples which Brown and Yule (1983) initially termed as automatic 
inferences can be dealt with by reference to 'mental models' or 'frame-like' 
conceptions of knowledge organization but the inferences they term as bridging 
assumptions suggest as having to be dealt with differently. While I query the use of 
their particular example on which they base the argument for processing time for these
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type of inferences, I believe their argument has some value and relates to the possible 
time it might take for some connections to be made in mental models.
For example, the connection in a mental model between (3.2a) and (3.2b) that beer 
was included in picnic supplies might talco longer to make because hccr might not be a 
normal part of an agent's model of picnic supplies. Brown & Yule make a similar 
point about a group of real ale enthusiasts who often indulge their enthusiasm on 
picnics. It is likely that beer for them would be an automatic component of their mental 
model of picnic supplies (ibid: 263). If this is the case it poses a problem for any 
distinction between 'automatic' or 'non-automatic' inferences and points to all 
inferencing as being related to the distance or depth of processing required to make 
connections between different items of information.
Some of the elements of Brown & Yules' discussion of inference are valuable for 
present purposes. I would wish to argue that inferences can be interpreted as being 
missing links of information or seen as information that is not immediately present or 
in focus for the hearer and thus requiring mental processing in terms of making 
connections.
Connections are made between different items which constitute mental models and 
different connections may need to be made between different mental models or more 
complex models. Some of these connections are made more or less automatically 
because the connections are present as essential and constitutive parts of the mental 
model. In other instances the mental model has to be developed and information from 
other models has to be retrieved for incorporation into a particular mental model which 
might take some mental processing time. Elements of this theory are incorporated into 
the model of dialogue to be presented in chapter four. In my model agents derive 
connections between pieces of information which are obtained from frame-like 
structures containing representations of their beliefs.
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3.2 Summary
The major elements that are viewed as being necessary for a theory of rational 
action and interaction have been identified and shown how they relate to this work.
It has been argued that dialogue is a purposive activity of intentional human 
systems who are viewed as being rational, albeit with an imperfect rationality. These 
intentional systems are also belief systems and the beliefs, wants, goals and plans 
characteristic of such systems activate and derive from intentions and intentional 
action. This occurs within a context of multi-agent rationality, cooperation and shared 
knowledge.
In the following chapters a descriptive model of dialogue is presented which is 
derived from the theory presented here.
•oOo-
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Chapter 4 - A model of natural language dialogue
It has been noted in the foregoing chapters that there are at least two major 
emphases in conversation analysis both of which tackle the problem from very 
different directions. For example, there are the speech act theorists who focus on the 
individual utterances of speech and appear to ignore the context in which individual 
utterances are made. On the other hand there are those researchers and analysts of 
conversation who view all utterances as being part of a sequence and consider that it is 
not appropriate to divorce a single utterance from its context within the conversational 
process. They argue that an utterance needs to be examined, not only in relation to the 
wider context but also as a unit among other utterances which it might be part of and in 
its appropriate place within the conversational sequence. I am in some sympathy with 
both approaches and utilize insights from both fields. However, the tension between 
these two approaches helps to identify the problem with which my research is 
concerned.
The major idea of this thesis is that dialogue is motivated by the goals and 
purposes of the participants. These initially are in the form of beliefs, attitudes and 
intentions. Agents construct plans by which their communicative intentions and 
associated goals are achieved and which culminate in individual utterances untü goals 
and purposes are either fulfilled or aborted. The result of such interaction is a dialogue 
or conversational sequence. The purpose of this present chapter is to identify and to 
describe the components of a model of natural language dialogue and show how these 
might work together in the process of dialogue.
In delineating the components of this model, the reader should bear in mind the 
type of model that is being constructed here and the comments made about such 
models that were more fully described in 1.8. The model presented here is not a scale 
model neither is it an analogue or mathematical model. It is a theoretical model and 
therefore, in Black's terms, "a certain way of talking" (Black, 1962: 229). The 
advantages and disadvantages of this type of model were discussed in 1.8 and I do not
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intend to repeat the arguments here. What needs to be emphasised here is that the 
components of the model to be described are viewed as being the strategic components 
necessary for inclusion in any proposed model of dialogue and therefore, likely to be 
among the most important elements in a theory of dialogue. It is likely that such major 
components are supported by a host of other subsidiary functions and operations. 
Though nonetheless important, these are not my major concern and therefore are not 
detailed in any specific manner within the model.
What is presented here is a precise arrangement of the knowledge configurations of 
two agents involved in a particular piece of communicative interaction. In this selected 
piece of interaction the agents each have individual and disparate goals to achieve. This 
is accomplished by communicative interaction and negotiation. They are not involved 
in a joint task as the possible outcomes of the interaction are very different for each of 
them. However, each of the agents can only achieve their goals if both agents are 
successful in achieving their individual goals. It is possible for one of the agents to 
achieve their goal at the expense of the other whilst the other agent has the power to 
see that neither goal is achieved.
Nevertheless, in order to achieve their different objectives tlie participants need to 
cooperate on a communicative level and only by each of the agents pursuing their own 
goals will each succeed in achieving their individual goals. Each agent brings to the 
interaction a different set of beliefs, attitudes and intentions. Furthermore, each agent 
has attitudes about the beliefs and intentions of the other agent The net result is what 
Power describes as a set of "interlocking mental states of great complexity" (Power, 
1984: 87).
The agents involved are assumed to function on rational principles and their 
utterances are seen to derive from their intentions based on their beliefs and attitudes. 
Goals arc achieved by the agents in an exchange of utterances that derive from the 
changes in knowledge configurations of each of the agents as the dialogue progresses. 
It takes place within a context of rational cooperation in which much knowledge is 
shared or held in common.
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4.1 Syntax, Semantics and Pragmatics
The organization for a natural language comprehension system is viewed by most 
researchers to require three phases: syntactic parsing, semantic interpretation and 
contextual interpretation and many toxtbooltG which address the subject of language, 
approach it along these three major dimensions as do numerous researchers (Allen, 
1987; Winograd, 1972). Whilst such an approach may be helpful to the student in 
enabling the subject to be grappled with in a manageable form» the delineation of the 
subject aiea in lliis manner remains an academic artifice and may prove at times to be a 
hindrance rather than an advantage.
An inherent danger in such an approach is the thinking that psychological 
processes governing language comprehension might be organized on the same basis. 
As a consequence, various syntactic models have been put forward as models of 
language production and comprehension but which demand ever increasing semantic 
and pragmatic inputs to make them anywhere near to being feasible models. It needs to 
be emphasized that such processes, while useful to describe in a linear manner, 
probably operate in reality in a closely integrated and parallel fashion.
Nevertheless, having identified certain dangers with this approach it is useful to 
think in terms of the three major dimensions of natural language comprehension as 
they enable us to think about the relationships between these different types of 
knowledge and how they might function together in the production of utterances.
4.2 How entities are represented in the model - an overview
My immediate concern is not about how the different aspects of knowledge 
(syntax, semantics, pragmatics) come together in the process of language but more 
particularly how a person's beliefs and goals motivate and produce the utterances that 
speakers make. Therefore, it is useful to make a distinction, between semantic, 
pragmatic and contextual knowledge on one hand and syntactic knowledge on the 
other. Though such a distinction may be blurred in reality, the phenomena relating to 
these respective areas makes the drawing of some distinction more viable than that
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sometimes made between semantic and contextual types of knowledge. A distinction is 
made between these different aspects of knowledge here for the purpose of showing 
how semantic and contextual knowledge might be implemented by syntactic 
knowledge.
In this model, the beliefs of the participants are made up of individual concepts 
which combine with others in certain relationships to form more complex types of 
belief. I have followed the prepositional system of Kintsch (1974: 13) for this purpose 
and the reasons for this as well as the system itself are described below. These beliefs 
might be about anything and by their very nature have a semantic content. The belief- 
set of each agent also includes beliefs about the context of the speech situation. The 
model attempts to demonstrate how utterances are planned given a set of beliefs and a 
particular set of goals relating to these beliefs. More specifically, participants in a 
dialogue can be viewed as having a set of beliefs about the world.
From this set of beliefs, goals are formed and the making of utterances are a means 
of achieving these goals. Utterances can be made in a variety of ways but have to be 
planned for. This process is modelled for two agents and culminates in each producing 
a proposition ill logical form prior to each utterance being made and which relates to 
their individual goals and purposes. The individual propositions, which contain 
elements of the beliefs and concepts directed at achieving a goal, are displayed to the 
other agent thus creating the process of dialogue.
No attempt is made to model the syntactic or grammatical form of the agents' 
utterances and therefore the prepositional forms are not transposed into a completed 
grammatical parsing. Much work has been done in the area of computational 
linguistics and parsing and it is not my purpose to replicate this work here. It must be 
noted that the computational linguistic approach to language has not been as successful 
as initially hoped for, for the reasons that a purely syntactic approach to language 
generation or comprehension will not work. As noted above, language has a semantic 
as well as a pragmatic component and these other components are likely to work with 
the syntactic component in a synchronized and parallel manner.
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Syntactic models and parsing components require semantic and contextual 
information to be integrated. One of the objectives for the model presented here is that 
it can serve as a semantic and contextual component of such an integrated model. 
Though it is not my intention to model the syntactic element of language I do show 
how the logical form of utterances derived from agent's initial belief sets could be used 
by a parsing or syntactic component, using Allen's (1987) syntactic notation and 
presentation.
The way in which the agent's beliefs are represented in the model is described 
first. The belief-sets of the respective agents consist of their general beliefs, beliefs 
about the context, goal-beliefs, beliefs about plans and plan-methods which are used to 
achieve specific outcomes. This is followed by a description of the logical form 
representation for the model. Elements from the particular sets of beliefs contribute to 
the planning and construction of a logical form which is formed prior to the utterance 
being made and guides the syntactic construction of the utterance.
4.3 The representation of beliefs in the model
It has been noted that knowledge as well as beliefs are likely to be stored in 
memory in some form of structure (3.1.4) and that there are likely to be operations that 
act on these structures. Of concern to philosophers, psychologists as weU as cognitive 
scientists are the operations permissible within these structures, that is, the processes 
of thought that reflect the phenomenon of 'natural logic'. As a consequence, many an 
investigator, in an attempt to understand the intricacies of natural language, has turned 
to standard logic for an instrument to assist in this task.
Standard logic is a medium that has attracted many researchers, especially those in 
AI, because of its deductive capacities for exploiting language and knowledge. Even 
so, standard logic does not describe human thinking for the reason that it is a 
prescriptive formal language. It was developed to permit unambiguous, correct 
inferences and it achieves this by making a clear distinctipn between logical syntax and 
semantics. What are acceptable well-formed formulas (wff s) i.e. expressions and
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proofs, are determined by the syntactic rules of standard logic while its semantics is 
concerned with truth values in possible worlds.
In natural language and natural logic no such priority is given to syntactic-formal 
rules and it is impossible to separate syntactic aspects of language from semantic 
considerations. To understand an utterance is to compute its meaning and to do this, 
syntax as well as semantic and pragmatic characteristics must be understood. As a 
result, several researchers have tried to construct semantic memory models with a 
disregard for standard logic (Anderson & Bower, 1973; Collins & Quillian, 1969; 
Kintsch, 1974; Rumelhart, Lindsay & Norman, 1972; Schank, 1972; Winograd, 
1972).
Kintsch (1974) is an investigator who has developed a model of semantic memory 
based upon the notion that propositions (3.1.4.1) are the basic elements of the 
semantic structure (ibid: 47). A problem he confronted in taking a non-standard 
approach to natural logic was to determine the adequacy of the proposed formalism of 
a propositional model as a base for natural language (ibid). He set himself the task of 
investigating the adequacy of a propositional model for this purpose and concluded 
that it was sufficiently powerful and explicit to account for at least some aspects of tlic 
classic topics such as quantification, definite and indefinite reference, modality, tense, 
implication and presupposition.
Kintsch's propositional theory and system is suitable for representing the belief 
system in my model. As previously noted, his system was designed as a base for 
natural language but I am using it to represent the belief base of agents. A complete 
description of his system is therefore not necessary for my immediate purpose and the 
interested reader is referred to his text for this. What I propose to describe are the basic 
elements of the formalism that have relevance for the immediate task in hand.
There are a number of problems that representations of agent’s beliefs have to deal 
with. Firstly, a distinction needs to be made between the explicit beliefs of an agent 
and their implicit beliefs. Abstract relationships such as actions and plan structures also 
need to be represented. Other problem areas concern the representing of nested beliefs,
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shared beliefs and beliefs about others' knowledge, beliefs, abilities and plans. Not all 
these problems are addressed by this model but what is required for present purposes 
is a form of representation for beliefs which is both clear, elegant, and one that shows 
how the initial beliefs come together to formulate a structure for realizing an utterance 
to achieve a goal or plan. This structure is the logical form for the proposed utterance.
A major premise of this work is that the essential concepts and the relationships 
between tlieiu, aie present in the belief structure that motivate the formulation of a goal 
or plan which results in speech. Therefore, an initial task is to identify the elements 
that will eventually be realised in natural language; as well as the abstract relationships 
that are present in the belief structure. The concepts and elements in this structure are 
used to form nouns, verbs or verb phrases, referents, tense, case, number and 
modality in the surface natural language.
4.3.1 The basic elements of Kintsch's propositional system
Kintsch argues that the semantic base of a text consists of ordered lists of 
propositions (ibid: 13). Propositions consist of elements which are word concepts, i.e. 
lexical items, and contain a predicator and n arguments (n ^1). Word concepts may 
be used either as arguments or as predicators. I am using propositions to represent 
beliefs and therefore, word concepts represent elements of a belief. Although these are 
identified as being lexical items I am not concerned with a lexicon as such or how this 
might be accessed in the process of dialogue.
The element of a belief consisting of the word concept BOOKSELLER might be 
realised in the lexicon as the English word bookseller though under some 
circumstances it could be realized as sales person or shop assistant. In Kintsch's 
system it is the task of the lexicon to specify permissible combinations of arguments 
and predicators but in my model this task is carried out in the construction of a logical 
form (to be explained below). In describing the system a number of conventions are 
observed. Propositions are enclosed by parentheses and appear in upper case; 
predicators are written first and all terms are separated by commas. A belief that is not
9 6
known is signified by the tilde before the action KNOW, i.e. -KNOW. The following 
are some examples:
(4.1 ) BookseUers sell books (SELL, BOOKSELLER, BOOKS)
(4.2) Customer wants book (WANT, CUSTOMER, BOOK)
(4.3) XYZisabook (BOOK,XYZ)
(4.4) Books cost money (COST, BOOKS, MONEY)
(4.5) A book has papercovers (HAVE, BOOK, PAPERCOVERS)
(4.6) A book has hardcovers (HAVE, BOOK, HARDCOVERS)
(4.7) The book is valuable (VALUABLE, BOOK)
(4.8) If bookseller has bookXYZ
customer will buy it (IF, (HAVE, BOOKSELLER,
BOOKXYZ),
(BUY, CUSTOMER), BOOKXYZ))
(4.9) Customer doesn't know price
of book. (-KNOW, CUSTOMER) &
(VALUE- £15, BOOKXYZ)
In 4.1,4.2 and 4.4 - 4.6 the predicators are verbs. In 4.3, a noun is a predicator. 
IS A could have been used here as a predicator but the copula is omitted in the base 
expression for the sake of consistency as it is in 4.7. The latter illustrates the use of an 
adjective as a predicator. In 4.8 a conjunction is used and this example shows that 
propositions may be embedded within other propositions as their arguments. An 
alternative notation is available for embedded propositions as it is sometimes preferable 
to separate embedded propositions notationally. This is achieved by providing the 
embedded propositions with arbitrary names and for this purpose I identify these by 
using letters of the alphabet An alternative way of writing 4.8 is:
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(4.10) (IF, a ) & ((HAVE, BOOKSELLER, BOOKXYZ) = a) & (BUY, 
CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ)
The ampersand is used to connect propositions, the order of which can be 
significant. Often the first proposition establishes some position or that some object 
exista and the remainder of the expressions make certain statements about this fact. For 
example:
(4.11) The old man smiled and left the room
(OLD, MAN)&(SMILE, MAN)<Si(LEAVE, MAN, ROOM)
whereas:
(4.12) Mary claimed that the old man smiled and left the room
would be represented as:
(CLAIM, MARY, a )&((OLD, MAN)&(SMILE, MAN) 
&(LEAVE,MAN,ROOM) = a )
When two or more propositions are connected, recurrent terms, i.e. word 
concepts, are assumed to have identical reference. For example, the second appearance 
of the argument BOOKSELLER in the belief base always refers to the BOOKSELLER 
previously introduced. If this identity of reference is not required a special notation can 
be introduced to distinguish between the items, in the form of index numbers, e.g. 
BOOKSELLER 1 and B00KSELLER2. A complete list of beliefs used in this model 
appear in Appendix 1.
4.3.2 The representation of beliefs about context
A particular class of representations for natural language are case structures. 
Traditionally, the notion of 'case' relates to the classification of noun forms according 
to their inflection and in languages such as Greek, gender and number are indicated by 
inflectional forms. Attempts were made to relate inflections to cases in the surface
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structure of language but often became bogged down in semantic as well as linguistic 
problems. This led to a distinction being made between 'surface cases' of the syntactic 
level and 'deep cases' of the semantic level. Fillmore argued that the characteristic of 
deep cases might be a universal characteristic of language:
"...what is needed is a conception of base structure in which case 
relationships are primitive terms of the theory and in which concepts 
such as 'subject' and 'direct object' are missing. The latter are regarded 
as proper only to the surface structure of some (but possibly not all) 
languages" (Fillmore, 1968: 2-3).
The idea behind deep cases is that they are useful for accounting for the 
acceptability of some sentences and for explaining how an intelligent system might 
understand language. This is because the selection restrictions associated with cases 
place semantic constraints on which objects fill case slots. It is useful to illustrate the 
notion of deep cases by describing an event and the following is an example for this 
purpose adapted from Bruce (1975:331-333). He suggests that events can be thought 
of as primary entities that can be interpreted in terms of a large set of unary predicates 
which classify these events and which can then be quantified over. For example the 
event of lacking' in the following:
(4.13) Susan awkwardly kicked the football to Mary with her left 
foot in the park
can be represented as:
(4.14) ($x) (kicking (x)
& agent (x, Susan)
& object (x, football)
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& time (x, past)
& manner (x, awkward)
& goal (x, Mary)
& instrument (x. al)
& location (x, a2)
(where al represents "her left foot" and a2 "in the park")
What Bruce draws attention to is that an indefinite number of properties may be 
specified for a given event and that some of these properties are important and 
significant while others are modifying properties. Furthermore, he concludes that the 
grouping of properties is sensitive to context which include the purpose of the speaker 
and the beliefs of both speaker and hearer. Bruce suggests a number of criteria for 
deep cases which are pertinent to this work.
A case is a property
(1) which must be used to distinguish different senses of a 
word
(2) which must be used for unique specification of an event
(3) whose value needs to be known, even if it is not explicitly 
specified
(4) whose value is usually specified for a given type of event
(5) which is particularly relevant to the domain of discourse
(6) A case is a relation which is ’important' for an event in the 
context in which it is described
(Bruce, 1975: 333- 335).
These criteria are in harmony with the main thrust of this thesis. Case has been a 
notion widely used in language understanding systems (Bruce, 1975; Haas & Metzler, 
1989; Huddleston, 1970; Kintsch, 1974: 23-25; Schank, 1972) and is a notion
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adopted in this model for the purpose of identifying the significant properties of the 
context in which the dialogue interaction takes place. The beliefs each agent has about 
the significant properties of the context present in the dialogue event are captured in 
CONTEXTFRAMEs. These are frame-like structures possessing slots that take certain 
types of fillers that govern the use and meaning of the CONTEXTFRAME. As a 
consequence, each agent has knowledge of a range of cases and those relevant to any 
particular speech event are identified and used to guide the construction of the pre­
utterance logical form. Bruce’s criteria 2-5, are therefore particularly salient for this 
perspective.
Case grammar has been an influential approach for computational models as one of 
its most intriguing claims is that the number of possible semantic relationships is quite 
small although there has been little agreement among researchers as to what this small 
set consists of (Allen, 1987:199; Bruce, 1975: 335-336; Haas & Metzler, 1989: 535). 
Different sets of cases are proposed by different researchers. AUen suggests that this is 
best explained by the fact that they base their semantic analysis at differing levels in the 
hierarchy. A full list of the cases that are used in this model appear in Appendix 3 and 
the definitions for these appear in Appendix 4.
4.4 The representation of goals in the model
Goals of the agents are represented as propositional belief structures. Goal-beliefs 
are distinguished from general beliefs by the action-type entities which form the 
predicator of the proposition otherwise they are indistinguishable. A mechanism for 
deriving an agent's goals from their belief-sets is not described and a set of goal- 
beliefs are prescribed to each agent. This is for the simple reason that the problem of 
goal formation is not a research aim of this work.
Each agent then, has a goal they wish to achieve represented as part of their belief- 
set. The individual propositions that comprise the goal-belief act as sub-goals and 
represent the elements of beliefs that are required to fulfil the goal. On one level, the 
sub-goals represent the plan of the agent to achieve their overall goal. These sub-goal
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propositions are constructed into a goal-tree from which an overall plan is derived to 
achieve the goal. The general-belief-set (GBS) contains other belief propositions that 
indicate what information is known or not known and which might be required for the 
achievement of a sub-goal.
4.5 The representation of plans in the model
A similar structure to that of CONTEXTFRAME is used for representing planning 
components of the model. A large number of plans could be represented but this is not 
the purpose of the model. The major idea behind the planning component of dialogue 
is that there are a great many stored plans as well as parts of plans that can be 
constructed to realize communicative goals. An objective of the model is to show how 
this might work. These planning components are represented as plan-methods which 
are described below (4.6).
Three of the most fundamental sentential mood choices in English are those of the 
assertion realized by declarative utterances; llie question or asking action realized by 
interrogative utterances and the command realized by imperative utterances. These 
three options form the planning components of the model. To participate in the 
dialogue each agent has to know how to display information and uses the DECLARE 
plan-method to display their knowledge configuration. The ASK plan-method is used 
to obtain a display of the other agent's knowledge configuration while the 
COMMAND plan-method is available for making urgent and imperative utterances. 
Each of these plan-methods, i.e. DECLARE, ASK and COMMAND have procedures 
attached to them in the fonn of functions for the purpose of formulating other actions.
For example, an agent might wish to know something which can be viewed as 
being either one thing or another where only two options are available for an answer 
i.e. 'yes' or 'no'. On the other hand an agent might wish to know something where 
the options available may be one or more. That is, an agent/customer might wish to 
know whether a book has papercover bindings in circumstances where a book has a 
number of possible bindings such as papercovers, hard board covers or has a leather
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or plastic binding etc. The subplan relating to the former type question is called a 
KNOWIF plan-method while the latter is a KNOWINFO plan-method. Similarly, the 
DECLARE plan-method has two associated plan-methods, namely INFORMIF and 
IMFORMINFO which are the counterparts of the question plan-methods. KNOWIF 
and INFORMIF deal with yes/no type questions and answers while KNOWINFO and 
INFORMINFO deal with those options which might require the provision of certain 
pieces of information.
4.6 The representation of plan-methods in the model
The entities formulated as plan-methods are action-type entities that can be viewed 
as the sub-components of plans. An agent/customer might formulate the plan to visit a 
book shop to purchase a particular book and exchange some money for this. The 
methods and procedures by which this objective is accomplished might include an 
assortment of actions such as walking to the shop, looking for the book, asking the 
shop assistant for it if it cannot be found, purchasing it and paying for i t  This general 
plan can be broken down into its individual sub-components which can be 
characterized as a number of methods to achieve each stage in the plan. It is these sub­
components of general plans that have been characterized as plan-methods. They are 
methods employed by agents to achieve a particular stage of a plan and which allow 
the general plan to be aborted or changed at any stage.
The notion of plan-method is employed by the model for a number of functions 
that can be signified as actions and is another type of knowledge structure possessed 
by the belief systems of the respective agents. In the model, plan-methods are 
represented as word concepts that might eventually be associated with a lexical item of 
the same kind. These are referred to as undefined primitive predicates and are basic 
types of action that relate to verbs such as 'want' and 'buy'. They remain undefined 
and are not reduced further to any small set of primitive concepts (cf Schank, 1972). 
Plan-methods are small sequences of actions used to initiate utterances or perform 
other actions such as WANT and BUY.
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They are frame-like structures containing slots. Selectional restrictions govern 
what can fill a slot or whether it contains another plan-method or a function. There are 
several plan-method type actions such as WANT, SELL, HELP, EXCHANGE- 
MONEY, OFFER-ASSISTANCE, GET-INFORMATION and a complete list of these 
is given in Appendix 2. Plan-methods can be used to execute DECLARE, ASK and 
COMMAND plans which in practice are themselves characterised as plan-methods. 
Plan methods often execute other plan methods in the process of obtaining the 
appropriate utterance. An example of a plan-method structure is:
NAME: WANT
OBJECT: 7B00K
FROM: ?(possibly bookseller)
TO: ?(possibly customer)
ACTION: POSSESS-OBJECT (another plan-method, function
or goal state)
An advantage of representing beliefs in this manner is that it helps to capture 
succinctly, some of the knowledge that is associated with these type of belief objects. 
For example. It is very difficult to define SELL without some reference or knowledge 
to BUYing or of PAYing without some reference to the concept of EXCHANGE. 
Such beliefs and concepts have as part of their definition aspects of the other concept. 
They can be understood in terms of the two sides of a coin in that you cannot have one 
side without the other. In one sense they can be seen to be defined by other plan- 
methods and therefore, their definitions appear to be circular and unreducible to further 
primitive concepts or actions. These type of beliefs are multi dimensional and a frame 
like structure is used to represent them and the selectional restrictions they require. The 
purpose of this is to capture essential knowledge that the propositional representation 
fails to demonstrate without much greater complexity.
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There is a slight similarity between plan-methods and the notion of script. The 
notion of script is a significant one and has been used to characterize stereotyped 
sequences of actions (Schank & Abelson, 1977)^ The similarity that the two notions 
share is the apparent phenomenon of 'chaining'. One event appears linked to another 
and suggests the idea of cause and effect. This is a characteristic of plan-methods 
where a plan-method might be linked to another plan-method and that in turn might be 
linked to yet another plan-method to achieve a certain outcome. This is the only 
similarity and the reader is given the opportunity of comparing the notion with an 
example of a script provided in Appendix 5.
4.7 Deriving a Logical Form for utterances
Allen (1987: 193) argues that to derive the syntactic structure of a sentence is just 
one step towards the goal of building a model of the language understanding process. 
What is further required, is an understanding of how word meaning as well as 
sentence meaning along with general world knowledge is used in the process of 
comprehension.
The approach Allen adopts for dealing with this problem is to divide the problems 
of semantic interpretation into two stages. In the first stage the appropriate meaning for 
each word is determined and these meanings are then combined in a logical form. The 
logical form is then interpreted in the light of contextual knowledge, allowing a set of 
conclusions to be made from the sentence.
The logical form can be viewed as the intermediate representation between the 
syntactic form of the sentence and a contextual interpretation of the sentence. While the 
logical form resembles a logic, in several ways its syntax is closer to that of a syntactic 
structure.
 ^ The notion of 'script' has been discussed widely in the literature and Schank & 
Abelson's (1977) ideas are well known. A brief review of the concept of script as well 
an example can be found in Appendix 5.
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The problem I am confronted with in this work bears similarities to that identified 
by Allen (ibid). A premise of this work is that the semantic content possessed by 
words and utterances is contained in the concepts, beliefs, knowledge and goals of 
agents and that syntax is one of the mediums by which such semantic content is 
displayed to other agents. The entities I am focussing on in this model are beliefs, 
goals and plans which form agent's knowledge configurations. These entities possess 
a semantic content and the model presented here attempts to show how the semantic 
content of these entities motivate and organizes utterances. They need to be represented 
in a form which reflect the rationality of agents' thinking and the constraints that 
concepts have on each other.
Furthermore, these entities, or tokens that represent them, need to be stated in a 
form which is consistent, cohesive and without ambiguity. In other words, it is 
necessary to derive a logical form for the way in which beliefs are composed prior to 
formulation into utterances. This can be illustrated as a simple hierarchical process:
Belief configurations
Logical forms
Utterances employing syntactic structures
A logical form notation, similar to that employed by Allen (ibid) is considered to be 
both adequate and appropriate for tliis purpose. The logical form in the context of this 
model can be viewed as the intermediate representation between the beliefs and ideas 
motivating the utterance and the utterance that is realized in its syntactic construction. 
The use of it here differs from that of Allen who views the logical form as being an 
intermediate representation between the syntactic form of a sentence and its contextual 
interpretation. That is:
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Syntactic construction 
Logical form 
Interpretation in context
Any decisions that require contextual knowledge in Allen's model, are not made in 
deriving the logical form. Instead, information from the sentence structure is recorded 
in the logical form for use later by a contextual analyser. A premise of my work is that 
cues from the immediate context as well as the wider context of a speech situation are 
known to the respective agents. Contextual information is contained in beliefs of the 
agents about the context in which the dialogue is taking place and therefore inform and 
influence the belief configurations of the agents involved. Therefore, in my model, 
beliefs about the context as well as the agent's knowledge about these contextual cues, 
are used in deriving a logical form for the utterance.
The rationale for choosing this form of representation to describe the model is that 
it has clarity without unnecessary complexity; it employs concepts which are stated in 
their English format and therefore, avoids the sometimes obscure characteristic of 
many formal language notations. It is also adequate for representing the components of 
the model in a parsimonious maimer.
It might have been feasible to use Kintsch's propositional system throughout 
instead of using another notation for this aspect of the model. A disadvantage of doing 
so is that in deriving a logical form, the notational system as used by Kintsch could 
become unwieldy and unnecessarily complicated for the purposes required by this 
model. Kintsch's system was primarily designed, as has been noted, as a base for 
natural language understanding and therefore is appropriate for representing sentences 
and larger texts. Allen's representation of logical form, although designed for a similar 
purpose, lends itself to characterising pre-utterances because of the way it deals with 
case relations, utterance performatives, tense and connectives.
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It will be necessary to introduce case relations as well as performatives into the 
notation and it is considered that Allen's form of representation is more appropriate for 
this purpose than that of Kintsch.
Another advantage of using two different notations is to distinguish between 
beliefs and elements of beliefs and how the logical form of an utterance is derived from 
these. The logical form is not only derived from the belief sets that relate to general 
beliefs of agents, but also from their beliefs about the context, their beliefs about plans 
of how to formulate utterances and their beliefs about plan-methods and how these 
enable then to carry out their plans. Each of these elements need to be represented in a 
logical form and Allen's type of representation is suitable for this purpose and can be 
modified to accommodate the basic elements of a propositional belief system as 
proposed by Kintsch.
4.7.1 A description of Allen's Logical Form
The Logical Form described here has been borrowed from Allen (1987) and 
adapted to suit the objectives of this research. It is necessary to describe the essential 
elements of the representation and to explain how they are to be used in this work. 
Allen's logical form is used for text understanding and is more comprehensive than 
that required for modelling the sample dialogue scenario demonstrated in the following 
chapter. Nevertheless, a more complete description of the logical form is given and 
though the level of detail might not be required for present purposes, it does serve to 
demonstrate how more complex utterance forms could be handled.
The representation of Jack kissed Jill in logical form would correspond to the 
following;
(4.15) (PAST si KISS-ACTION (AGENT si (NAME j l  PERSON 
"Jack"))
(THEME si (NAME j2 PERSON "Jill")))
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Each logical form statement is made up of the following components:
• an operator indicating the type of structure; in (4.15) PAST means that this 
represents an assertion of some event occurring in the past;
• the type of object - that is, KISS-ACTION;
• the modifiers of the object, which may be a list of logical form structures; in (4.15) 
the modifiers consist of two cases, AGENT and THEME.
Allen also employs a numerical representation for the names of the objects being 
described. In (4.15) a name for the instance of KISS-ACTION is s i. This is 
uimecessary for my purposes and inclusion of them only clutters the representations to 
no useful or explanatory purpose. Therefore, I dispense with numerical names for the 
objects in my model. They are retained in the examples here as these have been 
borrowed from Allen's text and illustrate his use of a logical form for text 
understanding. I am using a logical form to represent the belief-concepts of agents and 
the use of numerical identifiers are unnecessary for this purpose.
Other indicators of utterance structure will include PRES (simple present tense), 
FUT (simple future), and PAST (indicating the past tense).
This representation can be extended to represent noun phrases but is adapted in my 
model to represent belief concepts or propositions that mirror noun phrases that 
ultimately appear in utterances. Though these are viewed as being belief entities the 
terminology of noun phrases is retained as these are the entities that the beliefs reflect 
in utterances. The operator for simple noun phrases is used to indicate the determiner 
information so that it can be used by later processing. The possible combinations for 
unquantified NPs are as follows:
DEF/SING definite singular reference (the book)
DEF/PL definite plural reference (the books )
INDEF/SING indefinite singular reference ( a book )
INDEF/PL indefinite plural reference ( books )
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The name and type for simple NPs are as expected, and the modifiers consist of 
any qualification produced by adjectives or other modifying phrases. Thus the logical 
form for the NP The large boy would be
(4.16) (DEF/SING BOY bl(LARGEbl))
The quantified NPs map to similar structures using different markers as 
appropriate. Thus the sentence Each boy ate a large pizza would be represented as:
(4.17) (PAST al EAT-EVENT (AGENT al (EACH b2 BOY))
(THEME pi (INDEF/SING pi PIZZA (LARGE pi))))
For wh-questions, the wh-terms need a special marker in the logical form. Three 
forms are used - WH, WH/PL, and WH/SING - depending on whether the number is 
unspecified, plural, or singular, respectively. For example, the NP who has the 
logical form
(4.18) (WH pi PERSON)
whereas the NP which dogs has the logical form
(4.19) (WH/PL dl DOG)
Two special forms are used for NPs that consist of proper names and pronouns. 
The first of these was used in an earlier example - the operator NAME identifies an NP 
consisting of a proper name, and the name is listed in the position directly after the 
type. Modifiers can be added if needed. For example, the NP Big bad John might 
correspond to
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(4.20) (NAME j3 PERSON "John" (BIG j3) (BAD j3))
For pronouns a similar form with the marker PRO is defined. Thus the NP he is 
represented as
(4.21) (PRO hi MALE "he")
The logical form for NPs that describe events is virtually identical to the 
representation of event utterances, except that the marker will indicate a determiner 
rather than a tense marker. For example, the NP The arrival of George at the station 
would be represented as
(4.22) (DEF/SING al ARRIVE-EVENT
(AGENT al (NAME gl PERSON "George")) 
(TO-LOC al (DEE s6 STATION)))
whereas the sentence George arrived at the station would be represented by the logical 
form:
(4.23) (PAST a2 ARRIVE-EVENT
(AGENT a2 (NAME gl PERSON "George")) 
(TO-LOC a2 (DEF s6 STATION)))
Each of the four major utterance types has a corresponding logical form that takes 
the utterance interpretation as an argument. These are as follows. For declarative 
utterances, such as The man ate a peach, the complete logical form is
(4.24) (ASSERT (PAST el EAT (AGENT (DEF/SING m 1 MAN))
(THEME (INDEF/SING pi PEACH))))
111
For yos no questions^ ouch as Did the man eat a peach?, the logical form is
(4.25) (Y/N-QUERY (PAST el EAT (AGENT (DEF/SING ml MAN))
(THEME (INDEF/SING pi PEACH))))
For wh quostionSï such as, "^hat did the man eat?, the logical form is
(4.26) (WH-QUERY wl (PAST el EAT (AGENT (DEF/SING m l MAN))
(THEME (WH wl PHYSOBJ))))
For commands, such as Eat the peach, the logical form is
(4.27) (COMMAND (INF el EAT (THEME (DEF/SING pi PEACH))))
Embedded utterances, such as relative clauses, can be handled in the same way as 
other utterances. Any pointers in an embedded structure are analyzed simply by 
inserting the name of the structure built for the constituent that is referenced. Thus the 
utterance I want to leaver with the syntactic form
(4.28) (S SUBJ (NPl PRO I)
MAIN-V want 
TENSE pres 
COMP (S SUBJ -> NPl 
MAIN-V leave))
has a logical form of
(4.29) (ASSERT (PRES wl WANT
(EXPERIENCER (PRO il PERSON "I")) 
(THEME (INF LI LEAVE (AGENT il)))))
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Dealing with compound utterances is a more complex issue and not entirely 
relevant for the purposes needed here. If conjunctions are required they appear in the 
logical form as a type of operator. For example, the sentence I wanted to leave but I 
lost the keys, would have the logical form
(4.30) (ASSERT (BUT (PAST wl WANT
(EXPERIENCER (PRO il PERSON "I")) 
(THEME (INF LI LEAVE (AGENT il )))) 
(PAST LI LOSE (AGENT (PRO i2 PERSON "I"))
, (THEME (DEF/PL k l KEY)))))
This logical form notation is sufficient to cover the language needs of the 
utterances that are used in the model presented here.
4.8 A relevant domain for a model of natural language dialogue
A major difficulty in modelling natural language is to decide on a domain which 
forms a focus for the language being modelled. A problem with modelling any kind of 
dialogue or conversation, presents the researcher with countless difficulties as the 
extent of knowledge and the possible inferences that can stem from this free ranging 
type of interaction can be very great and extremely difficult to build into a computer 
program. It would have been noted from the survey of previous models of language 
(2.2.1), that researchers limit their models to a particular domain which might be 
baseball, travel schedules, block worlds, or noughts and crosses in order to limit the 
possible inferences and the knowledge required by the system.
Limiting the model to a particular domain or task has particular advantages as it 
places a constraint on the extent and type of knowledge that is required to be 
represented and also the inferences that might need to be made, although this can still 
be very large. Using a limited domain does have its disadvantages, one of the major 
ones being that the models are not usually transferable to other domains. Thus,
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SHRDLU (Winograd, 1972) might know much about the blocks world but would be 
totally lost with Clippinger’s (1977) neurotic client Power’s. (1974) Mary and John 
might know something about bolts and opening doors but little about travel schedules. 
It might be argued that these programs were not built to deal with this range of issues 
which might be a valid argument but the major criticism is that these models of 
language production are too limited by their particular domains and that they could not 
bo easily adapted to deal with others without radically altering their character.
A premise of this present work is that the belief and planning model presented 
here, does not have this limitation as it should be possible to give the model a different 
set of beliefs which should result in utterances relevant to those beliefs. However, it is 
necessary to have a relevant and an appropriate domain by which to demonstrate the 
workings of the model in the first instance and the particular domain chosen for this 
model is the type of interaction that might take place between a bookseller and a 
customer. The model has been applied to two other domains. The negotiations 
between management and union representatives and the interaction between a teacher 
and her students (see Appendix 6).
The interaction that takes place between a bookseller and a customer is a social 
rclotionGhip that many people in our society would be familiar with. Not least, because 
of the fact that trading normally occurs in a social context of law, trust and convention. 
For this reason it is likely to be associated in people's experience with a specific 
'script' for buying and selling books and which has characteristics in common with 
other selling/purchasing transactions. It is a task oriented domain which can bring 
people into fairly close interaction with one another although each of them may not 
have known the other prior to the transaction. On the other hand, the sales-person and 
customer might be well known to each other because of regularity of contact but still 
go through the scenario of the 'book-selling script' as if they had only just m et The 
book-selling scenario is incidental as it could be that associated with the grocer's, the 
newsagent's or the garage etcetera.
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It is a domain that can provide a source of dialogue from simple and brief 
exchanges to those of an extended and quite complex nature. Not only this, it is also a 
domain which lends itself to the specific purpose in hand which is to show that 
understanding natural language dialogue is also dependent on understanding the goal 
oriented and plan based nature of natural language.
There are three factors in the relationship being modelled. The customer, the 
bookseller and their knowledge about the artifacts relevant to the scenario. Customers 
have various, specific and general goals for buying books while booksellers have 
more prescribed goals for selling them. Each formulate plans and express these in 
language for achieving their separate and individual objectives but which combine to 
satisfy both participants. The ultimate goal of the bookseller is to sell books. The wise 
bookseller, like any good sales-person, might realize that this is best accomplished by 
satisfying the customer's needs and making the customer feel and believe that they 
have made the most appropriate choice. The more books she sells and the higher their 
price and mark-up, the greater her profit will be.
Some customers know what they want or they choose from the shelves and their 
sale can be made promptly and with the minimum of interaction or interference by the 
bookseller. The domain developed here is a scenario where a customer either accepts 
or requests help from the bookseller to assist them in their purchase and which 
necessarily involves both in an exchange of dialogue.
The bookseller has two options open to her in the way she approaches her task. 
She can attempt to force or persuade the customer to buy using the techniques of 'high 
pressure' selling or she can find out the customer's needs and seek to satisfy them. It 
is the latter method that is adopted here. The reason for this choice is that the latter 
method is considered to be more natural within a cooperative context and gives equal 
weight to the goals of both parties. The design of the model allows for either agent to 
have other sets of beliefs and goals and given these circumstances the former method 
could be adopted by the bookseller in another scenario with possibly very different 
outcomes.
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Success for the bookseller is likely to depend on the questions she asks the 
customer, to elicit the knowledge required of the customer's needs. The bookseller has 
to formulate goals to achieve these objectives and adopt a plan for carrying them 
through. Therefore, relevant questions need to be asked by the bookseller as well as 
the making of suitable suggestions that are shaped in a manner most likely to satisfy 
the customer's goals as well as assist in achieving her own. The domain therefore, is a 
suitable one for exploring the nature of dialogue.
4.9 The components of the model
In this section a description of the components are given and how they function 
together. This will provide the reader with a general overview of the workings of the 
model and show how each stage of the process fits in with its counterparts. In the 
following chapter, the process will be simulated using an example dialogue scenario, 
utilising the notational forms and constructs identified and discussed in this chapter.
4.9.1 The belief;sets
Both participants in the model have a set of individual beliefs (general-belief-set 
GBS) that are personal to them and are related to the goals they wish to achieve. They 
also have à number of beliefs that they share with the other participant as well as 
having access to shared knowledge such as beliefs about the context and procedural 
knowledge of how plan-methods are used. Some distinction is made between what the 
agents in the model know and what they believe. Things that are known are factual 
things which either both agents know or only one of them knows. It is possible for 
beliefs to be true or false for either agent.
Both agents have goals which can be fairly general or specific depending on the 
scenario being modelled. For instance, in the sample scenario the customer's goals are 
specific in that she wishes to purchase a particular book whereas the bookseller's goals 
are more general, i.e. to sell any book and to please the customer. The agent who has
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the more specific goal tends to maintain the overall initiative in the process although it 
is not necessarily this agent who initiates the dialogue.
Each agent has a goal which is made up of a number of concepts combined in 
certain relationships. This goal-belief is part of a larger set of beliefs which are related 
in various ways to the concepts of the goal-belief and also to beliefs relating to the 
context.
4.9.2 Achieving goals and plan construction
The initiating agent executes a plan operation to achieve the goal and a plan of this 
type is called ACHIEVEGOAL. Initially, a subsidiary operation called 
CREATEGOALTREE attached to ACHIEVEGOAL examines the propositions 
contained in the goal-belief and compares this set of propositions with the general- 
belief-set (GBS). Some propositions or elements of the proposition in the goal-belief 
might appear in the GBS because they are known to the agent while other elements 
might be marked as unknown. Any beliefs that relate to the goal-belief are identified by 
CREATEGOALTREE. It then creates a goal-tree of the propositions by which the goal 
is to be achieved. These propositions become sub-goals of the plan.
Propositions or parts of propositions may form a sub-goal in the agent’s plan and 
indicate that a particular piece of information is required by an agent to fulfil a sub­
goal. For instance, a plan for C’s goal might take the following form:
KNOWIF bookseller has book XYZ
- ASK for yes or no type response
KNOWINFO book XYZ in paperback covers
- ASK for information whether book XYZ is available in papercovers
KNOWIF book XYZ cost £15 or less
- ASK for information on price of book
-DECLARE decision
-BUY book and EXCHANGÊ-MONEY for book
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The precondition for the plan is that the agent does not possess the book and the 
effect of the successful fulfilment of the plan is that she does possess the book. The 
effects of the plan could change depending on the other agent's responses which could 
result in modification of the initial plan or even its abandonment. A more explicit 
description of the plan of C to achieve her goal is shown in Figure 4.1
The plan is made effective when it is translated into utterances. Each sub-goal of 
the plan realizes an intention of the agent and which culminates in an utterance. These 
together with the utterances of the other agent construct the dialogue. If the goal of C 
was to have the book at any cost, regardless of what price it was or what type of 
covers it was available in, this would have been indicated in the original set of beliefs 
from which the goal was formulated. In this event the sub-goals would be fewer as all 
C would need to do was ascertain from the bookseller whether she had the book for 
sale and indicate that she would buy i t
4.9.3 Processing sub-goals
If the set of propositions relating to a goal-belief contain undefined primitive 
predicates of the type HELP, WANT, BUY, HAVE and COST, these signify the steps 
that need to be taken for the goal to be realized. A particular problem relates to the 
order in which these subgoals should be realized and therefore is accomplished by 
ACHIEVEGOAL in a similar manner to the way a recursive function works. That is, 
each of the sub-goals are called or accomplished within the ACHIEVEGOAL process 
and before the original call to ACHIEVEGOAL can be completed.
Each sub-goal is achieved by plan-methods and other action operations. 
ACHIEVEGOAL operates on aU the predicates within a goal-belief until they are 
achieved.
The way in which ACHIEVEGOAL is used is a fundamental characteristic of the 
model as it is this operation that controls the process until the agent's goals are 
a ch i eve d  or given up. For  example ,  i f  the sub-
1 1 8
Nobookseller 
has book 
X Y Z ?
Enter
Yes
bookseller 
has book XYZ  
In papercovers?
No
Yes
Nois cost £15 
or less ?
Yes
Exit
alternative
p lans
alternative
purchase
book
alternative 
plan 1
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goals contain the predicates WANT and BUY, each plan-method with the name of 
WANT and BUY are called in turn. Because of the nature of plan-methods and the 
selectional restrictions associated with them, a particular plan-method might not be able 
to achieve its individual goal immediately because additional knowledge is required 
before it can do this or further predicates associated with the goal-belief remain to be 
processed.
The presence of further predicates in the set of propositions is likely to signify that 
more information is required or needing to be processed. The WANT plan-method of 
this particular sub-goal might be called first and identified as having an object (it could 
be a state). This might be identified as a particular BOOK that is wanted. One of the 
selectional restrictions of the WANT plan-method is that whatever object is identified 
by the WANT plan-method should be POSSESSed. At this stage in the process the 
sub-goal WANT is tagged with a NOTYET flag, as the object of WANT is not yet 
possessed. At this point the WANT plan-method has achieved part of its objective but 
there are other plan-methods in the goal-belief waiting to be processed. The WANT 
plan-method is then held in abeyance while the BUY plan-method is called. Once again 
the object of the BUY plan-method is identified and discovered to be a particular 
BOOK with the title XYZ. A selectional restriction of the BUY plan-method is the 
action EXCHANGE which is required for the plan-method's successful prosecution. 
This similarly is tagged at this stage with the flag NOTYET. The BUY plan-method is 
then held over because ACHIEVEGOAL continues to process the remaining 
predicates.
The predicates of COST and HAVE are examined by ACHIEVEGOAL and it is 
noted by this operation that the object of WANT and BUY requires the properties 
signified by COST and HAVE, that is, a value of [£15] and a particular binding i.e. 
[papercovers]. Predicates of the type HAVE and COST indicate a particular kind of 
state possessed by objects and are defined in the agent's GBS. These are similar 
structures to plan-methods and also have selectional restrictions relating to their use.
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In the initial operation of ACHIEVEGOAL, the information that the object of 
WANT and BUY is identified as being a specific book, namely BOOKXYZ. The price 
of this book and whether it has papercovers has been identified as being unknown. 
Consequently, ACHIEVEGOAL executes an UTTERANCEPLAN operation to obtain 
the required information.
4.9.4 UTTERANCEPLAN
An UTTERANCEPLAN operation constructs plans for the formation of utterances 
in order to realize the sub-goals associated with each agent's main goal. Plans are 
constructed one at a time and take place within the overall control procedure of 
ACHIEVEGOAL. That is, the sub-goals attached to each predicate node in the goal- 
tree govern what sort of utterance plan is to be constructed and are processed in turn. 
As each of the utterances are made, the recursive action of ACHIEVEGOAL unwinds 
and UTTERANCEPLAN operations process each of the nodes previously held in 
abeyance but only if utterances are required by these sub-goals. Some sub-goals may 
only require other actions like BUY requiring an EXCHANGE type action. It is 
possible though, that an utterance might be required by one of these associated actions 
in the realization of a sub-goal.
Utterance plans, as previously noted can be one of three kinds DECLARE, ASK 
and COMMAND and are cast as plan-methods. A sub-goal which is attached to a 
-KNOWN predicate automatically indicates an ASK type plan-method. Whether it is a 
KNOWIF type question that is required or a KNOWINFO depends on the elements 
contained in the proposition comprising the sub-goal.
A plan is constructed by UTTERANCEPLAN from the sub-goals associated with 
the original goal. That is, from the subgoals containing the predicates (e.g. WANT, 
BUY, HAVE and COST). These are constructed one at a time and in the order 
designated by the operation of ACHIEVEGOAL. For example, if the last predicate to 
be identified by ACHIEVEGOAL prior to UTTERANCEPLAN being initiated is 
COST, it relates to whether the object costs £15 or less. UTTERANCEPLAN
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examines this sub-goal and because it is attached to a -KNOWN predicate this 
indicates to UTTERANCEPLAN that an ASK operation be initiated. Furthermore, 
information attached to the predicate COST would indicate that the range of an object's 
cost could vary and this would indicate to ASK that the plan-method KNOWINFO 
should be selected in this instance. This requires information from the other agent 
rather than a simple yes/no type response.
Having made a decision as to what kind of utterance is to be made 
UTTERANCEPLAN then invokes a frame with slots which will reflect the logical 
form of the utterance. This is called a LOGFORM. Some of its slots are filled by 
inheriting from the fillers of the CONTEXTFRAMEs but the first three slots designate 
the utterance type, the tense of the utterance and its main action or object. This latter 
information is derived from the elements of the agent's sub-goal. Tense defaults to 
present tense (PRES) unless future (FUT) or past (PAST) is indicated in the sub-goals 
of the agent. LOGFORM refers to the frame in which the logical form of the utterance 
is formed and will be used when referring to this construct. The term logical form' is 
used when refering to the contents of this frame or when speaking generally about the 
forms of the agent's utterances.
UTTERANCEPLAN fills the first slot of the LOGFORM with the component that 
indicates what type of utterance it is to be. It could be a Y/N QUERY or WH-QUERY 
for an ASK type utterance or an ASSERT for a DECLARE type utterance. 
UTTERANCEPLAN then constructs a logical form for the rest of the planned 
utterance from the other concepts contained in the sub-goal being processed and also 
derives information from the CONTEXTFRAMEs. Information from the 
CONTEXTFRAMEs indicate what case slots need to be included in the logical form 
construction.
4.9.5 CONTEXTFRAMEs
CONTEXTFRAMEs are the constructs used to record the case information 
available from the context They comprise the beliefs the agents have about the context
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of the situation. These are not represented in the agent's GBSs directly but in frame­
like structures of the slot and filler variety similar to the representation for plan- 
methods (cf 4.7). A full list of cases used in the model is given in Appendix 3 and the 
the following is an example:
CASE-NAME: AGENT
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ((SELF = I) (OTHER = YOU)
(ANIMATE))
ACTION/STATE: NIL
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
What was said about representing beliefs about plan-methods in 4.7 can be said 
also about the representation of agent's beliefs about the context. Representing 
contextual beliefs as frame-like structures helps to capture succinctly, some of the 
knowledge that is associated with these type of belief objects. Cases have restrictions 
on who and what can fill a particular case role. Some roles or states indicate a state of 
affairs to exist while others indicate some action. Once again it has to be noted that 
these type of beliefs appear to be multi-dimensional and though they could be 
represented in a prepositional format this does not do justice to their individual 
complexity. For the purposes of this model they are best represented as belief objects 
in frame-like structures that more specifically represent their salient characteristics.
Particular cases are known to the agents such as AGENT, BENEFICIARY, 
LOCATION, THEME etc., which knowledge is derived from the context of the 
situation the agents are in. Some of the slots for these cases are filled at the 
commencement of the dialogue and become part of the agent's knowledge 
configuration. Others are filled in as the dialogue develops and can also change in this 
process, therefore, the CONTEXTFRAME belief structures are dynamic structures. 
The changes in these dynamic structures are carried out by subsidiary functions 
carrying messages between the different belief objects as well as the operations used to
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carry out the dialogue. For example between ACHIEVEGOAL, UTTERANCEPLAN, 
CONTEXTFRAMEs and PLAN-METHODs. Whereas some of the slots can be filled 
directly, because the knowledge relating to these cases is available from the context, 
fillers for other slots, such as the THEME slots can only be filled as each sub-goal is 
processed.
A slot can have more than one filler. For example, in the CONTEXTFRAME for 
AGENT, the IDENTITY FILLERS slot can have at least two fillers i.e. SELF and 
OTHER. The reason being that generally, when the agent is making an utterance they 
will view themselves as being the agent and will use the SELF restriction in the 
AGENT slot for constructing a logical form in which they themself serve as the 
AGENT. On these occasions they will view the agent they are interacting with as the 
CO-AGENT and the IDENTITY FILLER in this slot will mark OTHER as the 
appropriate fiUor. A similar sot of selective restrictions fill the IDENTITY FILLERS 
slot for the BENEFICIARY case, where the beneficiary indicated in an utterance could 
include either self, the other speaker or some other person. A full list of 
CONTEXTFRAMEs that are used in the model, along with their slot fillers, appear in 
Appendix 3. Definitions of these cases can be found in Appendix 4.
Once an utterance is made, ACHIEVEGOAL checks to see whether any further 
utterance needs to be made in the pursuit of the particular sub-goal being processed, or 
whether to await a response from the other agent. Depending on the decision, either a 
further utterance is made or a response is awaited from the other agent
The logical form of the utterance of the speaking agent is displayed to the hearing 
agent and is identified by the other agent as requiring interpretation. An INTERPRET 
operation is made by the receiving agent and an analysis of the logical form of the 
speaker's utterance is carried out within the process of their own ACHIEVEGOAL 
operation. Initially, INTERPRET identifies the type of utterance made by the speaker 
as to whether it is a DECLARE, ASK or COMMAND type. Following identification 
of the type of utterance it is, INTERPRET processes the information in the remainder 
of the speaker's logical form. The way in which this processing is carried out is
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dependent on what type of utterance it is. An ASK utterance of the type WH-QUERY 
will indicate to INTERPRET that the speaker is requiring information relating in some 
way to the remaining concepts displayed in the logical form.
The information in the logical form is processed and the hearer's ACHIEVEGOAL 
issues a DECLARE operation to provide information known to the hearer to be 
displayed to the first speaker. This is then displayed in a logical form to the agent who 
made the utterance. The original speaker then becomes the hearer and issues an 
INTERPRET operation to process the first hearer's response. This process continues 
until the dialogue achieves it objectives.
Information from responses results in their beliefs being updated with this new 
information so that the same question is not asked again. As the GBSs are updated the 
sub-goals are removed from the goal-trees and the next sub-goal initiated. More than 
one sub-goal can be removed from the tree at this stage for the reason that more than 
one sub-goal which initiated the utterance might have been achieved. This can be as a 
result of one agent providing more information than was originally requested by the 
other agent but in accordance with the second agent's goals.
The model presented here is based on four major operations and their subsidiary 
functions. To recap, these are ACHIEVEGOAL, UTTERANCEPLAN, LOGFORM 
and INTERPRET. These have been referred to and discussed as though they were 
single procedures but this is somewhat misleading. These procedures are in fact a 
number of operations that realize the objective indicated by the main procedure from 
which they take their name. Mental processes are complex and it is not helpful to 
identify these as being simple or singleton types of operation. The model seeks to 
explain the process of dialogue at a macro level and therefore does not set out to 
represent all the operations that comprise and support the major operations at a micro 
level.
Consequently, subsidiary operations employed by the major operations are 
assumed. Some of these operations may be as basic as GET, OBTAIN, SHOW, 
COMPILE, ADD, TAKE etc., and manipulate information for use by the major
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operations. This approach has some psychological plausibility. Agents have some 
awareness of the major operations which are used to form utterances although they 
might not know or be able to explain how these work. Whilst we might have some 
awareness of achieving a goal or planning an utterance there are likely to be many tacit 
operations and functions that accompany this process that we are totally unaware of 
and that are carried out automatically. This model makes a distinction between the 
major operations used in utterance formation and the more tacit subsidiary operations 
that might underlie and support their formation and operation.
In the following chapter the process of the model is simulated with a sample 
dialogue and scenario.
■oOo-
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Chapter 5 - A trace through the process of dialogue - the model in
operation
Having described the major components and operations and given an overview of 
how the model achieves its objective it is necessary to examine the process by which 
an example scenario of dialogue is produced. Other subsidiary components and 
operations of the model will be explained in this chapter as and where they necessarily 
fit into the dialogue process.
The process is traced from the formulation of goal-trees of each of the agents 
through to the making of the individual utterances and to the achievement of goals and 
the completion of the chosen dialogue scenario.
The process at the beginning is complex because of the necessity of detailing each 
stage of the process for each agent. However, once the first cycle of the model has 
been completed, that is, one agent has made an initiating utterance and the other agent 
has made a response, it is not my intention to explain the same processes that operate 
similarly for the remaining cycles. This could become unnecessarily laborious for the 
reader. Further detailed explanation will be given only where this serves to clarify a 
particular aspect of the model or its process.
Following the explanation of the first cycle of dialogue, explanation of the 
remaining cycles will be in an abbreviated form. This is accomplished simply by 
invoking the names of the processes that have previously been explained in detail and 
without delineating their specific operations each time. An advantage of dealing with 
the process in this way is that the close juxtaposition of each agent's utterances, 
without the intervening explanation, will afford a more succinct view of the remaining 
cycles and show how the logical forms of each agent's utterance, derives from their 
individual beliefs and goals, dovetailing together to achieve a dialogue in which both 
agents realize their goals.
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5.1 A note about research methodology
Bundy et al (1984: 146) have suggested a research strategy for AI which has been 
adopted as a basis for this work. They suggest that the researcher initially thinks of a 
scenario or a sample of output that exhibits the ability they want the computer to 
model. In vision this might be the recognition of a scene or in mathematics it might be 
a proof and in natural language a sample dialogue. After this initial stage, a hypothesis 
is made as to what processes might be involved in achieving the scenario.
A third stage is to think of further scenarios to see whether the proposed program 
could cope with them and which are used to refine, generalize, extend and debug the 
initial program. The fourth stage they suggest is that when satisfied and the proposed 
program ia otable, the rocoarcher should choose a programming language that closely 
fits the need and implement the program. This progium then needs to be run on further 
scenarios that haven't previously boon considered and is modified until it is 'robust'. 
The last stage is to describe the program by using a language that is independent of the 
particular implementation.
Generally, this methodology has been adopted for this work with some variation in 
the stages. A dialogue scenario has been selected from a particular domain (see below 
& 4.9). A hypothesis has been made as to how this particular piece of dialogue might 
be achieved and what processes might be involved (Chapter 3). This is described by 
using a language that is independent of the particular programming implementation for 
the model and which has been the purpose of the preceding chapter and this one and 
which provides an animated description of the model as it processes the chosen 
dialogue scenario.
Whilst it would be pleasing to produce a working computer program of the model 
this is not the main objective. The prime purpose is to derive a theory of natural 
language dialogue viewing it in AI terms as a process and using some of the 
constraints of AI tools and techniques to guide theory construction. Following the 
research strategy outlined above, the chosen scenario to be modelled is a dialogue 
between a bookseller or shop assistant and a customer; The model has also boon
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applied to two other scenarios, those of a union/management negotiation and a 
teacher/pupil situation. These applications are to be found in Appendix 6 and are 
referred to in the concluding chapter evaluating the model.
The bookseller/customer dialogue to be modelled is as follows:
Example Scenario - A customer asks the bookseller for a specific title.
B . Can I help you?
C. Yes Please.
Have you got any copies of XYZ?
B . Yes, I have them, both in papercovers and hardcovers.
C . How much is the papercover copy?
B. £15.
C. ru  take it.
Though on the surface a fairly simple, and uncomplicated piece of dialogue it 
poses a number of language problems, such as questions, answers, definite reference, 
anaphora, substitution, ellipsis, and turn-taking to name but some of them. The 
purpose of this chapter is to describe in detail the way in which the model produces the 
sample piece of dialogue.
A useful metaphor to explain what is being attempted here is to imagine that the 
knowledge configurations of an agent can be likened to a movie film made up of 
hundreds of individual picture frames. During editing, a film can be stopped and each 
frame examined individually. In this state, changes between one frame and the next in 
the sequence appear to be imperceptible.
What I am trying to describe in this chapter is a similar scenario. It is as if the 
knowledge configurations of two agents who are interacting together have suddenly 
been frozen at a particular point in time and then allowed to move on slowly providing 
an opportunity to examine the on-going process in some detail. It is as though a snap­
shot is taken of the knowledge configurations belonging to two agents which allow us 
to examine their beliefs and goals at the particular moment just prior to the
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commencement of the sample scenario dialogue. That is, knowledge configurations 
that contain some general beliefs relevant to the context and task in hand, goals to 
achieve some objective, and some plans and plan-method functions for achieving those 
goals.
5.2 A process simulation of the model
In this section the operations of the model are simulated and show how the 
scenario dialogue is produced. It is necessary to follow the procedures of the model 
through in some detail to see the way in which each agent's goals are achieved and 
how utterances made by both agents contribute to this dialogue and to the achievement 
of individual goals. The dialogue is dealt with in three cycles. That is, a move by one 
agent and the response to it are viewed as a cycle. No particular importance is attached 
to these cycles and they are differentiated only for ease of description.
5.2.1 The first cycle of dialogue
1. B Can I help you?
2. C Yes Please!
3. Have you got any copies of XYZ?
Initially, goals have to be attributed to both agents and for this particular scenario 
the customer B's goals are:
B wants to sell any books of high value to C. In a propositional representation this is:
(SELL, BOOKSELLER, BOOK) & (WANT, BOOKSELLER, a, b)
& ((BUY, CUSTOMER, BOOK[S]) = a) & ((HIGHVAL, BOOK[S]) = b)
C's goals are more specific than B's goals:
C wants a book with title XYZ in paperback and wül pay up to £15 for it, to B.
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(HAVE, CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ) & (WANT, CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ ) 
& (IF a, b, c (BUY, CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ)
&((HAVE, BOOKSELLER, BOOKXYZ) = a)
& ((PAPERBACK, BOOKXYZ) = b)
& ((VALUE £15, BOOKXYZ) = c)
As C's goals are the more specific of the two, the major initiative for dialogue 
comes from C. C has a specific goal to achieve whereas B has more general goals and 
does not know at the initial stage what C has in mind. Though B has a more general 
goal overall this does not mean to say B's plan for responding to C's request will be 
more simple. In some respects B has a greater task on hand as she needs to find out a 
considerable amount of information, if she is going to achieve her goal of selling 
books of high value without knowing C's objective.
It will be seen that B's plan can be quite complicated. For B to achieve her goal she 
needs to have the following information. She wants to know whether C requires any 
help and what she might want Her general belief set (GBS) at this stage indicates that 
this information is not known. Furthermore, she does not know that C does not 
possess a particular book. Although B is not aware of what C might know about a 
particular book she is aware of the books she has available for sale. Therefore, 
whether the knowledge about a particular book C might or might not be aware of, 
appears in B's GBS as specific propositions but which are identified as not being 
known.
For C to achieve her goal she needs to know answers to the following questions. 
Whether the bookseller has XYZ in stock and for sale; whether it is available in 
paperback and whether its price is either £15 or less. The belief-set at this stage, 
relevant to achieving this goal is constituted mostly of what she does not know. She 
does not know whether the bookseller has the book, neither does she know what price 
it might be and whether it is within the price range she has set herself. Nor does she 
know whether it is available in paperback which might have some bearing on its price.
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The propositions relating to these characteristics of the goal-beUefs appear in her 
GBS and are marked as being KNOWN or -KNOWN. An agent may want a book 
without knowing the price of a book and without even thinking about its value or cost 
At this stage the agent may not know the cost of the book, only that it will have a cost. 
At a later stage, when there is a firmer intention to purchase the book, the cost of it 
may then become more prominent or important to the agent This is not the place to 
discuss such ontological issues of knowledge and belief. What is important for the 
purposes of this model is that a goal is formed from a set of beliefs and the agent 
having formulated a goal draws certain conclusions about the knowledge they do not 
possess but need to possess if they are to achieve a particular goal.
The beliefs in B's GBS relevant to her goal are:
(-KNOW, BOOKSELLER) & (IF a )
& ((WANTS, CUSTOMER, HELP) = a)
(-KNOW, BOOKSELLER) & (IF a, b, c, d)
& ((KNOW, CUSTOMER) = a )
& (PAPERCOVERS, BOOKXYZ) = b )
&( HARDCOVER, BOOKXYZ) = c)
& (VALUE£15, BOOKXYZ) = d))
The beliefs in C's GBS relevant to her goal are:
(-KNOW, CUSTOMER) & (IF a, b, c, )
& ((HAVE, BOOKSELLER, BOOKXYZ) = a)
& ((PAPERCOVERS, BOOKXYZ) = b)
& ((VALUE£15, BOOKXYZ) = c)
5.2.2 Goal achievement
Immediately prior to the commencement of the scenario dialogue the constellation 
of beliefs belonging to B and C are as set out above. The beliefs that comprise their 
goals and those related beliefs from their GBSs together form the specific-belief-sets 
(SBSs) for the achievement of their goals. At the commencement of the dialogue each
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agent initiates an operation to achieve their respective goals. This operation is called 
ACHIEVEGOAL and is the control process by which goals are achieved from the time 
they are initiated to the stage where they are either achieved or abandoned. It is an 
operation that acts recursively (4.9.3). That is, a goal might be initiated but because it 
cannot be carried out immediately, it is held in abeyance until it can be. A reason for a 
goal not to be carried out immediately might be because other sub-goals have to be 
fulfilled first and the initial goal's successful fulfilment is dependent on the sub-goals 
being filled in. ACHIEVEGOAL, though referred to as a single operation consists of a 
number of operations but which operate within the overall function of achieving the 
goal.
A subsidiary operation attached to ACHIEVEGOAL is CREATEGOALTREE 
which is a planning operation whose function it is to examine the propositions 
contained in the goal-belief and to compare these with those in the GBS which are in 
anyway related to achieving the goal Those that are related are added to the goal-belief 
propositions and compile the SBS. ACHIEVEGOAL then constructs a planning goal- 
tree from the propositions and predicates of the SBS. The goal-trees for the bookseller 
and customer are shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 respectively.
Having constructed a goal-tree CREATEGOALTREE returns the tree to 
ACHIEVEGOAL which sets about the process of working through the sub-goals of 
the plan. ACHIEVEGOAL examines the predicate nodes in the tree working from the 
root node and then left to right across the tree, seeking to fulfil the individual sub­
goals. The process will be traced for both B's and C's achieve-goal operations.
Before proceeding further, it may be noted that nothing has yet been said as to who 
initiates the conversation in this particular dialogue scenario and this needs to be 
clarified. Who starts a dialogue is a characteristic which cannot be entirely captured by 
the model because some aspects of dialogue are governed by contextual and non­
verbal factors as well as the individual goals and purposes of agents. Even so, in the 
piece of dialogue that is being modelled here, specific goals have been attributed to 
both agents and it is possible that the goals which motivate the bookseller might
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predispose her to speak first, especially if the customer approaches her and gives a 
non-verbal indication requesting help. This is the scenario indicated by the goals 
attributed to B and C and to which the dialogue adheres.
5.2.3 The bookseller's execution of ACHIEVEGOAL
B's main goal is (SOLD, BOOK[S]), that is, to be in a state of having sold a book 
or several of them. ACHIEVEGOAL requires the first component of a proposition to 
be a predicate of some kind. This predicate is fundamental and governs how the 
arguments following it are to be used. The predicate in this instance is SOLD which is 
a state that the bookseller would like to achieve for either one of her books or many of 
them. SOLD is a state which appears in B's GBS as a proposition and is defined as 
follows:
(SOLD, STATE)
For B's sub-goal to be achieved the proposition (SOLD, BOOK) would have to be 
present in B's GBS. ACHIEVEGOAL identifies that this goal has not been achieved 
by using a CHECK operation to ensure that no belief registering this state of affairs 
exists in her GBS. If the GBS contained this belief then the goal-state would be 
considered as having been achieved and the process would be completed without any 
dialogue taking place. A consequence of the belief not being present in the GBS, is 
that this root goal node is flagged with a NOTYET achieved marker and the goal is 
held in abeyance while the next sub-goal is processed.
Moving down the goal-tree ACHIEVEGOAL identifies the next sub-goal. In this 
instance it is the predicate WANT which is a plan-method. ACHIEVEGOAL examines 
the WANT plan-method to view what selectional restrictions might be attached to it 
and also to see whether this sub-goal can be achieved. The WANT plan-method is:
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NAME: WANT
OBJECT: (a b )
FROM: CUSTOMER
TO: BOOKSELLER
ACTION: ((POSSESS (OBJECT)(STATE))(SATISFIED (STATE)))
One of the slots for the WANT plan-method indicate that if this is to be carried out 
successfully the wanted object must be either POSSESSED or the state be 
SATISFIED. ACHIEVEGOAL identifies that this sub-goal contains, propositions that 
require further information and therefore cannot be achieved immediately. 
Consequently, the node WANT is flagged with a NOTYET marker and this marker is 
placed in the ACTION slot of the plan-method.
NAME: WANT ■
OBJECT: (a b )
FROM: CUSTOMER
TO: BOOKSELLER *
ACTION: (POSSESS-STATE (NOTYET))
The other slots of the WANT plan-method are also filled with the arguments from 
the sub-goal. The OBJECT slot is filled with the markers a and b. These refer to other 
sub-goals in the goal tree that still await processing and require further information. 
The second argument of the sub-goal, i.e. BOOKSELLER, fills the TO slot as this is 
the agent who wants to be in the state of possession. The FROM slot defaults to C, the 
other agent in the dialogue scenario. This sub-goal and its plan-method are also held 
over while the next sub-goal is processed.
ACHIEVEGOAL moves on to examine the predicate node BUY and its sub-goal 
((BUY, CUSTOMER, BOOK) = a) & ((HIGHVAL, B00K[S1) = b). 
ACHIEVEGOAL identifies that the sub-goals attached to the BUY node are related to 
an earlier sub-goal which was marked as being NOTYET achieved. ACHIEVEGOAL 
knows from the GBS that there are no knowledge items contained there that indicate 
that this next sub-goal has been achieved. Consequently, the predicate node BUY is 
marked with a NOTYET flag and is placed in the action slot of the BUY plan-method
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which would have been activated at this point This sub-goal and its associated plan- 
method are also held over to be completed later.
In this operation the slots of the BUY plan-method are filled in with elements from 
the sub-goal:
NAME: BUY
OBJECT: (HIGHVALUE, BOOKS)
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: ((EXCHANGE (MONEY FOR OBJECT)) NOTYET)
ACHIEVEGOAL then examines the remaining predicate ~KNOW which indicates 
that several elements of knowledge are not known and need to be known if the two 
previous sub-goals are to be achieved. The propositions not known to B are:
(WANTS, CUSTOMER, HELP)
(IF a, b, c) & ((KNOW, CUSTOMER) = a)
& ((PAPERCOVERS, BOOKXYZ) = b)
&(HARDCOVERS, BOOKXYZ) = c))
(IF a, b) & ((KNOW, CUSTOMER) = a) &(VALUE, BOOKXYZ) = b))
No further predicates remain to be processed at this stage, therefore 
ACHIEVEGOAL executes an operation to construct an utterance. This is called 
UTTERANCEPLAN and operates on the three sub-goals of the ~KNOWN node in 
turn, again working from left to right, constructing an utterance plan for each as is 
required. This operation will be described later. First it is necessary to outline the 
execution of C's ACHIEVEGOAL operation.
5.2.4 The customer's execution of ACHIEVEGOAL
A similar operation as described above for B is executed by C's ACHIEVEGOAL 
operation. The goal-tree is constructed by CREATEGOALTREE in a similar manner 
and from the SBS composed of goal-belief propositions and beliefs within C's GBS.
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Some of the predicate nodes happen to be similar to those of B and occur because of 
the similarities for both agents of the context in which the dialogue is taking place. 
Though the predicate nodes are similar, this is only a surface similarity as the sub­
goals associated with the predicates are different and are the most strategic elements in 
this process. ACHIEVEGOAL examines each node of the tree in turn, moving from 
the top and then down and left to right in processing the predicate nodes and sub­
goals.
The root node represents C's main goal which is, (HAVE, BOOKXYZ), that is, to 
possess a certain book with the title XYZ. Like B's main goal the predicate of this 
proposition is a state that C would like to achieve, which is to possess a book with a 
particular title. Some states are defined as beliefs and appear in the GBSs of the agents 
while other states are defined as plan-method-Uke objects. This is for the reason that 
some states, like HAVE, can have an action component included in their definition as 
well as a 'state" sense component ACHIEVEGOAL uses a CHECK operation to 
examine the GBS and returns a product indicating that this goal is not yet achieved 
because no representation of it appears in the GBS. In this process the HAVE plan- 
method is activated and its relevant slots filled with elements from the goal. The 
FROM and TO slots are filled with SELF or C or the other agent in the dialogue and 
which indicate the direction in which the object is expected to change in POSSESSion. 
The node of the goal-tree is marked with a NOTYET flag and this is placed in the 
ACTION slot of the HAVE plan-method. The sub-goal is held over for later 
processing.
NAME: HAVE
OBJECT: BOOKXYZ
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: ((POSSESS (STATE)) NOTYET)
The next node to be examined is the predicate WANT and the sub goal attached to 
this is (WANT, CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ). ACHIEVEGOAL examines the WANT
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plan-method to view what selectional restrictions might be attached to it and also to see 
whether this sub-goal can be achieved. One of the slots for the WANT plan-method 
indicate that if this is to be carried out successfully the wanted object must be 
POSSESSED or SATISFIED. The WANT plan-method is activated and its slots filled 
with elements from the sub-goal. In this instance an OBJECT is the focus of the 
WANT plan-method and therefore the ACTION slot defaults to the options of 
POSSESS-OBJECT.
NAME: WANT
OBJECT: BOOKXYZ
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: (POSSESS-OBJECT (NOTYET))
ACHIEVEGOAL uses a CHECK operation to examine the GBS and finds that the 
object in question is not POSSESSED and so the node WANT is flagged with a 
NOTYET marker which is placed in the ACTION slot of the plan-method alongside 
the element that will be activated as an action or state at a later stage. This sub-goal is 
held over while the next sub-goal is processed.
ACHIEVEGOAL moves on to examine the predicate node BUY and its sub-goal 
(BUY, CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ). Other propositions form part of this sub-goal. 
The customer will buy the book given certain conditions. That is, providing the book 
is in papercovers and is £15. It examines the BUY plan-method and finds that a 
selectional restriction on BUY is the further plan-method operation EXCHANGE.
Another slot of the BUY plan-method indicates to ACHIEVEGOAL that an object 
is involved and this is identified as being the BOOKXYZ of this sub-goal as well as 
that of the previous sub-goals. ACHIEVEGOAL already has a record that this object 
has been dealt with in the processing of an earlier sub-goal which was marked as being 
NOTYET achieved. Consequently, the predicate BUY is marked with a NOTYET flag 
and the ACTION slot of the plan-method is flagged accordingly.
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NAME: BUY
OBJECT: BOOKXYZ
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: ((EXCHANGE (MONEY FOR OBJECT)) NOTYET)
The sub-goal is held over to be completed later. ACHIEVEGOAL then examines 
the remaining predicate ~KNOW which indicates that three elements of knowledge are 
not known and need to be known if the two previous sub-goals are to be achieved. 
The propositions not known to the customer are:
(HAVE, BOOKSELLER, BOOKXYZ)
(PAPERCOVERS, BOOKXYZ)
(VALUE£15, BOOKXYZ)
No further nodes remain to be processed at this stage therefore ACHIEVEGOAL 
executes an operation to construct an utterance to achieve the first sub-goal attached to 
the -KNOW node. UTTERANCEPLAN processes these sub-goals from left to right 
and in the order they are attached to the predicate node.
Before describing UTTERANCEPLAN for C it is necessary to describe the same 
operation for B first.
5.2.5 The bookseller's execution of UTTERANCEPLAN
The first sub-goal on which B's operation of UTTERANCEPLAN works is 
(WANT, CUSTOMER, HELP). The node to which this sub-goal is attached is a 
-KNOW predicate which is also defined as a plan-method. The -KNOW plan-method 
is called and elements from the sub-goal are used to fill the slots of the -KNOW plan- 
method. In the processing of ± is sub-goal two other plan-methods are activated, 
namely WANT and HELP so at this initial stage three plan-methods have been 
activated.
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NAME: -KNOW
OBJECT: HELP
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: (ASK (KNOWIF-QUESTION) (KNOWINFO-QUESTION))
NAME: WANT
OBJECT: HELP
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: ASK KNOWIF-QUESTION
NAME: HELP
OBJECT: NIL
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: OFFER-ASSISTANCE
The slots of the WANT plan-method are filled from elements in the sub-goal. The 
predicate WANT indicates that some object or state needs to be POSSESSED or 
SATISFIED and that this is related to another element in the sub-goal. This is the 
element HELP which can be either a state or an action. It is defined for both agents as 
a plan-method but how it is used depends on the selectional restrictions governing this 
particular plan-method. Its position within the proposition of the sub-goal indicates to 
UTTERANCEPLAN that it is a state that is required by C in this instance. The given 
information in this sub-goal is that of CUSTOMER and indicates to B which agent is 
to benefit from the state of HELP. The information that is not known to her is whether 
C wants help, (WANTS, CUSTOMER, HELP), the answer to which can be satisfied 
by a yes or no type response. The OBJECT that is wanted then, is the state HELP. 
The CUSTOMER wants this so the TO slot in the plan-method, which indicates the 
direction in which the help is to be pointed, is filled with C. The FROM slot defaults to 
B, she being the other agent in the dialogue and the provider of help.
The slots of the HELP plan-method are also filled. The object slot defaults to nil as 
there is no object in this instance. The TO slot is filled with C as this is the direction to 
which the HELP needs to be directed as indicated in the sub-goal. Furthermore, 
because C fills the TO slot this indicates that the HELP should be offered by B rather
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than requested and is identified in the ACTION slot of this plan-method. 
Consequently, the OFFER-ASSISTANCE plan-method is also activated:
NAME: OFFER-ASSISTANCE
OBJECT: HELP
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: (ASK KNOWIF-QUESTION (MOD/AUXpossib. "CAN"))
UTTERANCEPLAN takes information from the -KNOW plan-method which 
indicates that the object HELP is required and that either a KNOWIF or a 
KNOWINFO type plan is required to obtain this HELP. UTTERANCEPLAN also 
examines the other plan-methods that have been activated with this sub-goal and 
obtains the information from the WANT plan-method that an ASK KNOWIF type of 
utterance will best achieve this sub-goal. Examination of the HELP plan-method 
indicates that HELP should be offered in this instance and the action slot on the 
OFFER-ASSISTANCE plan-method confirms that an ASK KNOWIF type of 
question should be planned for. UTTERANCEPLAN thus obtains the information 
from several sources, two of which are more specific than the other, that an ASK 
KNOWIF type of utterance is required. UTTERANCEPLAN can now commence an 
utterance form. The ASK KNOWIF type of question indicates that a yes/no type 
response is required and which is designated in the options of the action slot of the 
-KNOW plan-method.
B does not know whether C can select the book she wants from stock on display 
or whether she wants help from B. The model assumes that the customer has signalled 
in a non-verbal manner that help by way of communication might be required from the 
bookseller.
Following UTTERANCEPLAN's processing of the sub-goal a subsidiary function 
of UTTERANCEPLAN called COMPILECONTEXT is called to fill the slots of the 
CONTEXTFRAMEs for later processing by UTTERANCEPLAN. Each agent takes 
the AGENT case when they are making the utterance and views the other agent as the
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CO-AGENT. Therefore a CONTEXTFRAME for AGENT is created with the option 
SELF selected, and one for CO-AGENT with the option OTHER selected, both for 
later processing and use in the LOGFORM.
CASE-NAME: AGENT
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ((SELF = (PRO PERSON ’! ”))
(OTHER = (PRO PERSON "YOU", 
"HE", "SHE", "IT" "THEY",
"THEM") (ANIMATE)) 
ACTION/STATE: ((INTERPRET ("I" = "YOU")
("YOU" = "I")("HE","SHE", "IT" = ?) 
("THEY", "THEM" = ?))) 
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: CO-AGENT
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ((SELF = (PRO PERSON "I"))
(OTHER =(PRO PERSON”YOU", 
"HE", "SHE", "IT"
"THEY","THEM") (ANIMATE)) 
ACTION/STATE: ((INTERPRET ("I" = "YOU")
("YOU" = "I")("HE","SHE", "IT" = ?) 
("THEY", "THEM" = ?))) 
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
Another element in the sub-goal is HELP which has previously been identified in 
this instance, as being a state. This element, and the information attached to the plan- 
methods already activated in relation to HELP, point to the necessity of some 
beneficiary being the recipient of this. Thus, a CONTEXTFRAME for 
BENEFICIARY is activated and the IDENTITY-FILLERS slot of this 
CONTEXTFRAME identifies OTHER rather than SELF as being the agent to benefit 
from the bookseller's assistance.
ACTION/STATE:
CASE-NAME: BENEFICIARY
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ((SELF = (PRO PERSON "I"))
(OTHER = (PRO PERSON”YOU”, 
"HE", "SHE", "IT"
"THEY","THEM") (ANIMATE)) 
((INTERPRET ("I" = "YOU") 
("YOU" = "I")
("HE","SHE", "IT" = ?)
("THEY", "THEM" = ?))) 
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
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COMPILECONTEXT also compiles any other CONTEXTFRAMEs required by 
the context of the dialogue scenario and obtains this information from the GBS, sub­
goal beliefs or plan-methods that have already been activated. The other 
CONTEXTFRAMEs required by B for this utterance are:
CASE-NAME: THEME
IDENTITY-FILLERS: HELP
RESTRICTIONS: SUBGOAL-ELEMENT
ACTION/STATE: ((INTERPRET ("I" = "YOU")
("YOU" = "I")("HE","SHE", "IT" = ?) 
("THEY", "THEM" = ?))) 
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: TO-LOCATION
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ANIMATE
ACTION/STATE: TO-CUSTOMER
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: FROM-LOCATION
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ANIMATE,
ACTION/STATE: FROM-BOOKSELLER
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: AT-POSSESSION
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ANIMATE
ACTION/STATE: WITH-BOOKSELLER
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: TO-POSSESSION
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ANIMATE
ACTION/STATE: TO-YOU
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: FROM-POSSESSION
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ANIMATE
ACTION/STATE: FROM-SELF
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
Working w ith the information that an ASK plan is being formed, 
UTTERANCEPLAN selects a KNOWIF type ASK plan-method, that is, a Y/N
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QUERY. This is identified as being a required option of an ASK plan-method from the 
ACTION slot of the previously activated OFFER-ASSISTANCE plan-method.
NAME: ASK
OBJECT: NIL
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: ((QUESTION ((ASK (KNOWIF-QUESTION =
Y/N QUERY))
(ASK(KNOWINFO-QUESTION WH-QUERY)))
Having completed this operation UTTERANCEPLAN invokes a LOGFORM and 
places the flag Y/N QUERY in this frame as its first construct. This is the first slot of 
the LOGFORM for the utterance being constructed. UTTERANCEPLAN then utilises 
information from the CONTEXTFRAMEs to construct the rest of the LOGFORM. 
Before looking at how CONTEXTFRAME is used, C's operation of 
UTTERANCEPLAN will be explained.
5.2.6 The custom er's execution of UTTERANCEPLAN
A limitation of a linear process model of dialogue is that it does not capture the 
parallel processing and near simultaneous production of dialogue which is an 
important characteristic of dialogue. Dialogue processes, are likely to operate 
simultaneously for both agents and this factor must not be forgotten. Whilst it may be 
possible for C to start her utterance before receiving B’s offer of assistance, in this 
scenario B speaks first Therefore, the major operations of each of the agents are 
described in turn and latterly it is shown how they cohere to produce a cohesive 
dialogue.
The description follows a path which describes how each agent forms their initial 
subgoals but the reader should bear in mind the caveat that C in this instance does not 
start to form her utterance until B has made her offer of assistance. However, she 
could have been forming a plan for her utterance either prior to, during or after B's 
initial utterance.
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C’s first sub-goal on which UTTERANCEPLAN focuses is (HAVE, 
BOOKSELLER, BOOKXYZ). This is attached to a -KNOW predicate and therefore 
the -KNOW plan-method is activated.
NAME: -KNOW
OBJECT: BOOKXYZ
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: ASK (KNOWIF-QUESTION,
KNOWINFO-QUESTION)
The slots of this plan-method are filled with elements from the sub-goal being 
processed. The second argument of the sub-goal which is BOOKSELLER fills the 
FROM slot as this indicates where the information required is to come from. The TO 
slot defaults to C or SELF as this is the agent requiring the information. The OBJECT 
slot is filled with the third argument from the sub-goal, this being the object which is 
the focus of the information request The ACTION slot on this plan-method indicates 
that a KNOWIF or a KNOWINFO question is a possibility. UTTERANCEPLAN 
continues to process the sub-goal and in doing so a HAVE plan-method is activated.
NAME: HAVE
OBJECT: BOOKXYZ
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: (POSSESS (STATE))
The slots of this plan-method are then filled by UTTERANCEPLAN. The 
OBJECT slot is filled with the third argument of the sub-goal, namely BOOKXYZ; the 
FROM slot with the second argument of the sub-goal, that is BOOKSELLER, and the 
TO slot defaults to C or SELF as this is a sub-goal belonging to C.
UTTERANCEPLAN then examines the ACTION slots of both the -KNOW and 
HAVE plan-methods. The ACTION slot of the HAVE plan-method indicates that a 
POSSESS type of STATE is required which is related to the OBJECT and the 
BOOKSELLER components of the plan-method. This information, combined with the
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filler of the ACTION slot of the -KNOW plan-method, indicates that an ASK type of 
question should be made to obtain this information. In this instance either a KNOWIF 
or a KNOWINFO ASK plan-method will meet the objective and the first option is 
selected, that is, a KNOWIF type of ASK plan-method. This information is obtained 
from the activation of an ASK plan-method.
NAME: ASK
OBJECT: NIL
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: ((QUESTION ((ASK (KNOWIF-QUESTION =
Y/N QUERY))
(ASK(KNOWINFO-QUESTION WH-QUERY)))
UTTERANCEPLAN has identified the requirement for a yes/no type response in 
this instance. The information that C is after, is whether a specific book is available for 
sale from B. All that is required by the agent wanting this information is a signal 
indicating yes or no. UTTERANCEPLAN uses this information in the construction of 
its plan and decides on an ASK/KNOWIF plan-method. Having completed this 
operation UTTERANCEPLAN invokes a LOGFORM and places the flag Y/N- 
QUERY in this form as its first construct Before describing how the rest of the logical 
form of the utterance is compiled it is necessary to describe C's COMPILECONTEXT 
operation.
This is a similar process to that described for B's CONTEXTFRAMEs. A number 
of CONTEXTFRAMEs required by the context are activated and their slots filled. The 
CONTEXTFRAMEs required by the the context and for use by C in this instance are:
CASE-NAME: AGENT
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ((SELF = (PRO PERSON ”1"))
(OTHER= (PRO PERSON " YOU", 
"HE",SHE", "IT" "THEY", 
"THEM")(ANIMATE)) 
ACTION/STATE: ((INTERPRET ("I" = "YOU"
("YOU" = "I")
("HE","SHE", "IT" = ?)
("THEY", "THEM" = ?))) 
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
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CASE-NAME:
IDENTITY-FILLERS:
RESTRICTIONS:
ACTION/STATE:
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS:
CO-AGENT
SELF, OTHER
((SELF = (PRO PERSON "I"))
(OTHER = (PRO PERSON ’’YOU”,
"HE", "SHE", "IT'
"THEY", "THEM") (ANIMATE)) 
((INTERPRET ("I" = "YOU") 
("YOU" = "I")
( "HE","SHE", "IT" = ?)
("THEY", "THEM " = ?)))
NIL
CASE-NAME:
IDENTITY-FILLERS:
RESTRICTIONS:
ACTION/STATE:
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS
BENEFICIARY 
SELF, OTHER 
((SELF = (PRO PERSON ”1”)) 
(OTHER = (PRO PERSON "YOU", 
"HE",""SHE", "IT" "THEY", 
"THEM") (ANIMATE)) 
((INTERPRET ("T" = "YOU") 
("YOU" = "T")
("HE","SHE", "IT" = ?)
("THEY", "THEM" = ?)))
NIL
CASE-NAME: 
IDENTITY-FILLERS: 
RESTRICTIONS: 
ACTION/STATE: 
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS:
THEME
BOOKXYZ
SUBGOAL-ELEMENT
NIL
NIL
CASE NAME: 
IDENTITY-FILLERS: 
RESTRICTIONS: 
ACTION/STATE: 
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS:
CO-THEME
INDEF/SING
BELIEF-ELEMENT
NIL
NIL
CASE-NAME: 
IDENTITY-FILLERS: 
RESTRICTIONS: 
ACTION/STATE: 
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS:
TO-LOCATION 
SELF, OTHER 
ANIMATE 
TO-CUSTOMER 
NIL
CASE-NAME: 
IDENTITY-FILLERS: 
RESTRICTIONS: 
ACTION/STATE: 
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS:
FROM-LOCAHON 
SELF, OTHER 
ANIMATE, 
FROM-BOOKSELLER 
NIL
CASE-NAME: 
IDENTITY-FILLERS: 
RESTRICTIONS: 
ACTION/STATE: 
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS:
AT-POSSESSION 
SELF, OTHER 
ANIMATE
WITH-BOOKSELLER
NIL
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CASE-NAME: TO-POSSESSION
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ANIMATE
ACTION/STATE: TO-SELF
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: FROM-POSSESSION
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ANIMATE
ACTION/STATE: FROM-BOOKSELLER
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
What needs to be noted is that some of these CONTEXTFRAMEs would have 
been created prior to C's planning of her utterance and at the time of her interpretation 
of B's offer of help. This is because both UTTERANCEPLAN and INTERPRET use 
COMPILECONTEXT for processing information about the context. This is discussed 
below in the context of C's INTERPRET operation (5.2.9).
Having made a major decision as to what type of utterance is being formed 
UTTERANCEPLAN uses another operation to compile the remaining logical form of 
the utterance. This operation is CONSTRUCTLF. CONSTRUCTLF can inherit 
information from the GBSs as well as sub-goals and plan-methods already processed 
and activated. It also obtains information from the CONTEXTFRAMEs which contain 
information about the context in which the dialogue is taking place.
5.2.7 The bookseller's execution of CONSTRUCTLF
The LOGFORM in which the logical form of the utterance is to be constructed is 
set up by UTTERANCEPLAN as has been previously noted. This operation starts the 
construction of the logical form by signifying the type of utterance it is to be and which 
in this instance is a Y/N QUERY. The next slot in the LOGFORM indicates the tense 
of the utterance being formed. This information derives from the context and generally 
defaults to PRES (present tense) unless otherwise indicated in the content of the sub­
goal.
The dialogue is taking place in the present but reference could be made by either 
agent to future or past actions. These are signified by the constructs FUT (future tense)
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and PAST (past tense) respectively. This information can derive either from the 
elements of an agent's sub-goal or from the context. Unless another tense is indicated 
from the propositions in the SBS it is assumed to be the PRES tense in which the 
utterance is being uttered. That is, unless another tense is indicated in the sub-goal of 
the agent, CONSTRUCTLF will place a PRES flag in the LOGFORM construction.
CONSTRUCTLF processes the current sub-goal and examines each element in 
turn before constructing the rest of the logical form. CONSTRUCTLF needs to make 
decisions as to how the elements in a sub-goal relate to each other. Some of the 
elements in the sub-goal will refer to objects but some of these objects can act as 
predicates in other contexts. What item becomes the main action in the logical form 
depends on the relationships between predicates and objects in the sub-goal. 
CONSTRUCTLF is assisted in this operation by being able to inherit information from 
the plan-methods and their slot fillers as well as the CONTEXTFRAMEs that have 
previously been activated or created.
The sub-goal belonging to B currently being processed is (WANTS, 
CUSTOMER, HELP) and is governed by the -KNOW predicate. That is, B does not 
know whether C is in need of help. UTTERANCEPLAN has decided on a plan for the 
utterance and has commenced a LOGFORM with the beginning of this plan. This is;
(Y/N QUERY (....
In the absence of any contrary information contained in the sub-goal, 
CONSTRUCTLF identifies that the utterance to be made by B relates to the present 
context and therefore places the flag PRES in the LOGFORM as being the next 
construct We then have;
(Y/N QUERY (PRES (....
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In its examination of the elements in the proposition being processed, 
CONSTRUCTLF identifies one element to possess two senses, one in which it can 
stand as a state and the other in which it can serve as an action. This is the element 
HELP which is something that can either be received by an agent or carried out by an 
agent. In B's sub-goal, HELP is functioning as a state, governed by the predicate 
WANT and the first object CUSTOMER. HELP is a plan-method which has been 
previously activated and its STATE option identified. That is, HELP is a state and 
something that B wishes to offer to C.
This is because one of the selective restrictions governing the definition of HELP 
is that of OFFER-ASSISTANCE. A restriction relating to the OFFER-ASSISTANCE 
plan-method is whether the offer is being volunteered or has been requested. In this 
instance it is being volunteered and therefore a requisite of the OFFER-ASSISTANCE 
plan-method is the use of a modal auxiliary, signifying possibility. CONSTRUCTLF 
selects this restriction and adds the flag MOD/AUXpossib., to the LOGFORM. A 
lexical form for this construct would employ the auxiliary verb "can". The logical form 
for B's first utterance thus far then is;
(Y/N QUERY (PRES (MOD/AUXpossib. "CAN" (....
CONSTRUCTLF attempts to fUl the remaining slots of the LOGFORM inheriting 
information for this purpose from any previous processing that has already been 
carried out and from the CONTEXTFRAMEs. The agent who is making the utterance 
is signified by SELF in the AGENT slot of B's CONTEXTFRAME for agent and this 
signals to CONSTRUCTLF that the AGENT slot in this instance should be filled by 
the personal pronoun "I". This selection is signified by the options available in the 
RESTRICTIONS slot of the AGENT CONTEXTFRAME and previously identified 
when it was created.
Therefore, the developing logical form becomes;
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(Y/N QUERY (PRES (MOD/AUXpossib. "CAN"
(AGENT (PRO PERSON "I")
The other cases that are relevant to the processing of this sub-goal are those of 
THEME and BENEFICIARY. When CONSTRUCTLF commenced processing the 
current sub-goal, the THEME CONTEXTFRAME would have been filled with the 
HELP element of the sub-goal along with any information that had been identified in 
the initial examination of this concept. HELP in this instance would have the 
information attached to it (via the plan-method for HELP) that CUSTOMER is to be 
the recipient of this help as identified in the sub-goal.
CUSTOMER is identified by CONSTRUCTLF as being the CO-AGENT in this 
instance and the IDENTITY-FILLERS slot of this CONTEXTFRAME indicate that the 
co-agent must be OTHER. Furthermore, the RESTRICTIONS slot of the CO-AGENT 
CONTEXTFRAME indicate that the PER PRO "YOU" is to be used in any utterance 
plan. However, not only is there a CO-AGENT CONTEXTFRAME in this instance 
but also a BENEFICIARY CONTEXTFRAME and in this instance the fillers from this 
frame take precedence over the CO-AGENT CONTEXTFRAME.
CONSTRUCTLF completes the LOGFORM for this particular utterance by 
including the THEME of HELP and the BENEFICIARY which is PER PRO "YOU";
(Y/N QUERY (PRES (MOD/AUXpossib. "CAN"
(AGENT (PRO PERSON "I")) 
(THEME (SCRIPT HELP)) 
(BENEFICIARY 
(PRO(PERSON "YOU"))))))
5.2.8 The customer's execution of CONSTRUCTLF
Initially, at the commencement of this piece of dialogue both agents are in a similar 
position. They both wish to make initial enquiries of the other. The current sub-goal of 
C is (HAVE, BOOKSELLER, BOOKXYZ) that is, a proposition comprising of a
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predicate and two arguments which are object concepts. The relationship between 
these elements is whether the first object (BOOKSELLER) has (i.e. HAVE) the 
second object (i.e. BOOKXYZ). This relationship was identified in the relationship 
between the slot fillers of the FROM, TO, and ACTION slots of the HAVE plan- 
method when it was activated (5.2.5).
CONSTRUCTLF selects first the predicate which governs the arguments of the 
proposition. This is the predicate HAVE, and this indicates to CONSTRUCTLF that 
an action is required for the utterance in order to indicate this type of action. This is 
placed in the next slot of C’s LOGFORM which is developing as follows;
(Y/N QUERY (PRES (HAVE (......
CONSTRUCTLF then processes the remaining elements of the proposition 
inheriting information from the previously processed CONTEXTFRAMEs. The 
IDENTITY slot of the AGENT CONTEXTFRAME indicates that SELF in this 
instance is "I" because self is the agent making the utterance. The person to whom the 
utterance is being addressed is viewed as being the CO-AGENT in the interaction. 
Therefore, information is obtained from the CO-AGENT CONTEXTFRAME which 
indicates that in this instance, the CO-AGENT should be referred to as YOU. The 
logical form under construction then becomes;
(Y/N QUERY (PRES (HAVE (CO-AGENT (PRO PERSON "YOU"), . . )
The last element in the proposition comprising the sub-goal is BOOKXYZ. This is 
the theme of what this proposition and sub-goal is concerned with. BOOKXYZ refers 
to a particular copy of a book and not to more than one. Altiiough tlie bookseller might 
have a number of copies of BOOKXYZ available for sale, C is only concerned with 
buying one of the copies. CONSTRUCTLF takes this single element of the
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proposition but displays it in the logical form as consisting of two elements of 
information.
The reason for this is that CONSTRUCTLF derives information from both the 
THEME CONTEXTFRAME as well as the CO-THEME CONTEXTFRAME. The 
reader will remember that when the CONTEXTFRAMEs were activated and filled in 
for this particular sub-goal, the THEME CONTEXTFRAME identified the THEME of 
this sub-goal as being BOOKXYZ and the CO-THEME was identified as being a 
single copy, that is, INDEF/SING (5.2.5).
The information concerning determiners is contained in the agents’ GBSs and 
relates to their knowledge about, the use of reference and how to express this in 
language. CONSTRUCTLF retrieves this information from the THEME and CO­
THEME slots of the CONTEXTFRAME respectively, using their contents to complete 
the logical form of the utterance. When displayed to the other agent it must be in a 
form that makes clear that a single copy of the book is what is required, and places this 
in the LOGFORM. Thus we now have;
(Y/N QUERY (PRES (HAVE (CO-AGENT (PRO PERSON ’’YOU ”)
(THEME (BOOKXYZ)
(CO-THEME (INDEF/SING COPY)))))
The process by which each agent forms utterances in accord with their beliefs and 
goals has been described. From this process we know what the bookseller’s goals are 
and how this governs the type of utterance her opening move is going to be. We also 
know the type of utterance the customer is composing to further her goals. What 
hasn’t been made explicit at this point is what happens following B’s opening 
utterance. How is B’s utterance interpreted by C and how does it affect her own 
utterance. The first cycle of this dialogue is not complete until the INTERPRET 
operation for C has been described.
1 5 4
5.2.9 The customer's operation of INTERPRET.
B displays her utterance to C. Within the context of the model this is a logical form 
as indicated above. It is assumed that C's knowledge of language and the speech 
community in which she is situated is similar to that of B and therefore predisposes her 
to be able to access the content of B's utterance via its logical form. What C constructs 
in interpreting B's logical form, is assumed to correspond to B's logical form as 
realised in natural language. She expects certain aspects of this to be significant and 
familiar, especially the type of components used and its order. She employs her facility 
for constructing logical forms for interpreting the logical forms of others. The template 
that is used for piecing together her own logical forms is used to piece together the 
incoming information which will be interpreted according to her GBS and her 
CONTEXTFRAMEs.
Initially, C's INTERPRET operation identifies the type of utterance made by the 
speaker as to whether it is a DECLARE, ASK or COMMAND type. If the utterance is 
a DECLARE type of utterance, the content of this is processed by C and any new 
information is added to her GBS. What type of response she makes or even whether 
she makes a response will depend on the content of this DECLARE in relation to her 
GBS and her own goals and purposes. A COMMAND type of utterance is processed 
in a similar manner but the response may be some physical action or behaviour. An 
ASK type of utterance indicates to C that a verbal response is required by the speaker.
The operation INTERPRET uses knowledge of plan-methods to process the 
incoming logical form. For example, there are different options for dealing with 
DECLARE, ASK and COMMAND type utterances and these are identified in the 
ACTION slots of the plan-method functions. When an ASK type of utterance is 
identified, INTERPRET invokes immediately a LOGFORM to prepare for a response 
but first completes the processing of the incoming logical form. The logical form for 
B's first utterance is:
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(Y/N QUERY (PRES (MOD/AUXpossib. "CAN"
(AGENT (PRO PERSON "I")) 
(THEME (SCRIPT HELP)) 
(BENEFICIARY 
(PRO (PERSON "YOU"))))))
B's logical form is interpreted by C in the following manner. Initially, the 
LOGFORM is identified as commencing with a Y/N QUERY and therefore a Y/N 
QUERY plan-method is activated and the slots filled in.
NAME: Y/N QUERY
OBJECT: HELP (STATE)
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: ((TO = ASK (KNOWIF-QUESTION))
(FROM = (REPLY (DECLARE))))
The MOD/AUXpossib. is identified as being the lexical item "CAN" from the 
definition of this category in C's GBS. This signifies to C the possibility of an offer of 
assistance. The AGENT signified as PRO PERSON "I" is identified as being the CO­
AGENT from C's perspective and therefore "I" is interpreted as referring to B. HELP 
is identified as being the THEME of the logical form and a HELP plan-method is 
activated. The slots of this are filled with the incoming information:
NAME: HELP
OBJECT: NIL
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: ((FROM = OFFER-ASSISTANCE)
(TO = ACCEPT-ASSISTANCE))
No object is identified in the logical form of the utterance so the OBJECT slot in 
this plan-method is left unfilled. The utterance has been made by B so the FROM slot 
is filled with this agent, that is the BOOKSELLER. The TO slot defaults to SELF or 
CUSTOMER, that is, the agent receiving the incoming information. Finally, 
INTERPRET identifies from the ACTION slot that the relationship between FROM
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and TO indicates that the filler of the FROM slot is making the offer of assistance and 
the occupier of the TO slot should accept this offer. The PRO PERSON "YOU" is 
interpreted by C as refering to herself.
As well as the Y/N QUERY and HELP plan-methods being activated at this point 
to aid in C's interpretation of B's utterance, CONTEXTFRAMEs are also created. The 
reader will remember from 5.2.5 that a number of CONTEXTFRAMEs were created 
when C formulated a plan for her utterance. However, it has also been previously 
noted that in this scenario, C does not form her reply until after B has made her offer 
of help and therefore the activation of the CONTEXTFRAMEs previously described, 
would not have been activated until C's first operation of INTERPRET.
What needs to be emphasized is that both UTTERANCEPLAN and INTERPRET 
use COMPILECONTEXT to create CONTEXTFRAMEs in order to obtain essential 
information about the situation in which the dialogue is taking place. INTERPRET S 
use of COMPILECONTEXT at this point in the process creates the following 
CONTEXTFRAMEs:
CASE-NAME:
IDENTITY-FILLERS:
RESTRICTIONS:
AGENT 
SELF, OTHER
((SELF = (PRO PERSON "I")) (OTHER 
= (PRO PERSON "YOU”, "HE",
"SHE ", "IT" "THEY","THEM") 
(ANIMATE))
((INTERPRET ("I" = "YOU")
("YOU" = "I")
("HE","SHE", "IT" =?)
("THEY", "THEM " = ?))) 
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
ACTION/STATE:
CASE-NAME: CO-AGENT
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ((SELF = (PRO PERSON ”1”)) (OTHER
= (PRO PERSON "YOU ", "HE",
"SHE", "IT" "THEY ", "THEM ") 
(ANIMATE))
((INTERPRET ("I" = "YOU")
("YOU" = "I")
("HE","SHE ", "IT" = ?)
( "THEY", "THEM" = ?))) 
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
ACTION/STATE:
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CASE-NAME: BENEFICIARY
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ((SELF = (PRO PERSON 'T '))  (OTHER
= (PRO PERSON "YOU", "HE",
"SHE", "IT" "THEY", "THEM") 
(ANIMATE))
ACTION/STATE: ((INTERPRET ("I" = "YOU")
("YOU" = "I")
("HE","SHE", "IT" = ?)
("THEY", "THEM" = ?))) 
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: THEME
IDENTITY-FILLERS: HELP
RESTRICTIONS: SUBGOAL-ELEMENT
ACTION/STATE: NIL
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: TO-LOCATION
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ANIMATE
ACTION/STATE: TO-CUSTOMER
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: FROM-LOCATION
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ANIMATE,
ACTION/STATE: FROM-BOOKSELLER
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: AT-POSSESSION
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ANIMATE
ACTION/STATE: WITH-BOOKSELLER
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: TO-POSSESSION
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ANIMATE
ACTION/STATE: TO-YOU
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE NAME: FROM POSSESSION
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ANIMATE
ACTION/STATE: FROM-SELF
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
As these CONTEXTFRAMEs are created the slots are filled with the relevant 
options indicating the conteAlual circumstances from C's perspective. B's use of the 
PER PRO "I" is interpreted by C's INTERPRET operation as being an AGENT
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CONTEXTFRAME in this instance and the PER PRO "YOU" as being a CO-AGENT 
CONTEXTFRAME. This is because each agent views the one who is making the 
utterance as being the AGENT and the receiving party as the CO-AGENT. 
Furthermore, C views herself as being the BENEFICIARY in this instance which 
information is defined by the HELP plan-method previously activated and which 
indicated that she was to receive the HELP whilst B was to give the HELP.
Accordingly, the appropriate slots of the other relevant CONTEXTFRAMEs, i.e. 
THEME, TO-LOCATION, FROM-LOCATION, AT-POSSESSION, and FROM- 
POSSESSION are filled.
The elements contained in B's logical form compose a proposition (HELP, 
BOOKSELLER, CUSTOMER) which is interpreted as such by C's INTERPRET 
operation. This proposition is new information for C and now becomes part of her 
GBS. It has been noted that a restriction on the HELP plan-method is that of 
ACCEPT-ASSISTANCE, another plan-method. This is processed by INTERPRET in 
this instance given the restrictions governing the FROM and TO slots of the HELP 
plan-method.
NAME: HELP
OBJECT: NIL
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: ((FROM = OFFER-ASSISTANCE)
(TO = ACCEPT-ASSISTANCE))
ACCEPT-ASSISTANCE is another plan-method which contains information as to 
how an ACCEPT can be made and has attached to it an action which is an affirmative 
response and could be signalled to B by C making a formulaic type of utterance such 
as the form "YES PLEASE ".
NAME: ACCEPT-ASSISTANCE
OBJECT: HELP
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: (ASSERT-AFFIRMATIVE (FORMULAIC "YES PLEASE")
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INTERPRET has completed its task but the ACCEPT-ASSISTANCE plan-method 
indicates that a response needs to be made. Furthermore, the ACTION slot of the Y/N 
QUERY plan-method used by INTERPRET to process B's LOGFORM also indicates 
that a REPLY should be made to this type of response. Where two or more plan- 
methods might have been activated by INTERPRET in the interpretation of a logical 
form, as in this instance, the last one to be activated is selected to provide the next 
action for the continuing process. There is an amount of redundancy in the process and 
if the last plan-method to be activated is unable to provide any further action one of the 
previously activated plan-methods can be selected for this purpose.
The type of action and response required having been selected, control returns to 
UTTERANCEPLAN. UTTERANCEPLAN makes an analysis of the ACCEPT- 
ASSISTANCE element options as it does initially with a sub-goal.
UTTERANCEPLAN begins the construction of the LOGFORM and fills the first 
slot with a DECLARE type utterance such as ASSERT. This type of utterance plan has 
been indicated by the ACTION slot of the ACCEPT-ASSISTANCE plan-method. It 
also uses a COMPILECONTEXT operation to create any further CONTEXTFRAMEs 
that are needed for the planned utterance. In this instance a THEME 
CONTEXTFRAME is required and COMPILECONTEXT creates one;
CASE-NAME: THEME
IDENTITY-FILLERS: AFFIRMATIVE
RESTRICTIONS : SCRIPT-ELEMENT
ACTION/STATE: NIL
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
The tense of B's logical form that has been interpreted by C is present tense. There 
is no information that anything with respect to tense has changed and 
UTTERANCEPLAN identifies that a response is required in the same tense. The tense 
slot of the LOGFORM is filled with a PRES tense flag. CONSTRUCTLF begins to 
compile the logical-form for the utterance;
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(ASSERT (PRES (...
CONSTRUCTLF obtains from the THEME slot of the CONTEXTFRAME the 
theme of affirmation to B's offer of help and inserts this into the LOGFORM under 
construction. Thus;
(ASSERT (PRES (THEME AFFIRMATIVE(formulaic "YES PLEASE")))
No other case frame information is conveyed in this logical form as it is not 
required by B for an understanding of C's response. This is because B's INTERPRET 
operation will process the response, in a similar manner as described above, and 
identifies from the HELP and OFFER-ASSISTANCE plan-methods (previously 
activated when B made her offer of help) that C's AFFIRMATIVE is an ACCEPT 
response to her OFFER-ASSISTANCE. B asked a question of a yes/no type and an 
affirmation response is all that is required in reply.
At this stage in the process, C having made a response to B's offer of assistance 
decides to make another utterance in furtherance of her goals and to explain to B the 
type of assistance that is required. The model does not capture this process explicitly. 
Much of the reasoning behind these two moves hes in the knowledge both participants 
have about making offers of help and their acceptance. This is knowledge both agents 
know about the pragmatics of language which is likely to be extensive. It is not my 
intention to represent this type of knowledge in the model apart from that which the 
plan-methods capture in a small way.
It is likely that B, having made an offer of assistance not only waits for a positive 
response but in the event of receiving a positive response is also prepared for a 
following utterance indicating what sort of help is required. Therefore, at this stage of 
the dialogue C makes her second utterance to achieve her goals (described above at 
5.2.5) which is then interpreted by B. First though, B's INTERPRET operation of 
both C's utterances will be described. They are:
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(ASSERT (PRES (THEME AFFIRMA'nVE(formulaic "YES PLEASE")))
(Y/N QUERY (PRES (HAVE (CO-AGENT (PRO PERSON "YOU")
(THEME (BOOKXYZ)
(CO-THEME (INDEF/SING COPY)))))
5.2.10 The bookseller's operation of INTERPRET
Following a similar operation of interpretation to that described above, B interprets 
the response of C. INTERPRET identifies the first move in C's response as being an 
ASSERT type of utterance which indicates to B that C is following a DECLARE type 
of plan for her utterance. It must be remembered that within the model, this ASSERT 
information is carried in the logical form. It is assumed that this element would 
correspond to certain linguistic objects and cues in natural language. INTERPRET 
obtains this information from activating the ASSERT plan-method and identifying that 
an AFFIRMATIVE response is a DECLARE type of plan and which matches the 
AFFIRMATIVE in C's logical form:
NAME: ASSERT
OBJECT: NIL
FROM: CUSTOMER
TO: BOOKSELLER
ACTION: (DECLARE (INFORMIF = (AFFIRMATIVE = YES,
NEGATIVE = NO)) (INFORMINFO = OTHER))
The AFFIRMATIVE element activates the ACTION slot of the ACCEPT- 
ASSISTANCE plan-method and so indicates to B that her offer of assistance has been 
accepted by C.
NAME: ACCEPT-ASSISTANCE
OBJECT: HELP
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: (ASSERT-AFFIRMATIVE (FORMULAIC " YES PLEASE")
B's knowledge of the ACCEPT-ASSISTANCE plan-method and its relationship 
and linkage to the OFFER-ASSISTANCE and HELP plan-methods indicates to B that
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this sub-goal has been achieved and that the customer has signified that she does want 
help. Therefore, the sub-goal (WANTS, CUSTOMER, HELP) is removed from the 
goal tree and placed in her GBS where it becomes a belief that is known that the 
customer wants help. B's goal-tree is now in the state signified in Figure 5.3 (1).
Furthermore, B's belief set is in the following state
(SELL, BOOKSELLER, BOOK) & (WANT, BOOKSELLER, a, b)
& ((BUY, CUSTOMER, BOOKS) = a) & ((HIGHVAL, BOOKS) = b)
(-KNOW, BOOKSELLER) & (IF a, b, c, d)
& ((KNOW, CUSTOMER) = a )
& (PAPERCOVERS, BOOKXYZ) = b )
&( HARDCOVER, BOOKXYZ) = c )
& (VALUE, BOOKXYZ) = d))
(KNOW, BOOKSELLER, a ) & ((WANTS, CUSTOMER, HELP) = a) 
(BOOKSELLER, I)
(CUSTOMER, YOU)
(BOOKSELLER, SELF)
C makes another move and B's INTERPRET operation remains activated. 
INTERPRET then processes the second utterance of C;
(Y/N QUERY (PRES (HAVE (CO-AGENT (PRO PERSON "YOU")
(THEME (BOOKXYZ)
(CO-THEME (INDEF/SING COPY)))))
The Y/N Qu e r y  element of C's logical form signals to B's INTERPRET 
operation that an ASK type plan is being used. This information is obtained from the 
ACTION slot of the Y/N QUERY plan-method which has been activated;
1 The general beliefs that pertain to both agents are not reproduced in these tables but can 
be found in the complete list of both agent's beliefs in Appendix 1
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(SOLD, BOOKS) 
GOAL
BUY
(WANT, BOOKSELLER
(BUY, CUSTOMER, BOOK) = 
& (HIGHVALUE, BOOKS) =
KNOW
(IF a b)
& (KNOW, CUSTOMER) = 8) 
& (VALUE, BOOKXYZ) = b)
( i F a b c )
& (KNOW, CUSTOMER) = 8 )
& (PAPERCOVERS, BOOKXYZ) = b) 
& (HARDCOVERS, BOOKXYZ) = C)
Figure 5.3 The r@vl9Ml BoQkseller'g 
Qoal-tree (1)
NAME: Y/N QUERY
OBJECT: NIL
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: ((TO = ASK (KNOWIF-QUESTION))
(FROM = (REPLY (DECLARE, ASK, COMMAND))))
An option in the ACTION slot of this plan-method indicates that C's utterance is of 
the KNOWIF category in an ASK plan and that it requires a response from B. The 
element HAVE indicates to B that the main action of this utterance concerns the state 
POSSESS and this information is derived from activation of the HAVE plan-method;
NAME:
OBJECT:
FROM:
TO:
ACTION;
HAVE 
BOOKXYZ 
BOOKSELLER 
CUSTOMER 
(POSSESS (STATE))
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B's CONTEXTFRAMEs are also used to interpret C's utterance and are also 
activated;
CASE-NAME; AGENT
IDENTITY-FILLERS; SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ((SELF = (PRO PERSON " I”)) (OTHER
= (PRO PERSON "YOU", "HE",
"SHE", "IT" "THEY", "THEM") 
(ANIMATE))
ACTION/STATE: ((INTERPRET ("I" = "YOU")
("YOU" = "I")
("HE","SHE", "IT" = ?)
( "THEY ", "THEM" = ?))) 
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: CO-AGENT
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ((SELF = (PRO PERSON "I")) (OTHER
= (PRO PERSON "YOU”, "HE", 
"SHE","IT " "THEY","THEM") 
(ANIMATE))
ACTION/STATE: ((INTERPRET ("I" = "YOU")
("YOU" = "I")
("HE","SHE", "IT"" = ?)
("THEY", "THEM" = ?))) 
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: THEME
IDENTITY-FILLERS: BOOKXYZ
RESTRICTIONS: SUBGOAL-ELEMENT
ACTION/STATE: NIL
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: CO-THEME
IDENTITY-FILLERS: INDEF/SING
RESTRICTIONS: BELIEF-ELEMENT
ACTION/STATE: NIL
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: TO-LOCATION
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ANIMATE
ACTION/STATE: TO-CUSTOMER
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: FROM-LOCATION
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ANIMATE,
ACTION/STATE: FROM-BOOKSELLER
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
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CASE-NAME: AT-POSSESSION
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ANIMATE
ACTTON/STATE: WITH-BOOKSELLER
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: TO-POSSESSION
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ANIMATE
ACTION/STATE: TO-SELF
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: FROM-POSSESSION
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ANIMATE
ACTION/STATE: FROM-BOOKSELLER
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
B's INTERPRET operation identifies the AGENT (PRO PERSON "YOU) as 
relating to the POSSESS element of the HAVE plan-method and therefore identifies it 
as relating to herself. The ACTION slot of the AGENT CONTEXTFRAME indicates 
that an agent receiving a PER PRO "YOU" is to interpret this as "I", that is, SELF. 
Furthermore, INTERPRET identifies from the other relevant CONTEXTFRAMEs the 
THEME as being a particular object, namely BOOKXYZ, and the CO-THEME as 
identifying this object as being a single definite copy. Other CONTEXTFRAMEs 
contain the information as to where this object is in terms of location and possession.
A complete cycle of the dialogue has now been completed and is:
B . (Y/N QUERY (PRES (MOD/AUXpossib. "CAN"
(AGENT (PRO PERSON "I"))
(THEME ( HELP))
(BENEFICIARY
(PRO (PERSON "YOU"))))))
C . (ASSERT (PRES (THEME AFFIRMATIVE
(formulaic "YES PLEASE")))
(Y/N QUERY (PRES (HAVE (AGENT (PRO PERSON "YOU") 
(THEME (BOOKXYZ))
(CO-THEME (INDEF/SING "COPY"))))
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5.2.11 The second cycle of dialogue
The major operations governing the processing of the model have now been 
described. For the remaining cycles of the dialogue only the names of these operations 
will be used. This offers a more succinct view of how the logical forms of each agent 
are derived from their sub-goals and how these are achieved and the GBSs of each 
agent are updated. The next cycle of dialogue to be processed is:
4. B Yes, I have them, both in papercovers and hardcovers.
5. C How much is the papercover copy?
The next sub-goal of B's awaiting processing is:
(IF a, b, c, )
& ((KNOW, CUSTOMER) = a)
& (PAPERCOVERS, BOOKXYZ) = b)
& (HARDCOVERS, BOOKXYZ) = c)
This is attached to the -KNOW predicate node and so indicates that B doesn't 
know whether the customer knows that the book she wants is available in papercovers 
or hardcovers. Another sub-goal relates to the value of the book and again is an 
element B doesn't know whether C has knowledge of. This information relates to B's 
earlier sub-goals of wanting the customer to buy books of a high value. B has the 
knowledge that hardcover books are generally more expensive than papercovers and 
that this means more profit for her. Her intention therefore, is to make the information 
available to C that both types of book cover for this title are available.
To realize this sub-goal, B formulates a DECLARE plan for displaying this 
information. The LOGFORM therefore begins with an ASSERT type of utterance. The 
utterance to be made is to be in the present tense and so the flag PRES fills the tense 
slot of the LOGFORM. Next, the AGENT slot is filled with PRO PERSON "I" 
indicating that B is the agent of this utterance. The main action slot contains the
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element HAVE indicating that B has the following items in her POSSESSion. The 
THEME for this utterance relates to two items she has and wants to display to C. It 
utilizes the determiner 'both', that is, DET "BOTH" the meaning and use of which is 
defined in her GBS. The CO-THEME relates to the cover types available, paper and 
hardcovers. Thus, the logical form for B's next utterance which is displayed to C is:
(ASSERT (PRES (HAVE (AGENT (PRO PERSON "I"))
(THEME (DET "BOTH"))
(CO-THEME (PAPERCOVERS & HARDCOVERS)))))
C interprets this logical form in the manner previously described and identifies that 
two of her sub-goals have been achieved. One of her sub-goals was (HAVE, 
BOOKSELLER, BOOKXYZ) and B's reply indicates that she does have this book 
available for sale. This knowledge that she did not know, becomes known to her, 
following the display of B's logical form, so this sub-goal is removed from her goal- 
tree and placed in her GBS becoming a proposition that is known.
Another sub-goal was (PAPERCOVERS, BOOKXYZ), that is, C did not know 
whether the specific book title she was wanting to buy had papercovers. In the logical 
form displayed by B this sub-goal was also met, in that the information was provided 
for her without C having to ask for it specifically. Accordingly, she does not have to 
ask for something she already knows and this sub-goal is also removed from the tree 
and is placed in her GBS as knowledge which is now known. C's goal-tree is now in 
the state as shown in Figure 5.4 (1) overleaf and her belief set is now in the following 
state:
(HAVE, CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ) & (WANT, CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ )
& (IF a, b, c (BUY, CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ)
&((HAVE, BOOKSELLER, BOOKXYZ) = a)
& ((PAPERBACK, BOOKXYZ) = b)
& ((VALUE£15, BOOKXYZ) = c )
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(-KNOW, CUSTOMER) & (IF c)
& ((VALUE£15, BOOKXYZ) = c )
(PAPERCOVERS, BOOKXYZ) 
(HARDCOVERS, BOOKXYZ) 
(HAVE, BOOKSELLER, BOOKXYZ) 
(CUSTOMER, SELF)
(CUSTOMER, I)
(BOOKSELLER, YOU)
(HAVE, BOOKXYZ) 
GOAL
WANT -KNOW
BUY
(WANT, CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ
(VALUE, BOOKXYZ, £15)
(BUY, CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ) 
& ( I F a b )
& (PAPERCOVERS, BOOKXYZ) = 8 )  
& (VALUE, BOOKXYZ, £15) = b )
Figure 5.4 The revised Customer's 
Qoql-treg (1)
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B’s goal-tree at this stage is now in the state signified by Figure 5.5 (2) below and 
her belief-set at this stage is now the following;
(SELL. BOOKSELLER. BOOK) & (WANT. BOOKSELLER, a. b)
& ((BUY. CUSTOMER. BOOKS) = a) & ((fflGHVAL. BOOKS) = b)
(-KNOW. BOOKSELLER) & (IF a.)
& (VALUE£I5. BOOKXYZ) = a))
((KNOW. BOOKSELLER, a ) & ((WANTS. CUSTOMER. HELP) = a)) 
((KNOW. CUSTOMER) = a. b. )
& (PAPERCOVERS. BOOKXYZ) = a)
&( HARDCOVER. BOOKXYZ) = b )
(BOOKSELLER. SELF)
(BOOKSELLER. I)
(CUSTOMER. YOU)
(SOLD. BOOKS) 
GOAL
WANT
-KNOW
BUY
(WANT, BOOKSELLER, a
& (KNOW, CUSTOMER) = 8 )  
& (VALUE, BOOKXYZ) = b)
(BUY, CUSTOMER, BOOK) = 8  ) 
& (HIGHVALUE, BOOKS) =  b )
Figure 5.5 The revised Bookseller's 
Goal-tree (2)
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Once B has DECLAREd the information to C that the BOOKXYZ she would like 
to buy is available in PAPERCOVERS and HARDCOVERS the sub-goal is removed 
from her goal-tree and the propositions composing the beliefs of this sub-goal, as weU 
as the additional information furnished by B becomes part of her GBS and which now 
indicates that C possesses this information.
The remaining piece of knowledge C requires to achieve her goal is to know the 
price of the book. Accordingly she plans an utterance which will achieve this sub-goal. 
She requires information in this instance and therefore, employs an ASK plan for the 
formation of her LOGFORM. The information she requires is not simply of the yes or 
no type and so a KNOWINFO category of ASK plan is required. The LOGFORM for 
this utterance will start with a WH-QUERY signifying that information is being 
sought. The present tense is being used and so the PRES flag appears next in the 
LOGFORM.
The main action of the utterance relates to a quantity element, that is, the value of 
the book in paperback. The lexical form for this quantity type of concept is realized by 
the use of the adverb "how" and is one of the lexical forms which signify to a hearer 
that a WH-QUERY is being made. The lexical form "how" is the only WH word 
which is not spelt with a WH and is defined as a plan-method in the model.
NAME: WH- QUERY
OBJECT: NIL
FROM: CUSTOMER
TO: BOOKSELLER
ACTION: ((TO = ASK (KNOWINFO-QUESTION))
(FROM = (REPLY (DECLARE. ASK. COMMAND))
The particular query being made concerns the value of the papercover copy of the 
book, that is. how much does it cost? This is the THEME of this utterance and its CO­
THEME is the element PAPERCOVERS.
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CASE-NAME: THEME
roEN tlTY -FILLER S: VALUE
RESTRICTIONS: SUBGOAL-ELEMENT
ACTION/STATE: NIL
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: CO-THEME
IDENTIT Y-FILLERS : PAPERCOVERS
RESTRICTIONS: BELIEF-ELEMENT
ACTION/STATE: NIL
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
Therefore the complete logical form for C s next utterance is:
(WH-QUERY (PRES ( "HOW" (THEME ( VALUE))
(CO-THEME (PAPERCOVERS)))))
This logical form is interpreted by an INTERPRET operation of B. The type of 
utterance is identified from the WH-QUERY plan-method as being an ASK plan of the 
KNOWINFO kind. The request for information relates to the value of the paperback 
copy of the BOOKXYZ. B identifies that the element relating to PAPERCOVERS in 
this logical form refers to BOOKXYZ of C's earlier utterance. B obtains this 
information from the record of the earlier logical forms in the conversation.
The record of this earlier conversation would have marked the elements 
PAPERCOVERS and HARDCOVERS in B's second utterance as referring to 
BOOKXYZ in the second part of C's first utterance. B knows both the value of the 
PAPERCOVERS and HARDCOVERS as this knowledge is contained in her GBS. 
Consequently, B plans an utterance to DECLARE this information to C.
5.2.12 The last cycle of dialogue
6. B. £15.
7. C. I'll take it
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As previously noted the WH-QUERY contained in C's logical form signals to B 
that information is required by the speaker which information is derived from the 
ACnON slot of this plan-method and that she needs to make a reply.
Two elements contained in C's query relate to two elements in the remaining sub­
goal of B. C's query to B about not knowing the price of BOOKXYZ is confirmation 
of B's belief. A LOGFORM is invoked by B's UTTERANCEPLAN to contain the 
logical form for a reply which is then constructed by CONSTRUCTLF. The plan for 
the utterance is of the DECLARE type and so the flag ASSERT is chosen to fill the 
first slot of the LOGFORM and indicates what type of utterance it is. The utterance is 
of the present tense so the tense flag PRES fills the second slot. The THEME and CO­
THEME are the value of the book and the papercovers edition, respectively. In natural 
language the third person singular pronoun could be used by B to refer C's attention 
to the object of the utterance and which has previously been referred to. This could be 
realized by the lexical form of 'it'.
The action in this utterance concerns something being something else. The reader 
will remember that the copula has been omitted in the prepositional forms being used 
(4.3.1) but that the second element in the proposition is governed by the first Thus in 
this instance £15 is governed by VALUE, that is, the value is £15. The logical form 
for this utterance then is;
(ASSERT (PRES (THEME (VALUE £15 ))
(CO-THEME PAPERCOVERS)))
Once this utterance has been made by B the sub-goal is removed from the goal-tree 
and the proposition (KNOW, CUSTOMER, VALUE£15) is placed in B's GBS. B's 
goal-tree is now in the state as in Figure 5.6 (3) overleaf and her belief set is:
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(SELL, BOOKSELLER, BOOK) & (WANT, BOOKSELLER, a, b)
& ((BUY, CUSTOMER, BOOKS) = a) & ((fflGHVAL, BOOKS) = b)
((KNOW, BOOKSELLER, a ) & ((WANTS, CUSTOMER, HELP) = a)) 
((KNOW, CUSTOMER) = a, b, c)
& ((PAPERCOVERS, BOOKXYZ) = a)
& ((HARDCOVER, BOOKXYZ) = b )
& ((VALUE£15, BOOKXYZ) = c))
(BOOKSELLER, SELF)
(BOOKSELLER, I)
(CUSTOMER, YOU)
(WANT, BOOKSELLER, a  b )
BUY
WANT
(SOLD, BOOKS) 
GOAL
(BUY, CUSTOMER, BOOK) =  a  ) 
& (HIGHVALUE, BOOKS) =  b )
Figure 5.6 The revised Bookseller'^ 
fioal-treg C3)
From the display of B's logical form, C makes an INTERPRET operation and 
learns that the THEME of this utterance relates to a VALUE and that this in turn relates 
to the CO-THEME which is the PAPERBACK edition of the book. The filler of the 
THEME slot, VALUE£15 is an item of fresh information but which also relates to an 
item in her remaining sub-goal, that is, (VALUE£15, BOOKXYZ). Tliis sub-goal is 
attached to the -KNOW predicate node which motivated her forming an utterance to
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obtain the information. This information is now known to her and therefore the sub­
goal is removed from the tree and the proposition (VALUE£15, BOOKXYZ) is placed 
in her GBS. The current states of Cs goal-tree and GBS are now in the state as shown 
below in Figure 5.7 (2).
The sub-goals emanating from the -KNOW predicate node in C's goal-tree have 
now been achieved. The recursive process of ACHIEVEGOAL now begins to unwind 
and ACHIEVEGOAL removes the -KNOW predicate node as it has been completed 
and has no further use.
ACHIEVEGOAL unwinds to the next predicate node which is BUY. C now has 
aU the information necessary to accomplish her action of BUY and so
(HAVE, BOOKXYZ)
GOAL
)(WANT, CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ)
(BUY, CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ) 
& ( I F a b )
& (PAPERCOVERS, BOOKXYZ) = 8 )
& (VALUE, BOOKXYZ, £15) = b )
Figure 5.7 The revised Customer's 
Goal-tree (2)
Cs belief-set is now the following:
. '
(HAVE, CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ) & (WANT, CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ ) 
& (IF a, b, c (BUY, CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ)
&((HAVE, BOOKSELLER, BOOKXYZ) = a)
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& ((PAPERBACK, BOOKXYZ) = b)
& ((VALUE£15, BOOKXYZ) = c )
(VALUE, £15, BOOKXYZ)
(PAPERCOVERS, BOOKXYZ)
(HARDCOVERS, BOOKXYZ)
(HAVE, BOOKSELLER, BOOKXYZ)
(CUSTOMER, SELF)
(CUSTOMER, 1)
(BOOKSELLER, YOU)
the NOTYET flag is removed from the action slot of this plan-method, which was 
previously activated but held over for later processing, and the BUY sub-goal is put 
into action, that is, (BUY, CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ). The other elements attached to 
this sub-goal have now been satisfied. That is, C contains in her GBS the knowledge 
that the BOOKXYZ is available in papercovers and is of a value equivalent to £15. 
These conditions having been satisfied the BUY sub-goal can proceed. 
ACHIEVEGOAL activates the BUY plan-method and an EXCHANGE-MONEY 
operation is identified.
NAME: BUY
OBJECT: BOOKXYZ
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: EXCHANGE (MONEY FOR OBJECT)
The plan-method EXCHANGE is used by C to complete the purchase of the book 
and an action associated with carrying out this plan-method indicates that an utterance 
needs to be made to signify the purchase. That is, that the exchange needs to be 
affirmed by an ASSERT type of utterance. UTTERANCEPLAN uses this action to 
elicit a LOGFORM and CONSTRUCTLF constructs C's last utterance in this 
dialogue.
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NAME: EXCHANGE
OBJECT: BOOKXYZ
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: ((TRANSFER OF OBJECT
(FROM BOOKSELLER TO CUSTOMER)) 
(AFFIRM-EXCHANGE (DECLARE)))
The information C requires to display to B is of an ASSERT type and therefore a 
DECLARE plan is put into operation and an ASSERT flag is placed in the first slot of 
the LOGFORM.
NAME: DECLARE
OBJECT: NIL
FROM: CUSTOMER
TO: BOOKSELLER
ACTION: (DECLARE (INFORMIF =
(AFFIRMATIVE = YES, NEGATIVE =N0)) 
(INFORMINFO = OTHER))
Both the action of exchange and the utterance affirming this exchange relate to the 
present and so the tense slot is filled with the flag PRES. The AGENT of the utterance 
is C and so this slot is filled with PRO PERSON "I". The main action of the AGENT 
in this utterance is a TAKE action, which is another plan-method.
NAME: TAKE
OBJECT: BOOKXYZ
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: TRANSFER OBJECT FROM
BOOK SELLER TO CUSTOMER
The THEME of the utterance is the BOOKXYZ with PAPERCOVERS having 
VALUE£15. This is the object with its associated characteristics which is being 
TAKEn. In natural language the third person singular pronoun "it" could be used to 
refer to this object Thus the logical form of Cs remaining utterance is:
(ASSERT (PRES (TAKE (AGENT (PRO PERSON "I"))
(THEME (BOOKXYZ, PAPERCOVERS, VALUE£15)))))
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Following C's utterance the transaction is assumed to take place and C has the 
book she wanted. The recursive action of her ACHIEVEGOAL operation continues to 
unwind. She has accomplished the BUY sub-goal and ACHIEVEGOAL removes this 
predicate node BUY from the tree as it has now been satisfied. ACHIEVEGOAL 
unwinds to the WANT predicate node and the NOTYET flag is removed from the 
WANT plan-method previously activated.
NAME; WANT 
OBJECT; BOOKXYZ
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: POSSESS-OBJECT (STATE)
The proposition that formed this sub-goal i.e.(WANTS, CUSTOMER, 
BOOKXYZ) has now been satisfied. Consequently, the sub-goal of WANT is 
removed from the tree and ACHIEVEGOAL unwinds to the root node of the tree 
which is (HAVE, BOOKXYZ). The goal has been achieved, C now possesses the 
book XYZ and the proposition signifying this fact is placed in C's GBS. The final 
state of C's belief-set is:
(HAVE, CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ)
(VALUE, £15, BOOKXYZ)
(PAPERCOVERS, BOOKXYZ)
(HARDCOVERS, BOOKXYZ)
(HAVE, BOOKSELLER, BOOKXYZ)
(CUSTOMER, SELF)
(CUSTOMER, I)
(BOOKSELLER, YOU)
Similarly for B, all the sub-goals attached to the -KNOW predicate node have been 
achieved and therefore this node is removed from B's goal-tree. See Figure 5.8 (4) 
overleaf.
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B’s operation of ACHIEVEGOAL unwinds to the BUY predicate node and the 
NOTYET flag is removed from the ACTION slot of the BUY plan-method. B 
participates in the exchange of money for BOOKXYZ simultaneously with C.
NAME: BUY
OBJECT: BOOKXYZ
FROM: BOOKSELLER
TO: CUSTOMER
ACTION: EXCHANGE (MONEY FOR OBJECT)
(SOLD, BOOKS) 
GOAL
WANT
BUY
(WANT, BOOKSELLER, a
(BUY, CUSTOMER, BOOK) a  ) 
& (HIGHVALUE, BOOKS) b )
Figure 5.8 The revised Bookseller's 
Goal-tree (4)
Consequently, the BUY predicate node is removed from the tree as having been 
accomplished and the propositions connected with this node are placed in B's GBS as 
having been achieved. B’s belief-set is now in the following state: '
(BUY, CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ)
((KNOW, BOOKSELLER, a ) & ((WANTS, CUSTOMER, HELP) = a)) 
((KNOW, CUSTOMER) = a, b, c)
& ((PAPERCOVERS, BOOKXYZ) = a)
& ((HARDCOVER, BOOKXYZ) = b )
& ((VALUE£15, BOOKXYZ) = c))
(BOOKSELLER, SELF)
17 9
(BOOKSELLER, I) 
(CUSTOMER, YOU)
ACHIEVEGOAL then unwinds to the WANT predicate node where the NOTYET 
flag is dispensed with.
(SOLD, BOOKS) 
GOAL
WANT
(WANT, BOOKSELLER, 8  b)
Figure 5.9 The revised Bookseller's 
GMl-tree (5)
ACHIEVEGOAL examines the sub-goal attached to the node and identifies that the 
propositions relating to this sub-goal have been previously satisfied under the BUY 
sub-goal. The WANT node is removed as having been achieved. ACHIEVEGOAL 
unwinds to the root goal node which is (SOLD, BOOKfS]) which is now achieved. 
Consequently, the proposition attached to this node and signifying this fact is placed in 
the GBS of the bookseller. The final state of B's belief-set is;
(SOLD, BOOK[S])
(BUY, CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ)
((KNOW, BOOKSELLER, a ) & ((WANTS, CUSTOMER, HELP) = a)) 
((KNOW, CUSTOMER) = a, b, c)
& ((PAPERCOVERS, BOOKXYZ) = a)
& ((HARDCOVER, BOOKXYZ) = b )
& ((VALUE£15, BOOKXYZ) = c))
(BOOKSELLER, SELF)
(BOOKSELLER, I)
(CUSTOMER, YOU)
18 0
Both parties, having achieved their goals, the interaction between them is complete 
and the dialogue finished.
-oOc-
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Chapter 6 - Conclusions and Evaluation
The research aims for this work were identified in chapter one (1.1). There it was 
stated that this thesis describes research aimed at a theoretical framework for a 
computer model of natural language dialogue. A preliminary theoretical exploration 
for a future implementation of a possible dialogue system. Within this context the aim 
of the study was to make some attempt at understanding how conversation might 
work and to identify some of the elements that might be required by a model for such 
an implementation. It was suggested that arising from this, it might be possible to 
discover characteristics as to how some aspects of conversation might be organised 
and structured. The motivating principle being the necessity to discover the 
psychological processes operating in the behaviour of dialogue to facilitate greater 
ease in man-machine interaction.
It is important to clarify the status of my model in relation to these research aims. 
The model I am presenting is not an implementation, but is a descriptive model that is 
animated by a process-oriented approach.
Furthermore, it is not a cognitive model and no claim has been made for cognitive 
plausibility. It is suggested that the model and this way of thinking might help us to 
learn or think about what is happening in our minds during the process of dialogue. 
Therefore, while some aspects of this model may have some psychological 
plausibility no claim is being made for psychological validity. Psychological 
processes might bear some similarity to what is presented here or they might be 
completely different It is important to remember this caveat in the ensuing discussion 
of what has been achieved, as aspects of the model are referred to and discussed in 
terms of human agency. Anthropomorphic descriptions, though contributing to ease 
in understanding, can be misleading and can help to create an impression of 
psychological validity that is not being claimed.
In this concluding chapter I propose to discuss and evaluate to what extent the 
aims have been achieved and what conclusions can be drawn, both from the work and
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the overall approach adopted. Firstly, it is necessary to summarise what has been 
achieved in this study and how the work relates to that reviewed in chapter 3. 
Secondly, some evaluation will be made and conclusions identified. Thirdly, attention 
will focus on how the work might be extended and improved and finally how it relates 
to current developments and trends since the work commenced.
6.1 A summary of what has been achieved
It was suggested in chapter one (1.4) that a model of dialogue needs to account for 
the roles of both participants to a dialogue and be able to specify the interaction 
between the participants and how each p^c ipan t achieves their goals simultaneously 
in the communicative encounter.
The model presented in this work contributes to such an account and suggests 
some ways as to how this might occur. It does not focus on only one of the 
participants to.a conversation, i.e. the speaker or hearer, but on both, the speaker and 
the hearer simultaneously and how these roles alternate as each agent pursues their 
individual plans and goals. In doing this it suggests how the individual goals and 
purposes of agents can be formulated from underlying belief and knowledge 
configurations. The notion underlying the work is that utterances are generated and 
interpreted as a consequence of participants pursuing their individual goals and 
purposes.
Agents are shown as having a particular set of beliefs from which plans are 
formulated to compose utterances to achieve goals that accord with those beliefs. The 
individual utterances of both participants form a dialogue in which it is shown that 
both agents achieve their individual, albeit different goals.
This work has been informed by the literature reviewed in chapters 2 and 3. and it 
is necessary to discuss some of this briefly.
It was stated in 3.1.1 that an assumption of this research is that dialogue is a 
cooperative enterprise and that this characteristic derives from the underlying 
rationality of the participants. It was noted there, that Ellis (1979), made a distinction
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between ideal rational systems and imperfect human rational systems and that Allwood 
(1976) and Dennett (1978) also emphasised the imperfect nature of human rationality.
Consequently, I have not attempted to present a formal model where aU the beliefs 
of the agents can be tested for consistency with each other or where logical truths that 
could be derived from the beliefs the agents hold, appear in their belief systems. This 
was the approach adopted by GaUiers (1989) who accepted the difficulty inherent in 
such formal systems, of all logical truths appearing among agents' beliefs; which is a 
characteristic of perfect rational systems (3.1.5). The beliefs the agents have in my 
model, have been given to them on the basis of what appears to be plausible and could 
be described in terms of the psychology notion of "common sense". It was not my 
intention to model a rational system and therefore, it does not show how beliefs are 
derived rationally and logically from other beliefs. The model assumes a basis of 
rationality according to the arguments identified in chapter three.
Viewing dialogue as a cooperative enterprise, the model described is informed by a 
view of cooperation as deriving from self interest (Axelrod, 1984: 6-7) discussed in 
2.1.3.2. It was noted there, that Galliers (1989), proposed that conflict has a positive 
role in maintaining conflict but the view I adopted for this work was that cooperation 
is a way of diminishing conflict
A definition of cooperation I suggested (2.1.3.2) includes a number of elements 
with which the model can be compared, to see how it performs in relation to these.
Participants involved in communicative interaction were said to be involved in a 
shared process. The model attempts to describe this shared process by identifying and 
stating the agent's respective sets of interlocking beliefs in the realization of individual 
communicative goals. The model accomplishes this with respect to the 
bookseller/customer scenario and also with the management/union negotiations 
(Appendix 6) but fads to establish this in the teacher/pupds dialogue. (Appendix 6) The 
reasons for its failure with respect to the latter, appear to relate to the type of dialogue 
in which the teacher and pupils are engaged in and to the extent the objectives of this
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dialogue were shared by the participants. The problems for the model that this 
dialogue identified will be discussed further in 6.1.7.
Another element of this definition was that the agents maintain the communicative 
process untü one or both of their goals are achieved or considered unsuccessful. The 
model traces the process of a particular piece of interaction.which suggests how the 
first part of this element might work, i.e. when both agents achieve their goal. It does 
not show what happens if goals are unsuccessful or are aborted and therefore 
compares favourably with only one aspect of this element. The position of the 
participants in the management/union negotiations is something of a stalemate and 
does not show how the parties extricate themselves from this impasse. To accomplish 
this aspect, the model would have to be applied to scenarios where agents have beliefs 
about aborting their goal(s).
A further element suggested was that cooperation includes the most economic and 
advantageous way in which purposes and goals are achieved and existing conflict 
either avoided or diminished or even increased.
The model does not show any particular diminishing or increasing of conflictper 
se. It may provide some pointers as to how agents' levels of frustration, associated 
with realising their individual goals, might be reduced but it does not show how 
interpersonal conflict might be diminished or avoided. The management/union 
dialogue can be viewed as a scenario of conflicting views but even here, while the 
model might help to show how the communicative interaction is maintained, it does 
not show how the inherent conflict characterised by the dispute is either reduced or 
resolved. At best, it shows how the status quo might be maintained.Therefore, this 
aspect has not been achieved.
It is therefore necessary to acknowledge, that the discussion of Galliers' views on 
conflict and cooperation and the alternative view suggested by this work are not as 
straight forward as the initial discussion might appear to have suggested. Both 
concepts remain difficult to define and at times it seems that some elements that are
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emphasised lead to the eclipse of others which are just as important It also begs the 
question as to whether the concept of cooperativity is a factor in all interaction.
Beliefs in the model are represented in a prepositional format Representation of 
beliefs and knowledge and the reasoning behind abstract propositional representations 
of belief was discussed in 3.1.4. 1 and 3.1.4.2 and I do not intend to duplicate the 
discussion again here, except to say that this type of representation chosen for the 
research appears to work reasonably weU in this type of model.
Belief revision and change (3.1.6) is achieved by a 'display' feature rather than by 
Allwood's other concept of manipulation' (3.1.6.) and works by the operation of 
association (3.1.6.2 ) rather than by the operation of inferences being made from 
particular configurations of beliefs (3.1.6.3).
The communicative utterances of an agent in the model are 'displayed' to the other 
agent in a logical form (4.7.1).Though there are structural weaknesses with this aspect 
of the model, which are discussed in 6.7, this aspect of the model is achieved in a 
straight-forward manner. It is difficult to envisage how either of the agents in this 
model could manipulate the configurations of the other without constructing sets of 
beliefs, goals and plans to achieve such an objective which seems to underline the 
arguments for the inappropriate use of this concept in this context, as argued in 3.1.6.
The suggestion that belief configurations of agents change as new information is 
displayed and which is then associated with the belief elements in the receiving agent’s 
goals is a further aspect achieved by the model (3.1.6.2). However, the way in which 
this operates in the model is by a simple matching process. The more complicated 
operation of inferencing is not demonstrated and it is likely that the model would have 
to be considerably revised or added to, to achieve this.
The characteristic of intention (3.1.2), planning (3.1.3), and wants and goals 
(3.1.5), and how they relate to the work reviewed in chapter 3 are discussed in the 
following sections.
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6.1.1 It models the beliefs and goals of participants simultaneously
The work describes how agents within the context of a piece of purposive 
interaction come to that interaction with a set of beliefs, motivations, intentions and 
plans. The resulting dialogue is not formulated randomly but is purposive and 
structured and the structure of the resulting dialogue-text reflects the participants' plans 
and purposes.
In ordinary human interaction each participant to a conversation, generally has at 
their disposal a wealth of information and knowledge prior to any engagement in a 
piece of interaction. This not only includes beliefs about what they want to achieve 
from the interaction but also includes knowledge and beliefs about the context in 
which the interaction is taking place. This will also include knowledge and beliefs 
about the other participant(s) in relation to gender, status and relationships to do with 
power and obligation (2.1.3).
Though the model does not attempt to model these aspects explicitly it does 
suggest how beliefs about the context, and therefore, these related beliefs might 
impinge upon an agent's goals and purposes.
It shows what might take place between two agents who are given the titles of 
bookseller and customer, within a constructed scenario when they are ascribed certain 
specific goals. Within this constructed and imaginary scenario the participants are 
provided with certain specific goals, elements of which are related to other beliefs they 
have in their general belief sets. They also hold other beliefs in common with each 
other. The beliefs and goals of each of the participants are identified and from these it 
is shown how plans might be formulated for the making and carrying out of specific 
utterances and how these might be displayed and thus how a dialogue develops.
The description of the process of the model is a linear account of what is 
happening between the participants and the model shows how individual goal trees are 
created and how utterances arising from these goal trees might be formulated to 
produce the dialogue. Nevertheless, this linear process and the construction of goal 
trees lends a somewhat static character to the model which in itself highlights a major
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weakness. Agents need to be able to create plans and adapt existing plans dynamically 
during a dialogue and the agents in this model cannot do this. It is difficult to see how 
this characteristic of the model could be altered to accommodate greater flexibility in 
the construction of plans without fundamental changes.
6.1.2 It applies a planning approach to the formation of individual 
utterances
Many of the plarming approaches described in the literature relate to the planning 
of motor behaviours or tasks such as the painting of a room or the moving of blocks 
and the order in which such kinds of task might be accomplished (Pollack, 1990:78- 
83). Some planning approaches described, though applied to conversation, generally 
relate to higher dialogue processes such as conversational preferences or moves such 
as those employed in argument, debate or the resolution of conflict (Galliers, 1989; 
Reichman, 1985; Stutt, 1989) or to the performance of actions that have a 
communicative component Power (1974), used a planning component in his model 
whereby Mary and John had to formulate a plan, and agree together on a particular 
action. Their utterances were an outcome of trying to make and agree these plans. 
Other planning approaches are aimed at choosing the type of speech act that might be 
required to make a particular utterance (Appelt, 1985).
The approach of this work is different in that it applies a planning approach to the 
formation of individual utterances. Using the general framework of the declarative, 
interrogative and imperative for utterances (4.5), the planning component utilises 
elements from the participants' belief structures which include drawing on their 
knowledge about the context and use of plan-methods that relate to that context. Thus 
the planning component uses information about the mood of the utterance required by 
the particular sub-goal of the agent being processed, the beliefs the agent might have 
pertaining to the context in which the dialogue is taking place, and also beliefs about 
the way in which certain concepts might be used in the making of utterances. The latter
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are portrayed in the form of plan-method entities. The characterisation of plans within 
the model is discussed further in 6.1.5.
6.1.3 It suggests how contextual and pragmatic information contained 
in agents' beliefs might contribute to dialogue
The model presented in this work is within a context that views people as being 
processors of information (1.7), but not only this. Participants to a dialogue cannot be 
viewed simply as having their own beliefs, goals and purposes in a vacuum but must 
be seen as operating within a wider social context (2.1.3). It follows from this 
assumption then, that participants to any interaction must be viewed as having beliefs 
and knowledge about their immediate context and also a much wider world context or 
view which will impinge on their participation in any conversational encounter. 
Information available to agents within an encounter but which is extemgd to them has 
to be interpreted and stored in their memories and belief systems.
The weakness of many approaches to the study of language and conversation is 
that it is often compartmentalised into the three areas, of syntax, semantics and 
pragmatics (4.1). It was noted in chapter 4 that Allen devised a system whereby the, 
syntactic construction of language was represented by a logical form, the latter which 
was used as an intermediate representation between the syntactic form of a sentence 
and its contextual interpretation (4.7). That is:
Syntactic construction 
Logical form 
Interpretation in context
Any decisions that require contextual knowledge in Allen's model, are not made in 
deriving the logical form. Instead, information from the sentence structure is recorded 
in the logical form for use later by a contextual analyser.
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The approach that has been adopted in this work is that the immediate context as 
well as the wider context of a speech situation are known to the respective agents and 
form part of their belief systems, otherwise none of these contextual elements could be 
used in the process of conversation.
Information about the context in which the dialogue is taking place is contained in 
the beliefs of the agents and therefore informs and influences the belief configurations 
of the agents involved. It is from these belief structures that they formulate their 
utterances and will choose syntactic constructions that reflect what they want to 
convey in accordance with what they believe.
As previously indicated, (6.1) beliefs of the agents in the model are represented in 
an abstract propositional.form (3.1.4.1) and the specific formulation used in the model 
is explained in 4.3 & 4.3.1. Individual elements or concepts comprising these belief 
propositions are then used in the construction of the agent's goals, plan-methods for 
realising these goals in practice, and the construction of context-frames. In this manner 
the model attempts to incorporate aspects of agents' beliefs about the wider context 
and how things are actually achieved by agents. Elements from the agent's prior set of 
beliefs, their goals, plan-methods and context-frames are used to construct a logical 
form prior to an utterance being made, which is then used to compile the syntactic 
form of the utterance.
A major weakness of the model is that it does not show how agents make the link 
or draw inferences between beliefs in their general belief-sets and the context This 
deficiency is overcome by the use of context-frame structures that contain much 
knowledge that is not defined specifically iii the agent's general belief sets. While this 
device works for the model it blurs the distinction between the beliefs the agent has 
that are specified in a propositional format and other beliefs or knowledge about the 
context that are being specified in a frame-like construct. This inconsistency in the 
presentation of different kinds of beliefs is a flaw which might be possible to correct 
by adopting a single format for the presentation of all beliefs and knowledge. It is a 
difficulty that relates to belief and knowledge and how this should be represented. A
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similar discrepancy occurs with the plan-method construct which is discussed in 
6.1.5.
6.1.4 It shows that agents pursue their own individual goals and only 
adopt the goals of the other agent if this suits them
It was noted that a widely accepted assumption within AI and the related literature; 
is that for conversation to be maintained, at least one of the agents need to accept the 
communicative goals of the other, otherwise the conversation will not work. This was 
discussed in 2.1.3.2 and I do not intend to repeat the discussion or arguments here. 
Nevertheless, in the discussion concerning the characteristic of cooperation it was 
argued that the behaviour of participating in conversation is a cooperative activity per 
se and does not require the explanation that one agent adopts the goal of another for it 
to be maintained.
Other examples, that involve human interaction which require the cooperation of 
the participants, such as some games, were identified to illustrate this point (2.1.3.2). 
It was argued in 2.1.3.2 that conversation is a cooperative activity of itself and that 
this was maintained by factors such as 'face' and social sanctions, status and power 
relations, the need to pursue present as well as future goals and the important necessity 
of minimising conflict (2.1.3).
This provides an alternative view and suggests that participants to a conversation 
can have very different goals from each other but still participate in conversational 
interaction which by its nature can be cooperative. Furthermore, that it is by having 
different goals, participants maintain motivation to pursue or discontinue the 
conversation.
The model shows how the bookseller and customer have different goals and 
objectives to achieve and through the process of identifying each others goals and 
purposes, dialogue is produced and their respective objectives achieved.
For this purpose, the goals of the agents are prescribed. It may have been useful to 
specify how these originated from the agent's belief-sets but it was not a purpose of
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this work to research the character of goal formation. Goals are specified in a 
prepositional format similar to beliefs (5.2.1) and on the surface, appear to be 
indistinguishable from beliefs. They are distinguished by the action-type elements that 
form the predicates of the belief propositions. With respect to the bookseller the 
elements SELL, WANT and BUY distinguish this set of belief propositions as being 
their general as well as specific goals for this dialogue and with respect to the customer 
it is the elements HAVE, WANT, and BUY.
Whether the inclusion of such action-type entities in a belief proposition would 
always constitute such a belief-proposition as being a goal, has not been tested 
exhaustively and therefore, this method of distinguishing between beliefs and goals 
could be flawed. Nevertheless, intuitively, goals do appear to possess elements of an 
intentional quality to them and the use of action-type entities to distinguish goals from 
beliefs serves to suggest how close a link there might be, between an agent's beliefs 
and the formulation of goals from those beliefs.
6.1.5 It focuses on speakers and hearers intentions and shows how 
these might be realised as sub components of plans
Attention was drawn to the comments of Grosz and Sidner (1986: 175) and also 
Cohen (1984:97) who believe that attention must be given to the 'intentional structure' 
of language and conversation (1.4). The subject of 'intention' is a philosophical one 
and the literature relating to it is considerable. However, it is not possible to ignore 
this aspect and some reference needs to be made to the concept in the use of 
conversation, particularly in any model that utilises a 'belief component. A major 
difficulty facing any researcher in this area is deciding what intentions actually are and 
how they can be represented.
This work is informed by the writings of Bratman (1987) who views "plans as 
intentions writ large" (3.1.3.2). This is a useful way of dealing with intention and 
lends itself to an approach whereby intentions can be described and modelled as sub­
components of plans which has been attempted in this work.
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The agents possess a certain set of beliefs about the world which provide them 
with motivation to achieve certain goals. These motivational elements of their goal- 
beliefs, discussed in the previous section, help to form their communicative goals in 
the dialogue. They are also used to formulate their goal-trees for the production of 
utterances. This motivational element of the goal-beliefs can also be viewed as having 
an intentional ingredient but this is more accidental than by design. The intentional 
component of the model is built into the plans and the plan-methods.
Plans within the model relate only to the mood of an utterance and how these are to 
be formed (4.5). That is, they relate only to the most fundamental mood choices in 
English which are declarative, interrogative and imperative. Although plans are 
distinguished theoretically within the model (4.5), in practice, they are formulated as 
plan-methods and therefore are indistinguishable from other plan-methods such as 
HELP, BUY, SELL, EXCHANGE, etc., (Appendix 2). Plans, intuitively, suggest as 
being somewhat large psychological entities that might contain several elements. With 
this in mind, the plan element within the model was defined in terms of more primitive 
entities by formulating them as plan-methods. The model does not have a mechanism 
for creating more general plans.
It is in the context where plans to achieve goals can be more easily specified that 
the concept of recursion as used in the model is a useful one. In order to achieve a 
major goal or carry out a plan it may be necessary to carry out a host of sub-plans and 
sub-goals which might emerge or change dynamically in the course of interaction. 
Recursion is a concept that helps to explain the process whereby agents are able to 
pursue their ultimate goals and to maintain interaction until either one or the other 
parties achieve their goals or they change their goals and call a halt to their 
discussions.
Plan methods are dynamic constructs and achieve action within the model. They 
have links with associated plan-methods through their ACTION components. 
Sometimes, the operations of several plan-methods are required to bring about an 
action or an utterance. Plan-methods are the intentional component of the model and
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can be likened to the sub-components of plans suggested by Bratman (1987). 
Furthermore, as both agents possess the same set of plan-methods, the recognition of 
the plan-methods or an element of the plan-method the other agent is using, is 
achieved by a simple matching process.
Plan-methods are a simple way of providing the agents with knowledge of how to 
do things. General beliefs are represented in an abstract prepositional form as are the 
goal-beliefs but knowledge about the context and knowledge about how to achieve 
things are represented in frame-like structures that have a dynamic element attached to 
them. The weakness of this approach is that the use of different representations to 
represent different kinds of knowledge can be confusing and criticisms made about the 
context-frame structures, can also be directed at the plan-method structures (6.1.3). 
The strength of this approach is the dynamic nature of these frame-like constructs.
A further disadvantage is that context-frames and plan-methods are also referred to 
as belief structures. They each contain and employ elements of beliefs from the agent's 
prepositional belief formats which tend to blur the boundaries between these entities. 
Once again, this points to the difficulty associated with the representation of 
knowledge and belief and the ease with which some kinds of knowledge lends itself to 
be represented in one way and other types of knowledge and belief to being 
represented in another. Difficulty with more precise definition has been encountered, 
especially when these entities tend to share similar elements.with each other.
Representing intention in this work has not been without its problems and no claim 
is made that this has been achieved. It contains intentional elements, and these, as has 
been noted, arc defined as plan-methods. Though an intention may be a psychological 
entity in its own right, distinct from a belief or plan or even a sub-component of a 
plan, what does become evident is the intentional ingredient or quality that appears to 
be inherent in beliefs, goals and plans and is difficult to distinguish from these entities. 
Motivation itself and the goals which are its objects appear to be multiple in character. 
An attempt to distinguish a separate entity of intention may be a somewhat forlorn
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exercise as it may be an emergent quality arising from other entities and unidentifiable 
apart from these.
6.1.6 Comparisons between this research and Power's work
Power's (1974) work is quite unique within the literature and his ideas have 
informed this research. Attention has been previously drawn to the fact that his work 
attempts to model both speaker and hearer in their alternating roles in the form of two 
robots within a model of conversation (2.2.2). It is therefore somewhat surprising that 
his work has not attracted more interest and debate than it generally has. This may be 
because of some of the inherent difficulties in modelling conversation that he helped 
identify and also the scale of such a task.
This research complements his in a limited manner. Firstly, it focuses on the 
beliefs of agents and how these are used to mediate between their perception of the 
world and their interaction in it by way of making utterances. What the agents believe 
become elements in their goals which are used to formulate their sub-plans in 
pursuance of these goals and which are then reflected in the content and structure of 
their utterances.
Secondly, an attempt has been made in this work to apply the model to more 
natural and life-like scenarios than that of Power's robots. The robots within Power's 
model have a very limited view of the world that is tied to a few specific objects and to 
rules relating to those objects and how they are to be used. What has been attempted 
here is to apply the model to more natural dialogue scenarios such as the task oriented 
dialogue between a customer and a bookseller; the negotiations between a union and 
management and a teacher and her pupils.
An important focus for the model was not the specific sets of beliefs that relate to 
each of the scenarios, but the processes by which the beliefs are used to achieve 
conversational goals. Given a different scenario, the resulting dialogue of agents with 
different sets of beliefs should reflect the beliefs and structure of those different goals 
and purposes but the processes and structures by which those utterances were
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achieved should remain the same. However, the attempt to apply the model to more 
fluid dialogues, other than the bookseller/customer scenario, was not successful as 
was initially anticipated and some of the difficulties encountered are discussed in the 
next section.
6.1.7 Extending the model to other domains
To illustrate the model in operation an example scenario had to be selected and the 
one chosen was the type of interaction that might take place between a shop assistant 
and a customer concerning the purchase of a particular book. The reasons prompting 
this choice being that this type of interaction is both familiar and natural but also 
structured and constrained by the task and objectives of each of the participants. Any 
'sales' type of scenario could have been selected for this purpose because it is a 
category of human interaction that places some constraint on the possible 
conversational options for the achievement of such a task.
One of the main ideas behind the model is that utterances and dialogue stem from 
an agent's specific set of beliefs and goals relating to some particular object. 
Therefore, if the agents within the model are allocated beliefs and goals relating to 
other scenarios, the resulting dialogue should reflect the structure of those goals and 
beliefs. It was necessary to test this idea on more fluid dialogues and some attempt has 
been made to apply the model to two other scenarios, the result of which, throws 
some doubt on the possibility of extending it to other domains These other scenarios 
are the negotiations between union and management representatives and the interaction 
between a teacher and her pupils (Appendix 6). Both these scenaiios are more fluid 
and less structured than the bookseller/customer scenario and serve to identify 
weaknesses within the model and the possible necessity for changes and/or 
modifications.
For instance, a major weakness is identified in the compiling of the agents' goal 
trees. Whereas in the interaction between a customer and bookseller the overall goals 
of each could be clearly defined in explicit well-developed goal-trees (5.2.3) this was
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not possible for the management and union negotiators or for the teacher/pupil 
interaction.
While each side in the management/union negotiation and the teacher in the 
teacher/pupils scenario, had overall goals they wished to achieve, it was difficult to 
identify any interim or sub-goals they might achieve on the way to achieving their 
ultimate goal. Both sets of negotiators in the management/union scenario, needed to 
chip away at each others arguments and responses. They might have started from 
opposing positions and needed to expose the flaws in each others arguments. This 
could either have been anticipated beforehand and built into their sub-goal strategy, but 
with the risk of anticipating wrongly, or more likely, could best be dealt with while the 
negotiations were being conducted.
The pupils in the teacher/pupil scenario did not know what they were going to be 
discussing until the teacher introduced the topic and even then, this might have been a 
completely new topic to them and involved them in the learning of new concepts. 
Therefore, it was not possible for them to have any general goal to achieve from this 
interaction prior to its commencement Not having any overall goal they would not 
have any sub-goals to achieve either.
This might suggest that a goal-oriented approach to dialogue cannot be applied to 
this sort of interaction and on the surface this might seem to be the case. If this is so, 
then the preceding theory that utterances are the sub-plan components of 
communicative goals that derive from agents' beliefs, is implausible and needs to be 
abandoned.
However, an assumption behind this work is that utterances are the outcome of 
intentional behaviour and that intentional behaviour is not random but is rational and 
planned. Therefore, this assumption needs to be applied to the interaction of the pupils 
in the teacher pupil scenario.
The explanation for their rational responses to a topic they are beginning to learn 
about can only be understood by ascribing to them a general goal of cooperating with 
the teacher. The pupils are likely to be in a lesson that they have to attend, although
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they might enjoy being there, and could be viewed as passive participants to the 
interaction. On the other hand, they could be eager learners and active participants. 
Whether they are passive participants or active learners, it is one of those dialogues 
that reveals the nature of the power relationships that can exist between participants in 
an interaction and the status and obligations these relationships might represent
Though it may not be possible to identify any communicative goals for them to 
pursue, prior to the commencement of this interaction, these can be seen to emerge in 
response to the teacher's demands on their thought and attention. The pupils are 
required to respond and they do so in a thoughtful and intelligent manner according to 
their beliefs and what knowledge they have available to them. Though the pupils are 
active in the dialogue it is not one that has been initiated by them but they cooperate 
and engage with the teacher, which behaviour can be interpreted as intentional and 
therefore goal-motivated behaviour.
They cannot be said to adopt the goals of the teacher as they don't know what 
these are and for the reason that they are learning new information about the concept 
'capital punishment'. The general goal of the pupils then, can be interpreted as 
cooperating with the teacher's questions and answers because they are involved in a 
cooperative activity per se. If they didn't cooperate, it is likely they would be open to 
sanctions by the teacher for uncooperative behaviour. Their 'conversational goals' are 
formed and made in response to the teacher's questions.
This suggests that goals and beliefs are changing, and or emerging, in the process 
of interaction and only an extremely dynamic system could model this characteristic. 
Even in the bookseller/customer scenario, though the goal-tree for the bookseller was 
identified quite explicitly it is likely that the more explicit sub-goals identified would 
only emerge as the dialogue progresses.
Any plausible model of dialogue would have to capture this dynamic and emergent 
charactoriotio of intentional behaviour in conversation.
It also suggests that different types of interaction require the use of different 
strategies. There are some types of interaction where the goals involved can be easily
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specified as can the plan and sub-plans to realise the goal. Other types of interaction 
suggest that the goals for each utterance and the planning of the next utterance take 
place as the interaction proceeds. This problem has been previously noted (6.1.1) and 
relates to the necessity of being able to create plans in a dialogue dynamically. The 
difficulty with any attempt to represent these processes in a more formal manner is that 
it ignores the characteristic of human consciousness and the ability of humans to think 
and reflect on what they are saying and what is being said to them.
6.2 Evaluation
It has been suggested that a characteristic of a good theory is that it clarifies the 
most significant factors of a process which make certain patterns predictable (Best, 
1986: 185). A method frequently adopted is to develop a formal system for the theory 
and then to argue that the organizational principles of the formal system are either 
analogous to, or even in some sense identical to, the organizational principles of the 
process being modelled. In the brief discussion of Black's (1962) comments about the 
sorts of models used in research (1.8), it was concluded that the type of model being 
presented in this work was a theoretical model.
One of the things that Black said about the use of this type of model was that it 
was more "a way of talking" rather than the building of an actual model and that 
imagination could be a useful and valuable ingredient in this task.
This work has been influenced by the latter approach. It has involved an attempt to 
construct a theoretical but imaginative model of natural language dialogue that captures 
some of the salient features of the processes involved. It has been constrained by the 
necessity to describe the model in terms of process with a view to a possible future 
implementation in a computer program. It is not an implementation, rather is it a 
descriptive model that is animated by describing it in terms of process.
Following the summary of what has been achieved in the previous sections, it is 
necessary to provide some critical evaluation and this is done on the basis of how 
closely the model adheres to either of these two dimensions.
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6.2.1 Strengths of the descriptive approach
The strength of the descriptive approach allows for the dual nature of dialogue to 
be described which includes language production as well as understanding. These are 
both large areas for research in their own right hut a model of the processes of 
dialogue needs to encapsulate both and the scale of what is involved possibly militates 
against developing a formal system.
A further strength of this approach is that it allows for the entire process of 
dialogue to be described. That is, from the formation of agent's goals which are part 
of their belief system; to the formation of plans to achieve those goals; to the formation 
of structures which include the components of mood, tense, belief elements and 
contextual cues prior to the making of utterances. It also allows demonstration of how 
each utterance of each agent dovetails with the utterances stemming from the goals of 
the other participating agent(s). In this way the model suggests how information given 
in a reply but not requested, nevertheless furthers the goals of the agent for whom this 
information is useful.
Another strength of this approach is that it helps show how the beliefs and goals of 
the participating agents might relate to each other and how these in turn might relate to 
the dialogue that is produced. The resulting structure and organization of the dialogue- 
text reflects the beliefs and goals that motivated it and can only be interpreted and 
understood in this context It suggests therefore, that to properly understand what is 
going on in any dialogue or conversation one would need to know what the beliefs, 
goals, purposes and motivations of the individual participants were. Without this 
knowledge any assumptions we might make, at best can only be subjective.
6.2.2 Advantages of the formal approach
A major criticism that could be levelled at the descriptive approach and therefore 
against this work is one I raised in relation to the writings of Merleau-Ponty in chapter 
one (1.7.2). It could be said, and possibly not without some justification, that having 
warned against the difficulty, I myself have not avoided it and that the approach
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adopted in this work is too subjective, being characterised by the use of too much 
imagination and lacking in essential rigour. Black did identify a major difficulty with 
this approach, previously identified when he said:
"a strained and artificial description of a domain sufficiently known 
otherwise" (Black, 1962: 237)
An advantage of a formal approach has already been noted in 6.2. By developing a 
formal system for a theory it is possible to argue that the organizational principles of 
the formal system are either analogous to, or even in some sense identical to, the 
organizational principles being modelled.
A formal approach to modelling dialogue requires a formal language such as a 
logic which possesses a precise semantics. Every expression in the language is 
determined by its semantics. Sentences in the language are derivable from the set of 
axioms and well formed formulas of the logic and should be a valid consequence of 
those axioms and formulas. That is, other logical conclusions might be derived from 
them.
This has a number of advantages. One consequence of such a formal system is that 
there can be no ambiguity in interpretation. Another is that the inference procedures 
can be checked for their soundness. Such a system that has a precise semantics to 
which all expressions must conform, could provide a ligourous basis for testing paths 
of reasoning in the formulation of utterances in dialogue.
The major drawback with this approach has been previously discussed (4.3 & 
6.1).This is that it makes the assumption that agents are ideal knowers and ideal 
reasoners. From the conclusions drawn from the discussion concerning rationality it 
was decided that human rational systems were not ideal or perfect rational systems and 
therefore this formal approach was not pursued.
In an attempt to avoid the pitfalls identified by Merleau-Ponty and Black, use has 
been made of the inherent discipline required by the demand to develop a model in
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terms of process as this was seen to be valuable and a useful constraint for the work 
and to keep imagination within acceptable bounds. Therefore, the model and the 
'hand-simulation' of the model is described and presented as a process and some 
attempt has been made to show how the most significant components of the model 
might relate to each other in an integrated system.
It is therefore necessary to view this work as being a preparative enquiry for a 
future implementation of the model in a computer program. It can be viewed as the 
preliminary development of some aspects of a theory of natural language dialogue that 
needs to be refined and developed by the rigour inherent in programming.
However it is also necessary to note that a computer model is not necessarily a 
formal model. It might be possible to build a computer model that does what its creator 
required it to do irrespective of how humans do it or it might be used to draw 
conclusions about the way in which human processing works, without necessarily 
claiming that the processes are exactly the same in both cases. On the other hand, an 
aim could be to construct programs that are functionally equivalent to a psychological 
theory where every thought process is specified in the program by a corresponding 
process. The most usual method of testing these models is to run the program to see 
whether the behaviour of the computer mimics or simulates that of the human being. 
Such simulations involve the double discipline of explicitness and testing which has 
been discussed in 5.1. A formal model or program is a symbolical system that leaves 
no room for doubt or misinterpretation whereas a computer model is generally a 
representation of a situation.
The model presented in this work is not a formal model and the extent to which it 
is a computer model needs to be clarified. It is not a model that seeks to simulate every 
process which might be involved in the production of natural language dialogue. 
Therefore, it does not claim to be a model of the human cognitive processes that might 
be employed in this behaviour. It is rather a model from which to draw conclusions as 
to the way human processing in dialogue might work. Any psychological model of
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natural language dialogue would probably need similar knowledge structures and 
processes that are suggested in this model.
The aim of building a model of natural language dialogue is to include those 
features of the process which are important to it. I have attempted to do this in this 
work which identifies some of the processes that might be required for such a system. 
A major weakness is that without being able to show how the components work 
together in a functional system it is not possible to test the model on the chosen 
dialogue scenarios, yet alone on more complex dialogues.
6.3 The simulation of the model
The description of the simulation of the model is of necessity, a linear description. 
This identifies a serious limitation, as an appropriate model of natural language 
dialogue would have to capture the simultaneous processing of beliefs and goals of 
both participants. For example, the process COMPILECONTEXT comes too late in 
the process. It is likely that cues from the context are already available to agents at the 
outset of any interaction. Similarly, it is possible for the process CONSTRUCTLF, to 
identify an element that has two meanings associated with it, i.e. the bookseller might 
be using the concept SELL but the obverse of this concept, BUY is required by the 
customer, (see also 5.2.7 and the discussion of HELP and whether the state or the 
action was required). This is not very plausible as a human processor is likely to 
derive the sense of the meaning required from the context with some immediacy. A 
minimal requirement for a system of natural language dialogue would therefore be 
parallel and simultaneous processing.
Furthermore, a hand-simulation of any model is an inherent weakness. Although 
the literature identifies others who have adopted this approach (Reichman, 1985: 108) 
it remains a less than satisfactory method and is much less plausible than a working 
program. Such a process enables any inherent weaknesses within the processes to be 
glossed over or to remain unidentified which would not be possible in a working 
computer program. Some of the ideas in this work could be implemented in a
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computer program and is one of the ways in which the work could be extended which 
is commented on below in 6.7.
In considering how to program a problem of this nature it was envisaged that some 
aspects of the conversational process might be captured in an object oriented approach 
to programming. The major components of the model such as the agents' beliefs, 
goals, plans and plan-methods can be envisaged as objects and using the characteristic 
of inheritance and the ability to pass messages between objects it might be possible to 
capture some elements that might contribute to a plausible model of dialogue.
6.4 What the model does not deal with
It does not deal with ambiguity, types of assertions such as passives, nor with 
ellipsis, anaphora, agrammaticisms, figures of speech and numerous other language 
characteristics and devices.
Speech is accompanied by gestures, intonation, pauses, hesitations, false starts, 
changes of focus and subject and the model has nothing to say about these 
characteristics although change of subject and focus could relate to the change in goals 
of the participants. Nor is any comment made about the non-verbal aspects of 
conversation although the model suggests that such information would have to be 
represented in the belief and knowledge stmctures of the participating agents.
In justification, the model never attempted to deal with these issues but what it did 
set out to deal with was the way in which utterances of two or more agents might be 
formed in relation to particular sets of beliefs and goals within the context of a limited 
domain. Despite the qualifications and criticisms, the model docs have something to 
contribute to our understanding of this process as identified above.
6.5 Possible objections to researcher constructed dialogues.
Brown and Yule make a distinction between 'sentence' and 'utterance' (1983: 
19ff). They suggest that it is reasonable to propose that features of spoken language 
should be considered as features of utterances and that features typical of written
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languages as being characteristics of sentences. Furthermore, they clarify what they 
mean by the term 'sentence' by drawing attention to the distinction Lyons makes 
between 'text-sentences' and 'system-sentences'. Lyons describes the latter in the 
following way:
"...system sentences never occur as the products of ordinary language- 
behaviour. Representations of system-sentences may of course be used 
in metalinguistic discussion of the structure and functions of language: 
and it is such representations that are customarily cited in grammatical 
descriptions of particular languages" (Lyons, 1977: 31).
Brown and Yule suggest that there are important methodological differences 
involved in the two approaches. The grammarian tends to concentrate on a particular 
body of data in an attempt to produce an exhaustive but economical set of rules which 
will account for all and only the acceptable sentences in his data. On the other hand, 
the discourse analyst treats his data as the record of a dynamic process in which 
language was used as an instrument of communication in a context to express 
meanings and achieve intentions. In their role as discourse analysts. Brown and Yule 
employ the term 'sentence' in the sense of 'text-sentence' because they are 
overwhelmingly concerned with ordinary language behaviour.
The purpose of this discussion is to demonstrate that both uses are legitimate and 
Gazdar has given something of an overt commitment to the constructed-data approach:
"I shall assume....that invented strings and certain intuitive judgements 
about them constitute legitimate data for linguistic research" (Gazdar,
1979: 11),
Because of the wish to account for the mental processes that might be involved in 
the language producer's production of utterances, this work adopted the constructed-
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data approach to the problem. In fact, this approach seems the only plausible way of 
proceeding where it is necessary to identify the beliefs, plans and goals of the 
participants. Because it is not possible to get at these elements objectively in 'ordinary 
language behaviour' for the reason that we cannot get inside another person's mind, it 
is necessary to construct the data. As well as constructing the dialogue it is also 
necessary to construct the beliefs and goals that might produce the particular piece of 
dialogue that has been constructed.
Not only is this a legitimate way of proceeding it seems to be the only way of 
proceeding in this context
6.6 Conclusions that can be drawn from the work
From the preceding discussion it is suggested that the following conclusions can 
be drawn.
• any plausible model of dialogue will have to account for the language behaviour of 
both participants and not only one of them.
• such a model would need to demonstrate how the beliefs, goals and plans of the 
participants were represented for each agent and how they interlocked together to 
produce dialogue.
• furthermore, such a model would need to identify how the beliefs, goals and plans of 
the participants contributed to the choice of semantic, syntactic and pragmatic options 
available to speakers and hearers in their alternating roles.
• the model would also have to account for how contextual and pragmatic cues were 
mediated by the participants and represented in their belief systems. Also, how cues of 
this type were added to the belief system in the course of the dialogue.
• it would also need to identify how utterances comprising all these elements are put 
together.
• furthermore, any plausible system of dialogue would need to capture the dynamic 
nature of goal and plan creation as the dialogue ebbs and flows.
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• a plausible model of dialogue would also need to account for conversational 
interaction per se and not just particular types of interaction.
• it would also have to capture the simultaneous and parallel characteristic of 
processing information.
• lastly, it would need to identify interpretative processes and demonstrate how 
feedback influences and changes goals, objectives and existing belief structures.
Although the model falls far short of offering any solutions to such problems it has 
made some tentative suggestions as to what might be involved. It is now necessary to 
examine how the model might be extended and improved.
6.7 Possible extensions and improvements to the model
The methodology chosen for this work was that of an iterative process described 
in 5.1. By performing a series of steps repeatedly, successive approxiinations can be 
made until the desired result is achieved.
It was noted in 5.1 that a dialogue scenario had been selected from a particular 
domain, the first stage in this iterative process. Then, a hypothesis was made as to 
how this particular piece of dialogue might be achieved and what processes might be 
involved (Chapter 3). A third stage of this process was to think of further scenarios to 
see whether the proposed model could cope with them as this was considered to be a 
useful way to refine, generalize and extend the model (Appendix 6). The fifth stage 
was to describe the model using a language independent of the programming language 
used to implement the model.(Chapter 5). It was also noted in 5.1 that this 
methodology had been modified, in that the fifth stage had been employed to describe 
the model but no programming of the model had been carried out. (the fourth stage).
The way in which this research relates to this methodology is the application of the 
first three stages of this iterative process to refine, generalize, extend and modify the 
model and the ideas behind it. The selection of an initial dialogue scenario and the 
making of an hypothesis as to what the processes involved might be, formed a major 
part of the early work which, initially, seemed quite promising. Application of the
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third stage, the introduction of further dialogue scenarios to see whether the model 
could cope with them, has already been discussed in 6.1.7 and the flaws and 
difficulties that this stage identified, as well as the implications for the success of the 
model have been noted.
The following discussion identifies further areas where improvements and 
modifications could be made by the application of this iterative process of improving 
the model.
ACHIEVEGOAL is the process that can be viewed as the executive function of the 
model. It is within this process that the other functions are implemented and which 
diaw on tlie necessary beliefs and knowledge to construct llie utterances. Tlie function 
ACHIEVEGOAL uses CREATEGOALTREE to construct a GOAL-TREE after which 
it uses UTTERANCEPLAN to CONSTRUCTLF, a logical form, using the function 
COMPILECONTEXT in this process. It then displays the logical form of the utterance 
to the other agent. This process has a number of inherent weaknesses that need to be 
identified.
The function ACHIEVEGOAL takes information from the general belief set (GBS) 
and the specific belief set (SBS) of tlie agent and from lliis information constructs a 
GOAL-TREE. ACHIEVEGOAL then processes this GOAL-TREE, sub-goal by sub­
goal utilising the other functions UTTERANCEPLAN, COMPILECONTEXT and 
CONSTRUCTLF to do this. It will be evident from this description of 
ACHIEVEGOAL that the process has a great deal of work to do but the model does 
not specify how this work is to be accomplished in any detail. This executive process 
was described as being a number of operations but these were not identified and this is 
a considerable weakness.
ACHIEVEGOAL has too much work to do and too many operations to carry out 
that remain unspecified and these operations need to bo identified in greater detail. One 
way in which the model could be improved is to make ACHIEVEGOAL an executive 
process only which uses more specified processes to accomplish its task. For 
instance, ACHIEVEGOAL uses the process CREATEGOALTREE to construct a
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GOAL-TREE which it then proceeds to process but how it does this is not specified. 
Another process is required to process the GOAL-TREES of the agents under the 
control of the executive function ACHIEVEGOAL.
Another weakness is associated with the GOAL-TREES themselves, which 
becomes evident in the application of the model to less structured dialogues such as the 
management/union and teacher/student scenarios.
In the bookseller/customer scenario the sub-plans for each participant were made 
explicit and were shown to be part of the agents' goal-trees constructed prior to the 
commencement of the dialogue. These sub-plans related closely to the logical forms 
from which the individual utterances were compiled and each contributed to a 
sequence in the dialogue.
The creation of goal-trees in the management/union negotiations exposes a 
possible weakness in this process and might suggest that either the concept is flawed 
or its representation is inadequate.
Both managers and union negotiators have an overall goal they wish to achieve. 
The union's goal is to persuade management to include a particular clause, favourable 
to their members, in their new disciplinary procedure while management's goal is to 
persuade the union to accept the procedure as it stands. The formation of the goal-trees 
of the agents participating in this exchange differ considerably in structure to those of 
the bookseller and customer. In the former scenario, both sets of negotiators are 
pursuing an argument and it is the stages in their argument that form the sub-plans in 
their goal-trees. However, what follows from this is that both sides make an assertion 
at the outset of their negotiations which is followed by further assertions from both 
sides. Each contribution to the dialogue is an assertion and both sides continue to 
make these until the discussion reaches a stalemate with neither side being able to 
convince the other of their arguments. Sometimes it is even difficult to categorise some 
of these assertions either as statements or questions as they have elements of each in 
their content
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A major difficulty for the model is that the sub-plans of the management and union 
negotiators' goal-trees become a list of sub-plan assertions attached to the main goal. 
In reality, it would be difficult to specify these prior to the dialogue as they would only 
emerge and be identified as the discussion progressed. Nevertheless, using a 
constructed-data scenario it is possible to show how such a discussion might take 
place with a list of assertions as sub-plans attached to the main goal.
A difficulty remains as to how this might otherwise be dealt with and exposes the 
necessity for being able to show the dynamic nature of such a process. What it does 
seem to suggest is the complexity and numerous ways the human mind has at its 
disposal of dealing with different forms of interaction. How in one scenario a 
particular strategy might be used and in another, a different strategy and sometimes, 
differing strategies in the same scenario. The number of strategies available are likely 
to be large, flexible and highly interchangeable depending on the communicative goals 
and context
Another area where considerable improvement needs to be made is the aspect of 
feedback of information. The model implies that this takes place by utilising a host of 
servant functions which do the passing of information and messages about the system. 
However, this needs to be defined in a more specific manner.
COMPILECONTEXT which is the process used by UTTERANCEPLAN to 
obtain information about the context for use in the logical form, is able to obtain 
information from the belief set of the agent which includes beliefs both from the GBS 
and also the SBS. How it does this is again unspecified and this needs to be identified 
in greater detail.
A further problem for the model is the way in which the INTERPRET process is 
used. INTERPRET makes an analysis of the other agent's LOGFORM which has 
been displayed. It uses the COMPILECONTEXT process to do this and once the 
information from the agent's LOGFORM has been processed it calls its 
ACHIEVEGOAL function to process or continue processing its sub-goals in order to 
make further utterances. INTERPRET is a process that sits uneasily in the model and
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in many ways seems detached or even added to as though it were a necessary 
appendage. It might be possible to incorporate this process more closely under a 
reorganised executive function of ACHIEVEGOAL.
Though it is necessary and useful to discuss how the model might be extended and 
improved, this sort of discussion is somewhat limited in value while it remains a 
theoretical model at this stage of development. While the description may have some 
plausibility, it remains a theoretical description only and what is required is a 
functional and operational implementation of the model.
An obvious extension to the work would be the compiling of a computer 
implementation. This would help to identify weaknesses in the present presentation 
and allow for the testing of less structured dialogues. Furthermore, it would assist in 
refining the theory and possibly lead to changes or replacement of existing structures 
or the creation of new structures. It might then be possible to make adaptations to the 
program by simulating only one of the agents and allowing a human operator to be the 
other agent. This would help test the robustness of the program, the overall purpose 
being to examine whether the theory could be developed further or whether it should 
be abandoned.
6.8 The relation of the work to current developments in the field
In 1986, George Kiss in a very thorough survey report, High-Level Dialogue in 
Man-Machine Interaction identified a number of directions for further research which 
he saw as being important in making contributions towards implementations of high- 
level dialogue in Human-Computer Interaction, Among the strands he identified were 
three that are connected with the work presented here. They are:
1. characterisation of agents;
2. the computations underlying action, particularly the relationship to 
goals, desires and values;
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3. the effect of relationships between agents on the computations 
determining action, particularly in the sense of cooperation and conflict 
between agents.
This present work can be viewed as an exploratory and preliminary stage of some 
aspects of a theory of natural language dialogue that might be further developed in a 
computer implementation. It has been motivated by some of the broader research 
directions identified as being necessary by Kiss.
In summary, an attempt has been made to characterise some of the characteristics 
of agents in the process of natural dialogue in line with his first research direction. It is 
an attempt to explore the way in which agents might intend and plan individual 
utterances and also identify the intentions and plans of other agents in their utterances. 
Furthermore, and following Kiss's second strategy, a purpose of this work is to show 
how goals and desires of agents might be related to their beliefs and how these might 
be realised in particular utterances in pursuance of those goals and beliefs. Thirdly, it 
is a model of natural language dialogue that is viewed as taking place within a context 
of cooperation and conflict but which differs from the more usual ideas about the 
nature of these concepts presented in the literature and therefore presents an alternative 
view. Therefore, the work is within these research directions identified by Kiss and 
makes a contribution to them.
It is also within a general framework which includes areas of study relating to 
intention, planning, plan recognition and speech act theory. All these remain a current 
focus of attention and concern for researchers at tlie present time. Indeed, it is these 
subject areas that continue to provide the field with its main obstacles and problem 
areas.
In March 1990, a symposium was held in which many of the leading researchers 
in the area of communication came together to discuss, what they believed to be the 
major issue facing researchers. This was identified as being the nature of intentions in 
communication. This symposium brought together many of the authors whose work
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in the 80's has been discussed in the preceding pages. The collected papers from this 
symposium, as well as evaluations and criticisms of them, have been published under 
the title Intentions in Communication (19901.
What is significant about this collection of papers is that it serves to summarise 
much of the research done in the previous decade and to identify many of the problems 
that have emerged. At the beginning of the 90's most of the major problems remain 
and much present research continues in the major areas identified above.
In their introduction to the papers, Cohen, Morgan and Pollack make a salient 
remark in commenting on the following dialogue:
"Where are the chuck stakes you advertised for 88 cents per pound?" to 
which the butcher replies, "How many do you want?" (Cohen, Morgan 
and Pollack, 1990: 1)
Cohen et al says,
"Despite all the theorizing about language that has been done by 
linguists, philosophers, computer scientists, and psychologists over 
the past thirty years, this simple interchange is magical"
The significance of this comment is the admission, that after all the effort of the 
last thirty years, we still cannot identify how the butcher's reasoning explains the 
dialogue. Nevertheless, what the writers do identify is that central to this dialogue, as 
to every other dialogue, is the nature of intention. Cohen et al point out that there is not 
yet a complete theory of the role of intentions in communication, that is:
" one that explains how intentions contribute to linguistic (as well
as nonlinguistic) meaning, how smaller intentions combine to form
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composite ones, how in making an utterance a speaker can satisfy 
certain intentions, and so on." (Cohen, Morgan and Pollack, 1990:3)
The work presented in this thesis identifies the nature of intention as being crucial 
to the understanding and explanation of how dialogue works. This was emphasised 
again by Bratman (1990), a major contributor to the symposium, who uses the 
concept of intention to characterise both our actions and our minds. He focuses on 
what it is to have future directed intentions, that is, intending to do something rather 
than doing something intentionally and the work of Cohen and Levesque (1990) 
contributing to the same symposium, takes up this focus in relation to how persistence 
and commitment relate to future directed intention. Their work provides valuable and 
thought provoking insights to this difficult area of study. The emphasis of my work is 
more modest and can be viewed as a refinement, as its focus is on intention in action. 
Viewing speech as action and individual utterances as intentions in action, an attempt 
has been made at a finer grained study.
The planning approaches to communication that appear to continue to dominate the 
research, also relate to future directed intentions. While Pollack (1990) moves away 
from the traditional AI approaches to planning, viewing plans as complex mental 
attitudes, these still relate to the future directed intentions of agents. My treatment and 
application of a planning component is different. Consistent with viewing the 
characteristic of intention as intention in action, my model applies a planning 
component to this characteristic of intentional behaviour and utterances themselves are 
viewed as being planned intentional actions of the agent
A related and continuing area of interest is how plans of agents are recognised by 
other agents within the interaction. This has not been dealt with explicitly in this work 
as it is related generally to the future directed intentions of agents rather than the 
intention in action of agents. What this work has attempted to focus on is how agents 
might recognise and understand the intention in action of other agents by what is
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presented in the context of the interaction as well as in the content of the other agent's 
utterances.
Applications embodying or based on speech-act theory continue to proliferate as 
much current work is based on some variation of this theory. Vanderveken (1990) 
puts forward a proposal for the unification of speech-act theory and a formal 
semantics. A cause for concern in his proposal, as well as in some other discussions 
of speech-act theory is that speech-act theory appears to be accepted without 
qualification. However, a significant body of criticism has arisen over the years and 
many questions about this approach remain unanswered (cf. Levinson, 1983). The 
relevance of speech-act theory to this work is that utterances are viewed as rational 
action, that is, intentional action that is motivated by particular beliefs, goals and 
plans.
The features considered in this work relate to high level-dialogue. Kiss has 
suggested that such features might find a place in the design of any interactive 
computer system but that where systems need to maintain an explicit model of the user 
and to reason about the dialogue itself then applications will need these features of 
high level dialogue.
6.9 Epilogue
Bach (1990; 400) suggests that in the research task there is a tension between the 
guiding principles being too broad while the detailed implementations are too narrow. 
He closes his paper by saying that the dilemma for researchers is how to devise 
models that are neither too vague and uninformative nor too constrained or specific.
This work is an attempt to look at some features of dialogue from a less orthodox 
perspective but within the context created by the dilemma of these competing 
principles.
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Appendix 1 -  Agents' B elief Sets
The Bookseller's goal beliefs:
(SELL, BOOKSELLER, BOOK) & (WANT, BOOKSELLER, a, b)
& ((BUY, CUSTOMER, BOOKS) = a ) & ((HIGHVAL, BOOKS) = b)
The Bookseller's general beliefs:
(-KNOW, BOOKSELLER) & (IF a ) & ((WANTS, CUSTOMER, HELP) a) 
(-KNOW, BOOKSELLER) & (IF a, b, c, d) & ((KNOW, CUSTOMER) = a ) 
& (PAPERCOVERS, BOOKXYZ) = b ) &( HARDCOVER, BOOKXYZ) = c) 
& (VALUE£15, BOOKXYZ) = d))
(B, SELF)
(B,D 
(C, YOU)
The Customer's goal beliefs:
(HAVE, CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ) & (WANT, CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ ) 
& (IF a, b, c (BUY, CUSTOMER, BOOKXYZ)
&((HAVE, BOOKSELLER, BOOKXYZ) = a)
& ((PAPERBACK, BOOKXYZ) = b)
& ((VALUE£15, BOOKXYZ) = c )
The Customer's general beliefs:
(-KNOW, CUSTOMER) & (IF a, b, c) &
((HAVE, BOOKSELLER, BOOKXYZ) = a)
& ((PAPERCOVERS, BOOKXYZ) = b)&((VALUE£15, BOOKXYZ) = c )
(C, SELF)
(C, I)
(B, YOU)
General beliefs possessed by both agents:
(C, CUSTOMER)
(B, BOOKSELLER)
(B, SELF)
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(SELLS, BOOKSELLER, BOOKS)
(BUYS, CUSTOMER, BOOKS)
(XYZ, BOOK)
(PAPERBACK, BINDING)
(HARDCOVERS, BINDING)
(COST, VALUE)
(VALUE, COST)
(MONEY, VALUE)
(COST, BOOKS, MONEY)
(HAVE, STATE)
(SOLD, STATE)
(KNOW, STATE)
(-KNOW, STATE)
(POSSESS, STATE)
(BOOKXYZ, DEF/SING)
(BOOKXYZ’s DEF/PL)
(BOOK, INDEF/SING)
(BOOKS, INDEF/PL)
("CAN", MOD/AUXposs)
(BOTH, DET)
“0 0 0 “
2 2 9
A Model of natural language dialogue Appendix 2
Appendix 2  -  Plan-method Definitions
NAME: WANT
OBJECT: ?
FROM: ?
TO: ?
ACTION: ((POSSESS (OBJECT)(STATE))(SATISFIED (STATE)))
NAME: BUY
OBJECT: ?
FROM: ?
TO: ?
ACTION: EXCHANGE (MONEY FOR OBJECT)
NAME: HELP
OBJECT: ?
FROM: ?
TO: ?
ACTION: ((FROM = OFFER-ASSISTANCE) (TO = ACCEPT-ASSISTANCE))
NAME: EXCHANGE
OBJECT: ?
FROM: ?
TO: ?
ACTION: ((TRANSFER OF OBJECT (FROM? TO?))
(AFFIRM EXCHANGE (ASSERT)))
NAME: SELL
OBJECT: ?
FROM: 7
TO: 7
ACTION: EXCHANGE (OBJECT FOR MONEY)
NAME: PAY
OBJECT: 7
FROM: 7
TO: ?
ACTION: EXCHANGE (MONEY FOR OBJECT)
NAME: OFFER-ASSISTANCE
OBJECT: 7
FROM: 7
TO: 7
ACTION: (ASK (KNOWIF-QUESTION = Y/N QUERY 
(MOD/AUXpossib. "CAN")))
NAME: REQUEST-ASSISTANCE
OBJECT: 7
FROM: ?
TO: ?
ACTION: ((ASK (KNOWIF-QUESTION = Y/N QUERY))
(KNOWINFO-QUESTION = 
WH-QUERY)))
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NAME: ACCEPT-ASSISTANCE
OBJECT: ?
FROM: ?
TO: ?
ACTION: (ASSERT-AFFIRMATIVE (FORMULAIC "YES PLEASE”)
NAME: GET-INFORMATION
OBJECT: ?
FROM: ?
TO: ?
ACTION: ASK KNOWINFO-QUESTION
NAME: GIVE-DIRECnON
OBJECT: ?
FROM: ?
TO: ?
ACTION: COMMAND
NAME: -KNOW
OBJECT: ?
FROM: ?
TO: ?
ACTION: ((ASK (KNOWIF-QUESTION = Y/N QUERY)) 
(KNOWINFO-QUESTION = WH-QUERY)))
NAME: HAVE
OBJECT: ?
FROM: ?
TO: ?
ACTION: (POSSESS (STATE))
NAME: ASSERT
OBJECT: ?
FROM: ?
TO: ?
ACTION: (DECLARE (INFORMIF = (AFFIRMATIVE =YESJ<EGATIVE=NO)) 
(INFORMINFO = OTHER))
NAME:
OBJECT:
FROM:
TO:
ACTION:
NAME:
OBJECT:
FROM:
TO:
ACTION:
ASK
?
?
?
((QUESTION ((ASK (KNOWIF-QUESTION = Y/N QUERY)) 
(KNOWINFO- QUESTION WH-QUERY)))
Y/N QUERY 
?
?
?
((TO = ASK (KNOWIF-QUESTION))
(FROM = (REPLY (DECLARE, ASK, COMMAND)))
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NAME: WH-QUERY
OBJECT: ?
FROM: ?
TO: ?
ACTION: ((TO = ASK (KNOWINFO-QUESTION))
(FROM = (REPLY (DECLARE. ASK, COMMAND))
NAME: REPLY
OBJECT: 7
FROM: ?
TO: ?
ACTION: ^ROM = DECLARE, COMMAND, ASK)
NAME: DECLARE
OBJECT: 7
FROM: ?
TO: ?
ACTION: (DECLARE (INFORMIF =(AFFIRMATIVE =YES JÆGATIVE 
(INFORMINFO = OTHER))
NAME: COMMAND
OBJECT: ?
FROM: ?
TO: ?
ACTION: ORDER
NAME: TAKE
OBJECT: 9
FROM: ? ,
TO: 7
ACTION: TRANSFER OBJECT FROM ? TO ?
NAME: TRANSFER
OBJECT: ?
FROM: 7
TO: ?
ACTION: OBJECT MOVES FROM ? TO ?
“OOo"
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Appendix 3 -  CONTEXTFRAME Definitions
CASE-NAME; AGENT
IDENTITY-FBLLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ((SELF = (PRO PERSON "I")) (OTHER =
(PRO PERSON "YOU", "HE", "SHE", "IT" 
"THEY","THEM") ANIMATE)) 
ACTION/STATE: ((INTERPRET ("I" = "YOU")
("YOU" = "I")("HE","SHE", "IT" = ?) 
("THEY", "THEM" = ?)))
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: CO-AGENT
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ((SELF = (PRO PERSON "I")) (OTHER =
"THEY", "THEM") (ANIMATE)) 
ACTION/STATE: ((INTERPRET ("I" = "YOU")
("YOU" = "D("HE","SHE". "IT" = ?) 
("THEY", "THEM" = ?)))
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: INSTRUMENT
IDENTITY-FILLERS: ?X?
RESTRICTIONS: (INANIMATE, ANIMATE)
ACTION/STATE: NIL
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: THEME
IDENTITY FILLERS: ?X?
RESTRICTIONS: (SUBGOAL-ELEMENT, BELIEF-ELEMENT)
ACTION/STATE: NIL
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: CO-THEME
IDENTITY-FILLERS: ?X?
RESTRICTIONS: (SUBGOAL-ELEMENT, BELIEF-ELEMENT)
ACTION/STATE: NIL
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: EXPERIENCER
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER
RESTRICTIONS: ((SELF = (PRO PERSON "I")) (OTHER =
(PRO PERSON "YOU", "HE", "SHE", "IT" 
"THEY", "THEM") (ANIMATE)) 
ACTION/STATE: ((INTERPRET ("I" ^ "YOU")("YOU" = "I")
("HE","SHE", "IT" = ?)("THEY",
"THEM" = ?)))
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
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CASE-NAME:
IDENTITY-FILLERS:
RESTRICTIONS:
ACTION/STATE:
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS:
BENEFICIARY 
SELF, OTHER
((SELF = (PRO PERSON "I")) (OTHER = 
(PRO PERSON "YOU", "HE", "SHE", "IT" 
"THEY", "THEM") (ANIMATE)) 
((INTERPRET ("I" = "YOU")
("YOU" = "I")("HE","SHE", "IT" = ?) 
("THEY", "THEM" = ?)))
NIL
CASE-NAME: AT-LOCATION
IDENTITY-FILLERS: SELF, OTHER, OBJECT
RESTRICTIONS: (PLACE, ANIMATE, INANIMATE)
ACTION/STATE: ((?X? WITH ?Y?) (?X? WIIH ?Z?))
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS: NIL
CASE-NAME: 
IDENTITY-FILLERS: 
RESTRICTIONS: 
ACTION/STATE: 
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS:
TO-LOCATION 
SELF, OTHER, OBJECT 
(PLACE, ANIMATE, INANIMATE) 
(TO?X?)
NIL
CASE-NAME: 
IDENTITY-FILLERS: 
RESTRICTIONS: 
ACTION/STATE: 
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS:
FROM-LOCATION 
SELF, OTHER
(PLACE, ANIMATE, INANIMATE) 
(FROM ?Y?)
NIL
CASE-NAME: 
IDENTITY-FILLERS: 
RESTRICTIONS: 
ACTION/STATE: 
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS:
AT-POSSESSION 
SELF, OTHER 
(ANIMATE)
(w rra ? x ? )
NIL
CASE-NAME: 
IDENTITY-FILLERS: 
RESTRICTIONS: 
ACTION/STATE: 
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS:
TO-POSSESSION 
SELF, OTHER 
(ANIMATE)
(TO ?X?)
NIL
CASE-NAME: 
IDENTITY-FILLERS: 
RESTRICTIONS: 
ACTION/STATE: 
SUBSIDIARY FUNCTIONS:
FROM-POSSESSION 
SELF, OTHER 
(ANIMATE)
(FROM ?X?)
NIL
-oOo-
2 3 4
A Model of natural language dialogue Appendix 4
Appendix 4  -  Definitions o f cases used in the model
£ASE
AGENT
CO-AGENT
INSTRUMENT
THEME
CO-THEME
EXPERIENCER
BENEFICIARY
AT-LOCATION
TO-LOCATION
FROM-LOCATION
AT-POSSESSION
TO-POSSESSION
FROM-POSSESSION
m u m j x Q u
• the agent that caused the event to 
happen....intentional causation.
• a secondary agent in a dialogue...the one 
addressed.
• force or tool used in causing the event.
• the thing that the utterance is about
• a secondary theme in an exchange.
• the person who is doing the perceiving or 
is in a psychological state.
• the person for whom some act is done.
• the state/value on some dimension where the 
event occurred....location.
• final value in a state change...destination or 
final location.
• original value in a state change...original 
location or source.
• the state/value on some dimension where the 
event occurred location.
• final possessor or recipient.
• original possessor.
Some of these case definitions are borrowed from AUen (1987: 203) and are used as 
he defines them whüe others have been adapted to suit the purposes required by the 
model proposed in this research.
-oOo-
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Appendix 5  -  Scripts
Schank & Abelson (1977) view understanding as the fitting of new information 
into a previously organized view of the world, A great deal of work both with sentence 
comprehension and the understanding of prose within different contexts suggests that 
single words can set up expectations about what is likely to be encountered in the 
remainder of the sentence or the rest of the passage (cf. Halliday & Hasan, 1976). 
Single sentences or utterances can set up expectations about what is to follow in the 
rest of the story or conversation.
Schank & Abelson (ibid.) suggest that these expectations characterize world 
knowledge which bears on any given situation. For them, a 'script' encapsulates this 
world knowledge and is a structure that describes an appropriate sequence of events 
within particular contexts. It is a structure which is composed of slots and specific 
requirements about what can fill these slots. The whole is interconnected and what fills 
one slot con affect the contents of other slots. Scripts are a way of dealing with stylized 
everyday situations which arc subject to little change,
Schank & Abelson view scripts as predetermined, stereotyped sequences of 
actions defining well known situations. There are scripts for eating in restaurants, for 
birthday parties, cricket matches, classrooms and boardroom meetings, in fact they are 
extremely numerous, and each script has its players who assume different roles in the 
action. A script is adopted from the viewpoint of each participant and changes from 
differing viewpoints. They have a role in the understanding of natural language 
(Lehnert, 1979).
Schank has suggested that paragraphs within a text can be represented in 
memory by causal chaining (Schank & Abelson, 1977: 423).
This theory implies that for a passage of text or a story to be understood, 
inferences must be drawn to connect each conceptualisation to all the others in the 
story that relate to it. This connection process is also said to be operative in the use of 
scripts, and in fact facilitates the processing of a script. Each act in the script is
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connected by this causal chaining process in that each step of the action in the sequence 
results in conditions becoming operative for the next step to occur. Prior steps in the 
script must be completed satisfactorily for the latter ones to be enacted. If not, the 
hitches and discrepancies which may occur, have to be dealt with, perhaps requiring a 
new action being generated to get things moving again but not prescribed by the script.
The general format for a script is not a list of events but a set of paths linked at 
certain crucial points linked by a causal chain. Certain sets of circumstance define 
when a specific script is appropriate or necessary to be called into play. In the example 
in this Appendix, a sketch of a script for a restaurant from the customer's point of 
view is shown. In this script actions are specified in terms of the primitive ACTS of 
conceptual dependency theory (Schank, 1972). Schank proposed a theory of 
semantics in which the meanings of words are represented by semantic primitives. 
They include the following items: PTRANS - the transfer of the physical location of an 
object, ATRANS - the transfer of an abstract relation such as possession, MTRANS - 
the transfer of mental information, MOVE - movement of a body part, PROPEL - 
application of a physical force to an object, and MBUILD - the construction of new 
informaliun.
script: restaurant
roles: customer, waitress, chef, cashier
reason: to get food so as to go up in pleasure and down in hunger
scene 1: entering
PTRANS self into restaurant 
ATTEND eyes to where empty tables are 
MBUILD where to sit 
PTRANS self to table 
MOVE to sit down
scene 2: ordering
ATRANS receive menu 
MTRANS read menu
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MBUILD decide what self wants 
MTRANS order to waitress
scene 3: eating
ATRANS receive food 
INGEST food
scene 4: exiting
MTRANS ask for cheque 
ATRANS receive cheque 
ATRANS tip to waitress 
PTRANS self to cashier 
ATRANS money to cashier 
PTRANS self out of restaurant
A Sketch of a script for a restaurant from the customer's point of view. (Taken from 
Scripts, Plans, and Knowledge by Roger C. Schank and Robert P. Abelson - reading 
26 in Thinking: Readings in Cognitive Science, edited by P. N. Johnson-Laird and P.
C. Wason; C.U.P. 1977).
oOo-
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Appendix 6  -  Applications o f model to further scenarios 
6a Negotiations between management and union representatives
In this scenario management are wanting to introduce a new disciplinary procedure 
replacing practices which have previously been dealt with by custom and practice. The 
new procedure does away with an external appeals procedure and keeps any final 
appeal on any matter of discipline within the organisation which becomes the 
responsibility of the employers. The union side wish to retain the freedom to make a 
final appeal to an outside body made up of national employers and union 
representatives which in their view would be fairer and a more favourable option for 
their members. The external appeals would be made to a body called the Joint 
Negotiating Committee whereas the body in house to which appeals would be heard is 
called The Committee. The following is a constructed-data dialogue between the chief 
negotiators of both sides on this issue.
Union Neg.
Man. Neg.
Union Neg.
Man. Neg.
Our members have always known that they can make 
an appeal to the JNC as a last resort.
Your members are not losing anything. They will be 
able to make an appeal to The Committee.
This is not good enough. The Committee are not likely 
to disagree with Management are they? Our members 
will not believe they are getting a fair hearing.
No that's not the case. The Committee are
very experienced in these matters. They understand
the issues and wUl be able to deal with
them appropriately. You can reassure your members
that they are competent to deal with appeals and they
will get a fair hearing.
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Man. Neg. Anyhow, we don't really see your problem. You have
never ever taken an appeal to the JNC have you? So 
what difference does this change really make?
Union Neg. Its a change in members conditions of service. They
don't like this change and believe they will lose out 
They believe they will get a fairer hearing before the 
JNC than they wiU before their own Employers.
The Union goals in this scenario
To obtain a clause in the new management disciplinary procedure to allow 
members to make an appeal to an external body such as the JNC or to ACAS. To get 
Management to change their mind and to incorporate this in their procedure.
The Management goals in this scenario
Get the Union to agree that appeals are no longer made to an external body but to 
the Committee, the Employing body and persuade them to accept this new disciplinary 
procedure.
The goal-tree of the union negotiator
(GOAL (MAKE, MEMBERS, APPEALS) &
(APPEALS, MEMBERS, JNC))
(ASSERT (MAKE, MEMBERS, APPEALS) &
(APPEALS, MEMBERS, JNC) &
(UNACCEPTABLE))
(ASSERT (-DISAGREE, COMMITTEE, MANAGEMENT) &
(-GET, MEMBERS, (HEARING, FAIR)))
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(ASSERT (-WANT, MEMBERS, CHANGE) &
(BELIEVE, MEMBERS, a, b,)
((LOSE, MEMBERS, PRESENTCONDmON.) = a)
((-GET, MEMBERS (HEARING, FAIR)) = b))
(ASSERT (BELIEVE, MEMBERS, a, b,)
((GOOD, PRESENTCONDmON.) = a)
((BAD, NEWCONDmON) =b))
The goal-tree of the management negotiator
(GOAL (AGREE, UNION, NEWCONDmON) &
(ACCEPT, UNION, CHANGE))
(ASSERT (-LOSE, UNIONMEMBERS, ANYTHING) &
(MAKE, UNIONMEMBERS, APPEALS) &
(APPEALS, UNIONMEMBERS, COMMITTEE))
(ASSERT (-TRUE (-DISAGREE, COMMITTEE, MANAGEMENT) &
(-GET, MEMBERS, (HEARING, FAIR))
(COMMITTEE, EXPERIENCED, (APPEAL, HEARINGS)) & 
(COMMITTEE, COMPETENT, (APPEAL, HEARINGS)) & 
(REASSURE, UNIONMEMBERS, a,b,c)
((COMPETENT, COMMITTEE, (APPEAL, HEARINGS)) = a)
((GET, UNIONMEMBERS, (HEARING, FAIR)) = b)) .
(ASSERT (-UNDERSTAND, MANAGEMENT ) &
(-WANT, UNIONMEMBERS, CHANGE)
(-TAKEN, UNION (APPEAL, UNIONMEMBERS, JNC)))
241
A Model of natural language dialogue Appendix 6
(QUESTION (-KNOW (DIFFERENCE, NEWCONDUION, 
PRESENTCONDmON))
6b The communicative interaction between a teacher and two pupils.
In this scenario I have departed from using a constructed-data dialogue and have 
selected a dialogue from the literature attributing goals and objectives to the 
participants. This has served two purposes. An attempt to apply the principles of the 
model to an aspect of conversational analysis and to see how far the model might relate 
to this type of interaction. The dialogue is taken from "Discourse Analysis" by Michael 
Stubbs (1983: pp.54-5). The transcript of the tape-recording of the dialogue is on the 
left and on the right are reproduced the metacommunication functions Stubbs ascribes 
to this dialogue.
The dialogue between a teacher and two pupils
Transcript of tape-recording Metacommunication functions
Teacher: right,
as I was saying - - 
the subject of the discussion 
is capital punishment - 
now -
you don't understand what 
this means
capital punishment - is when
Attracts pupils' attention 
Attracts pupils attention
Specifies topic of discussion 
Attracts pupils attention
Checks pupils' 
understanding
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Pupil 1: 
Teacher: 
Pupil 1: 
Teacher:
Pupil 1: 
Teacher: 
Pupil 1: 
Teacher:
Pupil 2: 
Teacher:
Pupil 2: 
Teacher:
- a murderer 
do you know what a 
murderer is - 
a murderer
yes
if a man kills another man 
ah yes yes 
he is a murderer - 
then - when - a murderer is 
arrested - and he has a 
trial - then what happens to 
him afterwards - 
what happens after that
he has a punishment 
yes he is punished 
punished 
now -
what punishment do you 
think he should get? 
prison 
prison
Defines term
(makes stiangling gesture) 
can you tell what - explain
Repeats to check 
understanding
Defines a word
Reformulates to check 
understanding
Corrects pupil’s language
Attracts pupils' attention
Checks his 
own understanding 
or shows attention
Explicitly controls amount 
of speech
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Pupil 2: they put a rot
Teacher: a rope
Pupil 2: a rope - around his neck
Teacher: yes
Pupil 2: and hang him
Teacher: and hang him
so ah we've got two 
different ideas here
Corrects pupil's language
Shows attention
Repeats to check his own 
understanding or show 
attention
Summarizes
The teacher's goal
The goal ascribed to the teacher in this scenario is to introduce and to discuss the 
concept capital punishment
The pupils goal
This dialogue presents the model with an apparent problem immediately as it is 
difficult to ascribe any goals to the pupils prior to the commencement of the dialogue. 
The pupils are likely to be in a lesson that they have to attend and could be viewed as 
passive participants to the interaction. It is one of those dialogues that reveals the 
nature of the power relationships that can exist between participants to an interaction 
and the status and obligations these relationships might represent However, that the 
pupils in this action are only passive participants is not necessarily the case.
Though it may not be possible to identify any communicative goals for them to 
pursue prior to the commencement of this interaction these can be seen to emerge in 
response to the teacher's demands on their thought and attention. The pupils are 
required to respond and they do so in a thoughtful and intelligent manner according to 
their beliefs and what knowledge they have available to them. Though the pupüs are
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active in the dialogue it is not one that has been initiated by them but they co-operate 
and engage with the teacher which can be interpreted as intentional and therefore goal- 
motivated behaviour. The general goal of the pupils then, can be interpreted as co­
operating with the teachers questions and answers. Their 'conversational goals' are 
formed and made in response to the teachers questions.
Stubbs suggests that this dialogue is revealing for the reason that it shows clearly 
some of the strategies which a teacher employs to keep in touch with pupils. The 
ascribing of these strategies or metacommunicative functions to the teacher, though 
they may be highly accurate, are nevertheless made by subjective assessments or 
judgements. Stubbs describes these strategies as attracting attention, specifying topic, 
checking understanding, and defining terms. In terms of my model these strategies 
would be carried out as ASSERT or QUESTION type utterances.
"0 0 0 “
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Appendix 7.- The Turn-taking Model o f Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson
It has been noted that turn taking is used for many human activities other than 
conversation (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1973). Turn taking is used for the 
ordering of moves in games, for allocating political office, for regulating traffic at 
intersections and so on. It is evident that it is a prominent characteristic of social 
organization and Sacks et al., suggest:
"For socially organized activities, the presence of turns suggests an 
economy, with turns for something being valued, and with means for 
allocating them affecting their relative distribution, as they do in 
economies" (ibid., 1973: 696)
What concerns us here is the distribution of turns at talk and the way in which 
speakers regulate and coordinate them. The data of conversation analysis make 
increasingly plain the fact that turn-taking must be organized. Normally, one party 
speaks at a time though the speakers vary and so to does the size of the turn. The 
ordering of turns between the speakers also varies and transitions seem finely 
coordinated. It becomes evident that there are techniques for allocating turns and also 
for the construction of utterances.
Sacks et al., describe a system for turn-taking for conversation in terms of two 
components and a set of rules.
Component 1 - Turn-Constructional Component 
There are various unit-types with which a speaker may set out to 
construct a turn. Unit-types for English include sentential, clausal, 
phrasal, and lexical constructions. Instances of the unit-types so usable 
allow a projection of the unit-type under way, and what, roughly, it 
will take for an instance of that unit-type to be completed. Unit-types 
that lack the feature of projectability may not be usable in the same 
way.
For the unit-types a speaker employs in starting the construction of a 
turn's talk, the speaker is initially entitled, in having a "turn", to one 
such unit. The first possible completion of a first such unit constitutes 
an initial transition-relevance place. Transfer of speakership is 
coordinated by reference to such transition-relevance places, which any 
unit-type instance will reach.
Component 2 - Turn- Allocational Component
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Tum-allocational techniques are distributed into two groups: (a) those 
in which next turn is allocated by current speaker selecting a next 
speaker; and (b) those in which a next turn is allocated by self 
selection.
The following are the set of basic rules governing tum-constniction, 
providing for the allocation of a next turn to one party, and 
coordinating transfer so as to minimize gap and overlap. For any turn:
1. At initial turn-constructional unit's initial transition-relevance 
place,
(a) If the tum-so-far is so constructed as to involve the use of a 
"current speaker selects next" technique, then the party so selected has 
rights and is obliged to take next turn to speak, and no others have 
such rights or obligations, transfer occurring at that place.
(b) If the tum-so-far is so constructed as not to involve the use of a 
"current speaker selects next" technique, self-selection for next 
speakership may, but need not, be instituted, with first starter acquiring 
rights to a turn, transfer occurring at that place.
(c) If the tum-so-far is so constmcted as not to involve the use of a 
"current speaker selects next" technique, then current speaker may, but 
need not, continue, unless another self-selects.
2. If, at initial tum-constructional unit's initial transition-relevance 
place, neither 1(a) nor 1(b) has operated, and, following the provision 
of 1(c), current speaker has continued, then the Rule-set (a) - (c) 
reapplies at next transition-relevance place, and recursively at each next 
transition-relevance place, until transfer is effected (Sacks et al., 1973:
702-3; 1978: 12-13).
The mlcs of Sacks ct al's model (hereafter Sack's model) are so ordered that they 
constrain each of the options provided by the mles. Lower priority options constrain 
the use of higher priority options. The options of each of the mles are constrained by 
the options of other mles in the set regardless of whether those options are employed. 
Thus the operation of the option rule la  is constrained by the presence in the set of mle 
lb  and so on. The mles provide an ordering for the application of the two tum- 
allocational components thus making it compatible with the requirement of 'one 
speaker at a time'. Without the inclusion of both components being ordered in this
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way there would be the potential for violation and of more than one party being 
selected at any given point
-oOo-
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Appendix 8  -  The conversation between Mary and John from  Power's
.V  iuO^^model Jr* n  O q o r u i f : !
*: ?! ,T JfJ 1  a&v/ '•
What follows is an example of the dialogue that Powers .program produces. In
this example, the preliminary situation was defined as follows. JOHN,OUT, MARY
IN, BOLT UP, DOOR SHUT. John is able to see all,the objects.but-Maryds blind and
van not see any of them. John can move, slide the bolt but cannot pushithe rioor. Mary
can perform all three actions. John believes that, 1) if you moye,mot^g^happens; 2)
if you push the door, it changes position; and 3) if you;^sUde the^W tr nothing
happens. Mary believes that, 1).if,you,move when.the door is open,.yourchange
^  r r i v - u e  J v / H  v i c f ï  I ' L L ' \ ^ u  . JTdïiL .^<1 u i  ®
position; 2) if you push the door, it changes position; 3) i^ ]g ^ l id e ,^ ^ o l^  nothing 
happens. John has been given the goal to get himself, in whereas Mary,has no goal.o  o  o  ,a v v y iv i  U'^»ï r u w  :<>v
The adapted example is reproduced from Power's (197.4: 30-31)ifStudy and 
includes his annotated notes. It is only the first part of the conv^atio^^^f^ ^
1 JOHN: MARY. Qt^jT.aMOEUOY 38A  ! YA.M
2 MARY: YES. .OA3Î1/ DO :'/WOl£S:
3 JOHN: I WANT TO SUGGEST, ^ 0 % ^  p,
4 MARY: GO AHEAD. W FOt
6 MARY: BY ALL MEANS. 3VOM UOY
*The robots have now agreed to cooperate to achieye^T A »
V",5I\ÎÏ ,C A  j l  n i l : ?  i f c j  r ï (L it  m  i > J l u . O t  I S J I A  ^
♦John's goal. Mary has learned John's goal, and _  . *wOfW m s i/^ n rm& ?40i oi? t / v v u  ot bard
♦John has learned that she is willing to help.. If Mary,_^^,HBD îuifîl 'LvHV be; iiA b cm ijiilcnv/
♦had been given a goal different from John's she would ^  ,:#id jUCdfi o; Cün c^ nz .onuo z: yx’rj .cvum
haverefused^ohdp avM6v:tnic^qcri3JA luol "
7 JOHN: S H M . L \ ^ ^ A P L ^ ^ ^ ^
8 MARY. ^  r.'n<îf»ï- iPth .frifc zi toob cdJ ^
0  T O H N -  Y F ^
rnol b«i> :ilc2nui bnc "tOcJj f io  ndrit *
1 0 M A R Y : , ] ^ Y I ^ ^  '
11 JOHN: GO A H E^.^^ , aril to *
12 MARY: ARE YOU IN.
13 JOHN: NO.
• c0<i>“
♦ Mary interrupted because she did not know whether the
♦ goal was already achieved (she is blind, remember);
♦ had she been cleverer, she would have inferred John's
♦ position from 5. Before selecting a plan to achieve
♦ a goal, a robot always checks that the goal is not yet 
- ' ♦ attained and that a plan is thus needed. The
